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도덕적 프락시스(Praxis)에 있어 덕과 서사의 위상에 관한 연구
자유주의적 개인주의, 관료제적 자본주의, 가치다원주의를 중심으로 현대의 도덕적 상황은 가치 갈등 및 행위의 선택을 어렵게 만든다. 이러한 문제상황을 타개하기 위해 본 논문에서는 목적론적 윤리학이 주장하는 덕 중심의 공동체적 체계와 이를 더 잘 이해하고 실행할 수 있는 방법론으로서의 서사를 중심으로 대안을 모색하였다. Today's circumstance of ethics is composed of the liberal individualism, bureaucratic capitalism, and value pluralism. This circumstances present us that our conflicts of value lies between the intention of isolated individual and totality of social structures. Therefore our self can't keep consistency between in the aspects of the individuality and in that of society, and we adept roughly our selves to circumstance. This phenomenon acquire fitness in the name of value pluralism. The moral Philosopher, Alasdair Macintyre named this modern self as ' Emotivist self'. This self does not have any relation, cannot be able to know the limit of value judgment, and consider everything as means for it's profit. For this reason, we are always feel anxiety and lonely. In this dissertation, I judged circumstances of ethics in these days as the situation that requires moral reflection, and as an alternative plan, I try to suggest the Virtue Ethics of communitarianism. The background of Emotivist self is the modern ethics that consider the rational reasoning as basic. As compared to Emotivist self, Virtue ethics pursue self that has virtuous character. This virtuous character aimed at right judgment on moral situation and proper behavior, because Emotivist self cannot ensure moral behavior, concentrating on the reasoning of moral judgment. The circumstance of ethics of these days are the results of historic process, starting from foundationalism and emotivism of the modern. Macintyre says that the accordance of the circumstance of modern ethics is based on the modern moral philosophy which considers free and independent rational individual as a starting point of morality and which is started from abolishment of the system of teleology, based on the Telos of life. 'The Enlightenment project', tried to justify morality with rationality, did not consider virtuous character as moral person. It tried to establish moral system only from one of reason and sensibility. Therefore, Be and Ought, Fact and Value are separated and morality is remained as a selective issue. The standard ethical peoples in ancient Greek ethics is the people who has virtuous character. This virtuous ethical system is the ethics of Aristotle. Aristotle insist that it is possible to produce judgment and behavior which are consistant in morally and most proper in certain situation when the life of a person pursues the same purpose of other people(Telos, the final purpose) and the person make harmony between his or her emotion and reason. If a person joins the system of social custom, and recognizes general narrative community of life, and develops community virtue in moral traditional environment, the person can live a virtuous life that aimed at final purpose of life as weaving narrative of life continuously. And these conversion of paradigm is the only one that can change modern moral circumstances. Dased on the ethics of Aristotle, Macintyre suggested virtue ethics which are adaptable to the circumstance of modern ethics. The possibility to know the life is the system of purpose and to nurture virtuous person is narrative. Conflict phenomenon of a variety of life, revealed in narrative structure, make it possible to realize what is life and to realize what is the meaning of acting as ethically, and finally to provide the possibility for all the member of community to overcome conflict and to live a harmonious life with others. We could obtain virtuous character, having phronesis, through the processes. We can understand other person as well as ourselves more when we talk and understand in language through intermediate. Therefore, the community can accomplish the final purpose, or happiness when it exhibit excellence in the process of making communication and composing narrative, a Poiesis and the display of behavior in that life, a moral Praxis.
Moral education in Korea has mainly been carried out by a subject of moral or ethical education at school. In spite of its limitations in practice, it has been successful in cognitive area. However, it also has produced many problems in teaching and learning the subject of moral education. For example, to many students, learning is the one thing and practice is another. A student who has high capacity in studying morality often makes wrong doing in the everyday life. We teachers should have some responsibilities for this matter. Every body ought to take over the current situations of moral corruption. First of all, we should change the environments of educationa condition in the classes. We suggest some renovations in moral education. In this context, I consider some essential methodological problems in moral education, namely, narrative approach in moral education in this paper. It is necessary fo us to transform the passive students in to active ones in moral subject, because they don't feel any identification in moral behaviors of moral heros in moral text at school. I suggest new methodological approach in moral education. It is the narrative approach in moral education. I could justify my point with easy, because the traditional methodology, namely the propositional approach which has been oriented only to cognitive contents. Narrative approach could be supported by new paradigm of thought, namely post-modernism as the spirit of the times, and new paradigm of ethics of virtue etc. I made it clear what narrative ethics is by dividing it into three subcategories; narrative as a basis, narrative as a complement, and post-modern narrative. I have proposed a narrative approach of moral education based on those propositions above with the respect of 'contents method', 'process method', and 'reflection method'. Generally speaking, the 'contents method' reflects a conservative orientation to moral education. The 'process method' emphasis not on moral contents but on the process an individual uses to develop a moral position. Process theorists' stories are more student-centered. The stories emphasized in the process approach are those told by the students about themselves as well as those told by the teacher. The third approach is called 'reflection approach.' These theorists focus on the creation of meaning in moral action and call into question standard moral practices. Reflection theorists challenge traditional forms of moral stories and storytelling and tell new stories that aim to transform society into something more moral. Each of the method to moral education in narrative approach has an important function and role in a solution to the problem at hand. Each method is necessary, but not sufficient, for a producing desirable moral education program. So the approaches need to be combined in such a way that their merits can complement each other. Through applying these methods to the situation and the level of each learner, I expect, every students could realize the maxim of "doing what you have learned to do."
환자의 자율성에 관한 연구 : Beauchamp과 Childress의 관점에 대한 비판적 검토
The purpose of this dissertation is to elucidate the autonomy of patient on biomedical ethics. In this dissertation I critically analyze the concepts of competence and voluntariness mentioned Beauchamp & Childress (Hereafter I will abbreviate to B & C) as threshold elements of autonomy, to elongate patient's freedom, eventually human dignity, by examining how different from liberal autonomy, how B & C was questioned and answer to feminism or communitarianism. While B&C criticize the liberal autonomy, they inducted the term "normal choosers", means. no ideal theory is acceptable if it is beyond the reach of normal patients. So, B & C suggest competence and voluntariness as the preconditions or threshold elements of autonomous choice. Even if the levels and range of patient's competence varies, his autonomy depends on threshold levels of it. Therefore, if the patient satisfies threshold levels of competence, then he is considerd as he is fully competent in decision making even if he is under the influence or control of other people. But in recent years some criticisms raised to B & C. According to them, normal choosers could not accept two preconditions of autonomous choice, even though B & C try to give nonideal moral requirements of autonomy. And B & C misunderstood the nature of normal choosers, so the concepts of competence and voluntariness considered by B&C as rational cognitive ability and rigid independence from other individuals influence is inadequate to judging patient's autonomy. Their main critics could be summarized as follows. First, The nature and standard of competence relies on rational patients who calculate social goods from a list of them and freely choose among them. B & C argue that the standard of patient's competence is determined as rational cognitive abilities, and the adequate relation to physician and patient is contractual. Second, the nature of voluntariness requires that patient should have rigid independence from other individuals. B & C confuse autonomy with independence regards dependency as moral inadequacy. Therefore B & C's autonomy conception is not practical relevance in medical practice. Unfortunately, I could not accept above criticism. B & C stress the request due to an autonomous agent rather than an ideal image of a fully autonomous self. Since B & C do not deny the communal life and human relationships provide the matrix for the development of the self, B & C's autonomy is not stark, individualistic conceptions of autonomy that is the target of criticisms. Also, B & C's autonomy considered the vulnerable nature of patient. But it is true that I think, B & C do not consider the dependent nature which is represented in patient's choice. The choice of healthy person is apt to make a decision voluntarily, but the choice of patient is different. Therefore, the recommendation or persuasion of physicians could make a compulsory influence on patients determination. Even though, B&C deserve critics the lack of understanding of incapacity and dependency of patient, they are still continually trying to find out the new criteria on competence and voluntariness in concrete situation to overcome their limits. So it is not reasonable to deny B&C, but give them hands to remove their problems one by one. Our goal is to raise up the flags that is adequate for assessing autonomy for patients as extending decision-making capacity, and human dignity in medical ethics contexts. 본 논문은 의료윤리 분야에서 최근 논의의 중심이 되고 있는 환자의 자율성 문제를 다루었다. 필자는 환자의 자율성에 관한 논의들 중 Beauchamp과 Childress(이하 B & C로 약함)의 자율성 개념을 중심으로 살펴보았다. B & C가 종래의 자유주의 자율성 논의와 어떻게 다른지, B & C에 대해 어떻게 비판하고 있는지, 그리고 B & C가 그들의 비판에 대해 어떤 답변을 제시하고 있는지를 살펴봄으로써 B & C의 자율성 개념을 비판적으로 검토하였다. 종래의 자유주의 자율성에 대한 비판을 통해, B & C는 환자의 선택이 자율적인지를 판단할 수 있는 기준은 ‘보통의 선택 자들(normal choosers)'이 수용할 수 있는 수준이어야 한다고 주장한다. B & C 는 자율적 선택을 판단하기 위한 조건들로 의사결정능력(competence)과 자발성(voluntariness)을 제시한다. 의사결정능력과 자발성은 자율적 선택의 선결 요건이며, 문지방 요소(threshold elements)이고, 의사가 환자로부터 동의를 구하는 과정에서 자율적 선택을 판단하기 위한 필요조건이다. 그러나 B & C의 의사결정능력과 자발성에 관한 논의는 환자의 선택의 성격이 어떠한지를 고려하지 못함으로써 환자의 자율성을 판단하기에 적합하지 않다는 비판을 받는다. 비판적인 논의에 의하면 B & C의 자율적 선택의 두 가지 조건 모두 보통의 선택 자들이 수용하기에 이상적인 기준을 제시하고 있다는 것이다. B & C 역시 종래의 자유주의 자율성 논의와 같이 보통의 선택 자들의 성격을 고려하지 못했다는 것이다. B & C의 논의는 환자의 의사결정능력을 합리적인 인식능력에 국한하여 이해함으로써 의사와 환자의 관계를 계약의 관계로 축소하고, 자율성의 가치를 절대적인 가치로 만들었다는 것이다. 그리고 B & C의 자발성의 성격은 환자에게 타인의 영향으로부터 독립적이어야 한다는 것을 요구하는데, 이는 의존을 자율성의 반대 개념으로 이해하는 결과를 가져왔다. 이로써 비판적인 논의들은 B & C가 환자의 취약성과 의존성을 고려하지 못함으로써 협소한 자율성의 조건을 제시하였다고 비판한다. 이에 대한 필자의 생각은, 이상의 B & C에 대한 비판이 적절하지 않다고 본다. B & C는 환자의 자율성을 행위자 개인의 능력에 국한하여 이상적인 논의를 전개한 것이 아니다. B & C는 자율적인 선택의 조건으로서 합리적인 인식능력 이상의 능력을 요구한 것이 아니라 능력 판단 기준의 최소한의 기준을 제시하였다. 또한 환자의 불안이나 공포 혹은 심리적 위축과 같은 요인이 의사결정능력에 어떤 영향을 미치는지를 능력의 판단 기준을 설정할 때 염두에 두었다. 이는 B & C가 환자의 취약성을 고려했음을 의미한다. 그러나 B & C가 환자의 의존적인 특성을 덜 고려한 것은 사실이다. 환자는 다른 자들에 비해 선택의 과정에서 의존적인 성격을 더 강하게 나타낼 수밖에 없다. 이러한 맥락에서 B & C의 자율성의 기준이 합리적이고 독립적인 자아의 성격을 중심으로 제시되었기 때문에 환자의 의존적인 성격을 충분히 고려하지 못했고 따라서 환자의 자발성을 판단하기 적절하지 않다는 비판은 틀리지 않다. B & C가 환자의 취약성과 의존성을 충분히 고려하지 못했다는 비판을 받고 있지만, 필자는 B & C의 논의가 그들에 대한 비판 논의를 수용할 수 있다고 본다. B & C는 환자의 능력과 자발성의 성격이 어떠한지를 구체적인 상황 속에서 판단하고자 했고 이를 환자의 능력과 자발성을 판단하는 기준 속에 반영하고자 했기 때문이다. 따라서 환자의 자율성을 판단하는 적절한 기준을 세우기 위해서는, B & C의 자율성 논의와 B & C를 비판하는 주장들이 적절히 융합되어야 한다고 본다. 이는 어떤 자율성 논의가 환자의 자율성을 판단하기에 적합한 논의인지를 밝히는 것이 아니라 환자의 자율성을 적절하게 판단할 수 있는 조건을 제시하기 위해 자율성 논의들이 어떻게 융합되어야 하는지에 관한 논의를 필요로 할 것이다.
불교사상에 근거한 정보통신윤리 구성과 실천에 관한 연구
본 연구는 현대 정보화 사회가 초래하고 있는 역기능을 해소하기 위해 불교윤리적 관점에서 정보화의 윤리적 문제를 해결을 연구의 목적으로 하였다. 연구의 목적을 달성하기 위하여 먼저 정보사회의 의미와 윤리적 문제와 관련한 내용을 고찰하였다. 정보사회에서 발생하는 윤리적 문제를 해결하기 위한 윤리적 방안이 필요함을 알았다. 그 방법에는 기존의 윤리를 그대로 활용하는 방안이 있다. 대표적으로 의무론과 목적론인데, 구체적으로 칸트의 윤리학과 공리주의 윤리학을 중심으로 고찰하였다. 그러나 현대의 새로운 윤리적 문제들을 해결하기에는 여전히 문제가 있다고 인식되고 있다. 기존의 윤리학설에서 필요한 장점만 추출하여 기존의 윤리학설을 활용하여 새로운 윤리체계를 정립하여 활용하고 있는 중이다. 응용윤리 방법론은 원리주의를 포함하는 연역주의와 사례를 중심으로 탐구하는 귀납주의가 있다. 연역주의는 이미 제정된 원리로써 도덕적 판단을 내리기 위한 방법이다. 그러나 원리주의가 만들어지는 과정이나 원리를 정당화하는 방법을 고찰해 보면 그냥 만들어지는 것이 아니고 귀납적 방법이나 기존의 윤리학설에서 그 원리를 채택함으로서 제정되는 것이다. 응용윤리의 방법론에서 귀납적 방법은 사회적 맥락을 고려한다는 점에서 우수한 점이 있다. 응용윤리가 사회적 맥락에 따라 발생하는 경우가 대부분이기 때문이다. 따라서 불교윤리적 관점의 정보윤리가 사회적 맥락에 따라 다양하게 요구되는 정보윤리의 한 형태로서 필요성이 요청된다. 정보화의 역기능을 해소하기 위해 정보사회에서 필요한 윤리적 관점에서 불교를 해석하고, 불교적 관점에서 정보사회의 윤리적 문제에 대한 관점을 표명하고 해소방안을 연구하였다. 여기에 적합한 윤리적 내용은 도덕성의 세 가지 차원인 도덕적 인지, 도덕적 감성, 도덕적 행동의 관점에서 해석하는 것이었다. 불교윤리를 통합적 인격 관점에서 고찰하면서 도덕적 정체성 형성의 학습이 제대로 이루어지는 지를 고찰하는 것이 불교윤리 고찰의 목적이었다. 본 연구를 통하여 불교윤리는 통합적 인격 형성을 위한 가치들을 갖고 있었다. 그러나 모든 불교의 수련 체계가 통합적 인격 형성이 가능한 것은 아니고 팔정도가 가장 포괄적인 내용을 담고 있다는 것을 알 수 있었다. 팔정도의 윤리적 고찰을 통하여 도덕성의 세 가지 요소인 인지적 요소, 도덕적 감정의 요소, 도덕적 행동의 요소를 가지고 있다는 것을 명료하게 알 수 있었다. 이와 함께 인지적 요소, 정서적 요소와 행동적 요소가 서로 일관성 있는 연계를 가지고 진행되는 것을 명료하게 보여주고 있었다. 이것으로 팔정도가 도덕성의 세 가지 요소를 갖춘 통합적 인격 형성을 위한 도덕교육 프로그램이 될 수 있다는 것을 알 수 있었다. 팔정도는 통합적 인격인 윤리적 덕성 함양을 위해 잘 조직된 수련체계를 갖추고 있다는 것을 알 수 있었다. 이상과 같이 정보사회에서 훌륭한 인격을 형성할 수 있는 교육 프로그램을 활용하기 위해서 정보사회의 역기능에 대한 불교윤리적 관점을 연구하였다. 본 연구에서는 표현의 자유, 저작권, 프라이버시권, 사이버 언어폭력, 사이버 성폭력과 음란물, 인터넷 사기, 유해정보 사이트 운영, 사이버 테러(해킹 및 컴퓨터 바이러스 유포), 인터넷 중독, 네티켓에 대해 고찰하여 불교윤리의 관점을 표명하고 강령을 제정하였다. 불교윤리적 관점에서 본 정보화의 윤리적 문제점에 대한 관점은 기존의 네티즌 윤리 강령과 차이가 없는 것으로 나타났다. 따라서 불교적 관점에서 정보화의 윤리적 문제를 해결할 수 있을 것이다. The purpose of this study was to examine ways of resolving ethnical problems triggered by informatization from a perspective of Buddhist ethics in an attempt to improve the dysfunction of modern information society. The meaning of information society and ethical problems were reviewed, and it's found that an ethical approach should be taken to iron out ethical problems that take place in information society. One of the ways to make it happen is by taking advantage of existing ethics without any modifications, and typical ethics that could be utilized here are deontology and teleology. In this study, Kant's ethics and utilitarian ethics were primarily analyzed. In fact, however, it seems that this approach isn't sufficient enough to resolve ethical problems that occur in modern society, and an attempt to build a new system of ethics just by capitalizing on the strength of existing theories of ethics has been made. There are two different sorts of methodology for applied ethics. One is deductivism that is comprehensive of principlism, and the other is inductivism that makes an inquiry into cases. The former is to make a moral judgment based on well-established principals, but principlism was basically created by taking an inductive approach or by extracting principles from existing theories of ethics, and that's also the case for the justification of principals. The inductive approach is of great use for the methodology of applied ethics in that it takes considerations on social contexts that exerts a crucial influence on the generation of applied ethics. Under the circumstances, the necessity of Buddhism-oriented information ethics is justified in today's information society in which social contexts are extremely diverse. To remedy the dysfunction of informatization, Buddhism was discussed from an ethical standpoint in this study, and then how to approach ethical problems in this society from the viewpoint of Buddhism was discussed. One of the possible ways to make it happen is by interpreting ethical phenomena from three different perspectives of morality: moral cognition, moral sensitivity and moral behavior. Whether Buddhist ethics made it possible for people to have an integrated personality and whether students were taught to build their moral identity was investigated. Basically, Buddhist ethics seeks after great values that are necessary for having an integrated personality, but not every sort of Buddhist training makes it possible to do that, and the Noble Eightfold Path was found to be most comprehensive in terms of that. When the Noble Eight-fold Path was analyzed, it was found to be definitely comprehensive of the three elements of morality: cognition, moral sentiment and moral behavior, and there was a coherent relationship among the three factors. Therefore the Noble Eightfold Path could be used as one of moral education programs to let students have an integrated personality thanks to its well-organized training system geared toward cultivating moral virtues. Thus, this study attempted to shed light on the dysfunction of information society from a Buddhist perspective to find out an appropriate educational program to teach students to have a great personality. The freedom of speech, copyright, privacy, cyber verbal violence, cyber sexual violence, indecent online materials, cyber fraud, the operation of hazardous sites, cyber terror(hacking and spread of computer viruses), Internet addiction and netiquette were discussed to suggest general principles about how to approach those issues from a Buddhist ethics perspective. As a result, there were little differences between the existing moral principles of Netizens and the general principles suggested in this study. Therefore information ethics based on Buddhist ethics is expected to make a contribution to the settlement of ethical issues related to informatization.
칸트의 '덕 이론'에 관한 연구 : 덕과 도덕법칙의 관계를 중심으로
In recent years Kant's ethics has suffered badly under the current revival of virtue ethics, of normative theories whose primary focus is on persons rather than decision-making in problematic situations, agents and the sorts of lives they lead rather than discrete acts and rules for making choices, characters and their morally relevant traits rather than laws of obligation. Contemporary virtue theorists are often motivated by a sense of impoverishment of modern moral tradition. For them, Kant is widely regarded as deontology personified, the first moral theorist to place a non-derivative conception of duty at the centre of the moral philosophy. In addition, virtue theorist also seem to have more historical reasons for disapproving of Kant. For the rise of quandary ethics is often associated with Enlightenment efforts to escape from tradition and the pull of local communities, and a consequent yearning for an ahistorical and universalistic conception of morality. Kant, as spokesman for the Enlightenment is a natural target of criticism. In this respect, Kant's ethics is the worst possible sort of deontological rule ethics, one which is primarily responsible for the eclipse of agent-centred ethics. Yet some readers of Kant argue that Kant's ethics is not rule ethics but virtue ethics. They focused on『Metaphysics of Morals』, one of the Kant's latest work, and placed it in the context of the contemporary virtue ethics debates. Besides, Kant begins his ethical investigations with a powerful proclamation about the good will. So Kant's opening claim concerning the unqualified goodness of the good will means that what is fundamentally important in his ethics is not acts but agents. Kant's virtuous agent is a human approximation of a good will who through strength of mind continually acts out of respect for the moral law while still feeling the presence of natural inclinations which could tempt him to act from other motives. From the perspective of virtue ethics, to what extent should Kant's position on the good will be construed as evidence of an agent-rather than an act-centred ethics? In my consideration, while virtue has far greater prominence in Kant's ethics than many of readers suppose, it is nevertheless overstating matters to assert baldly that Kantian ethics is virtue ethics. But it dose not mean that Kant's ethics has a flaw or lack. In my reflection, the eventual difference between virtue ethics and Kant's theory of virtue lies in their attitude toward the feelings of naturally sympathetic person; in particular, about whether the presence of such feelings could contribute any moral character to action. Unlike virtue ethics, Kant holds that the cold person who acts from duty is not any less good, morally speaking, than the person who acts from duty and enjoys it. For Kant, therefore, feelings serve only as external aids to the performance of virtuous action. But, in my consideration, the real difference between virtue ethics and Kant's virtue theory lies in their different understanding of inclination, happiness and self-love. The pursuit of happiness requires a free and rational will, Kant emphasizes, because it involves the capacity to compare and this capacity belongs only to reason. I think that Kant takes our self-love to involve a rationally based desire for happiness that is essentially comparative: we want to think of ourselves as better than others, and this leads us to compete for status in their eyes and always to measure our own happiness by comparing ourselves with others. Happiness is an end I set for myself, taking it to be objectively good. So self-conceit(very problematic form of self-love) is not only a desire to be worth more than others, but also makes an objective claim to superior self-worth. Kant holds that human nature includes a radical propensity to evil, or to self-conceit, which leads us self-deceptively to persuade ourselves of our absolute superiority over others. And Kant indicates that the effect of awareness of the moral law on us is always to strike down our self-conceit. This seems to imply that no person could ever have valid pretensions to a self-worth greater than of any other. I argue that virtue ethics and Kant's theory of virtue differ in that the former allows that one person can be worth more than another, while Kant bases worth in the dignity of rational nature itself and thus hold that all rational beings have a worth that is absolute and equal. The basis of Kant's ethics is that every human being ought to be treated as an end in itself. And the conception of an end in itself is closely associated with the dignity of rational nature, that is, the thesis that rational nature in each person possesses an absolute worth that can never be compared with or traded off against any other value. But the basis of this argument is the very possibility of a categorical imperative, that is a moral law. It seems to be a more difficult question whether for Kant there could be differences in the self-worth of people based on moral virtue or character. But there is no room for degrees of membership in the realm of ends. Any being that is included, however imperfect it may be, has the same absolute worth as those perfect beings (if there are any) that exercise their rational capacities successfully on every occasion. I conclude, then, that the only conception of self-worth (and human dignity) that is consistent with Kant's theory of virtue is that all human beings have absolute worth, hence that their worth is incomparable and therefore entirely independent of their respective degrees of virtue. Kant require us to make one kind of comparative moral judgment. We are to compare ourselves with the moral law. In terms of this comparison we do gain in self-worth as we acquire virtue and meet the law's demand. In Kant's reflection, 'Self-conceit' and 'radical evil' are two names for one and the same propensity. Respect for the moral law also makes up for the inequities of nature. Some people are naturally loving, friendly, and thoughtful. Nature has not been so generous to others. If only natural motives were available to move us to do what morality requires, then some, through no fault of their own, would be unable to comply with it. Kant's doctrine implies that no one need be prevented by the niggardliness of nature from attaining moral worth. Kant insists that no inclination will ever reliably produce good action; only the motive of duty can do that. This is because in his view the human will is eternally in conflict. The pretense that we might someday be able to do good without any inner conflict, without the self-constraint of the law, is nothing but "moral enthusiasm" and a dangerous form of self-conceit. Kant does not see morality as springing from virtuous dispositions that make us want to help others. He sees it as always a struggle. Virtue itself is defined in terms of struggle. And it is "moral strength of will" in overcoming temptations to transgress the law. Law is prior to virtue, and must control desires to help others as well as desire to harm. It is Kant's belief in the importance of struggle in the moral life that leads him to his view that virtue cannot be defined as a settled habit or disposition. Kant knows that he is fighting a long ethical tradition at this point. He realizes that the illusion that self-worth can be comparative is deeply involved in the judgment of customary propriety. As human culture began to develop, Kant thinks, people found that to maintain their sense of dignity, they needed to behave in ways that inspire the approval of others or at least avoid inciting their contempt. Kant criticise classical virtue theory because it merely supports the customary morality which permits moral comparisons between ourselves and others. As we know, Kant invented a new way of understanding morality and moral agents. And at the center of Kant's theory of virtue is the claim that normal rational agents are capable of being fully self-governing in moral matters. In Kant's terminology, All human beings are free and "autonomous." Autonomy involves that no authority external to ourselves is needed to constitute or inform us of the demands of morality. We can each know without being told what we ought to do because moral requirements are requirements we impose on ourselves. Here we can see the another role of moral law in Kant's ethics. (We impose a moral law on ourselves, and the law give rise to moral requirements.) Kant thinks that autonomy has basic social and political implication. Although no one can lose the autonomy that is a essence of freedom and rational agents, social arrangements and the actions of others can encourage lapses into governance by our inclination, or heteronomy. Kant found it difficult to explain just how this could happen, but he always held that the moral need for our autonomy to express itself was incompatible with certain kinds of social regulation. Kant's ethical thought is grounded in two insights derived from Rousseau but developed in distinctive ways. One is the principle of the intrinsic dignity of all human beings, and the other is the recognition that human beings, in their historically developed social condition, go to great lengths to deny this equality and dignity. Rousseau convinced Kant that everyone must have the capacity to be a free(autonomous) moral agents, and that it is this characteristic that gives each person a special kind of value or dignity. Culture in its present corrupt state conceals this capacity of ours, Rousseau thought, and society must be changed to let it show and be effective. So he called for the construction of a community in which everyone agrees to be governed by the dictates of the "general will." Like Rousseau, Kant called for the construction of a community in which everyone agrees to be governed by the dictates of the "good will." The name of such a community is a "kingdom of virtue" or "ethical community." In my reflection, Kant's work,『Metaphysics of Morals』, can be read as a delineation of ethical community. And moral law plays a key role for the construction of ethical community. (It is closely related with external and internal freedom.) Kant gives us more detail on this in the『Metaphysics of Morals』. Kant there divides morality into two domains, one of law/right, and one of virtue. The domain of law, which extends to civil law, arises from maxims that are vetoed because they cannot even be thought coherently when universalized. The rejection of such maxims turns out to provide a counterpart to the recognition of the strict rights of others. We may not interfere with their legitimate projections, may not take their property, and so on. The domain of virtue involves maxims that can be thought but not willed as universal laws. Within the world constituted by universal moral law, practical reason directs us to form a moral world by imposing moral order on the whole of human society as well as on our individual desires. In all of these respects, Kant takes the moral law to be central to morality (to his ethics) and the motivation (to his theory of virtue) he thinks.
지역통일교육 관련자의 통일인식에 따른 지역사회통일교육 활성화 방안 : 경남지역을 중심 으로
Local Unification has been scheduled for local community residents. Until now it has not been evaluated appropriately. The aim of this paper is to examine the unification consciousness of the persons concerned in the local communities and explore sustainable development of the local unification education. To obtain the objective,this research raised several inquiry issues. They could be called research hypotheses. Are there perceptional differences in the Korean unification among educatees? Second, does the differences in unification exist in the lower factors of each variables? Third, is there any statistical significant differences of unification recognition in terms of demographic variables. Fourth, is there any correlation among main variables factors on the subject of unification? Lastly, are there perceptional differences about the particular issues during long periods. This empirical research shows some significant result according to the demographic variables. Especially the variable of vocational background shows significant differences. Based on results, this research proposes a few implications for the local unification eduction. To begin with, the network for unification eduction must be established in early stages: this network ought to be founded upon the local community and the important role of it. In the second place, the unification consciousness of the local residents should be surveyed and examined periodically and the research results must be put inside program of the future unification education. Third, the Korean council for unification studies(Tongilmunjeyeonguhyeopeuihoi) which has the governmental and civilian status at the same side must be made importance role for local unification education. Fourth, the evaluation tool for the local unification education needs to be developed. Fifth, the criterion with which we select good organizations must be arranged and be modified well in order to run local unification education programs. Finally, the unification education must be revitalized through the lifelong education institution which has been established in the local major universities. Accordingly, the national unification policy must be formulated and implemented with the consideration of the local community features and the propensity of the parties involved. 남북한의 통일은 분단의 극복을 말한다. 남북한의 분단은 민족 내부문제인 동시에 국제문제라는 이중성을 갖고 있다. 하지만 남북한 통일의 문제는 이러한 분단의 과정보다 훨씬 복잡하다. 즉 외형적 국토의 분단에 대한 통일의 문제뿐만 아니라 심리적 정서의 분단에 대한 통일까지도 고려해야 함이 그 유형상의 복잡함이라 할 수 있다. 다음으로 분단과정의 장기적 지속성을 들 수 있다. 다시 말해서 단일민족의 역사성이 장기간의 남북 분단으로 말미암아 민족적 이질성으로 갈라지고 그 폭이 점차 넓어지고 있는 것이 큰 문제인 것이다. 그리고 관계적인 측면에서 보면, 통일을 위한 주변국과의 관계, 남북한의 상호관계, 대한민국 내의 국민간의 통일에 대한 의식의 공감대 형성의 문제 등이 과제로 남아 있다. 이렇듯 한국민에게 있어서 통일과 북한연구의 문제는 ‘의지와 관심의 필요성’이 절실하다. 남북한의 통일은 이와 같은 복잡한 분단과정과 장기간의 분단으로 야기된 이질성의 확대, 그리고 남한 내 국민의 상반된 통일의식 등을 동시에 고려해야 한다. 그 중에서도 특히 소위 ‘남남갈등’이라고 불리는 한국사회내의 통일에 대한 서로 다른 통일의식의 극복이 무엇보다 중요하다. 즉 통일에 대한 상반된 의식을 극복하고 동일한 국민적 공감대를 형성하는 것이 중요한 것이다. 현재 우리 사회는 불특정하면서도 가변성이 있는 계층 간의 갈등도 우려되지만 지역에 기반을 두고 있는 지방적 이념적 갈등 구조는 그 파장이 더 심각하다고 볼 수 있다. 요컨대 남북한의 통일을 효율적으로 이루기 위해서는 통일에 대한 공동체 구성원간의 갈등적 인식이 극복되어야 하고 통일에 대한 국민들의 바른 인식이 전제되어야 한다. 바로 이러한 국민들의 바른 통일인식을 형성하기 위한 교육적인 활동을 통일교육이라고 한다. 그런 면에서 통일교육의 개념을 다시 정리해보면, 자유민주주의에 대한 신념과 민족공동체 의식, 그리고 건전한 안보관을 바탕으로 통일을 이룩하는 데 필요한 가치관과 태도를 기르도록 하기 위한 교육이라고 할 수 있다. 이와 같은 통일교육의 목표를 선정함에 있어서 헌법을 통해 살펴보면 다음과 같다. 먼저 헌법 전문에서는 “조국의 평화적 통일의 사명에 입각하여 정의·인도와 동포애로써 민족의 단결을 공고히 하고, 자율과 조화를 바탕으로 자유민주적 기본질서를 더욱 확고히 하여”라고 명시하고 있으며, 헌법 제4조는 “대한민국은 통일을 지향하며, 자유민주적 기본질서에 입각한 평화적 통일정책을 수립하고 이를 추진한다”고 규정하고 있다. 이러한 법령적 근거에 의해, 통일부는 통일교육의 구체적인 목표로, 첫째, 자유민주주의적 가치와 민족공동체 의식을 토대로 한 통일관 정립, 둘째, 평화통일의 의지와 역량의 함양, 셋째, 통일환경 및 북한에 대한 객관적 이해와 건전한 안보관 확립을 상정하고 있다. 통일부는 통일교육의 효과 증진을 위해 다양한 지도방법을 제시하고 있다. 그 중에서 네 번째로 제시된 “학습자의 특성에 따른 ‘맞춤형 교육’”은 지역사회통일교육에 있어서 피교육자의 특성이 중요함을 강조하고 있는 근거이다. 상세한 내용은 다음과 같다. 사회 통일교육의 대상은 학교 통일교육과 달리 연령적, 집단적 다양성을 지닌다. 학습자 중에는 6·25 전쟁을 경험한 세대도 있고, 전쟁을 경험하지 않는 전후 세대도 존재한다. 교사, 공무원, 군인에서부터 일반 사기업의 직장인이나 주부에 이르기까지 직업별 특성도 차이를 보인다. 사회 통일교육의 효율성이 확보되기 위해서는 학습자 집단의 특성에 맞추는 교수 내용이나 기법 상의 변화가 필요하다. 학습자 집단의 연령별, 직능별 및 성별 가치와 사고의 정향성이나 지적 수준 등에서 차이를 나타낼 수 있기 때문이다. 한편, 사회 통일교육은 학습자의 전문성에 부응하는 특성화 교육을 병행해야 한다. 다시 말해, 특정 그룹에 대한 특정 통일분야의 교육을 강화하는 것이다. 예컨대, 교사들의 경우 북한의 교육제도, 북한 청소년의 생활상 등 학교 현장에서 실제 통일교육시 활용할 수 있는 내용을 강화할 필요가 있다. 공무원이나 군인 혹은 일반 직장인의 경우도 직능별 특성에 맞는 통일교육이 이루어질 경우, 현재의 직무 수행에 도움이 되는 정보를 집중적으로 제공함으로써 학습자의 관심을 촉진시키고 교육효과를 제고할 것이다. 따라서 본 논문은 통일에 대한 법령적 근거와 통일부의 통일교육 지침을 바탕으로 하여, 지역단위의 사회통일교육에 있어서 피교육자의 통일에 대한 인식의 차이가 실증적으로 어떻게 반영되고 있는지를 살피고, 이를 토대로 지역사회통일교육의 활성화 방안을 모색하는 데 그 목적을 둔다.
윤리성과 기독교 종교성 비교 연구 : 상황윤리이론을 중심으로
논자가 본 논문에서 주장하고자하는 바는 첫째, 기독교내에서 윤리성과 종교성이 충돌하는 경우를 좀 더 면밀하게 분석하는 것이었다. 4가지 충돌 사례를 윤리성과 종교성 모두를 함의하는 개념으로 가정하고, 그 의미를 3가지로 분류하여 논점을 첨예하게 만들고자 하였다. 합당한 신앙적 행위의 비윤리성과 모호한 신앙적 행위의 비윤리성 그리고 부당한 신앙적 행위의 윤리성 등이 그것이다. 둘째, 4가지 갈등사례를 통해서, 기존의 윤리성을 초월하는 종교적 우월성의 의미와 혹은 그와 반대로 종교성을 배제하는 순수 윤리성에 대한 담론의 내용들을 자세하게 소개하려 했다. 셋째, 그러한 4가지 충돌사례에 대한 적절한 대안이론으로 플레처의 ‘상황이론’을 빌려 문제를 해결하고자 시도하였다. 이러한 시도는 기독교윤리학으로의 진부한 회귀가 아니라 각 종교에 맞는 ‘적답(適答)’으로써의 대안임을 앞서 밝힌바 있다. 상황윤리의 문제점으로 지적될 수 있는 이론적 허점에 대한 수정사항을, 예상되는 반론에 대한 답변 형식으로 삼아 논하였다. What the writer wants to tell in this thesis are followings. First, the writer wants to analyze closely the collision between religiosity and ethicality in Christianity. The writer at first supposed that the 4 conflict cases are the concepts involved ethicality and religiosity and then the writer classified the concepts as three types to make the point definitely ; the immorality of reasonable religious action, the immorality of ambiguous religious action and the immorality of unreasonable religious action Second, the discussion through 4 conflict cases is about the religiosity beyond ethicality and the pure ethicality without religiosity. Third, the writer tried to solve the problem about the 4 conflict cases as proper alternative theory, the Joseph Fletcher's 'Situation ethics Theory' The research process of this thesis is as follows. In the introduction, the writer has written the intention of the thesis. In the chapter 2, writer has defined the meaning of the terms, ethicality and religiosity clearly. In the chapter 3, the writer has categorized the conflicts of the ethicality and the religiosity into 3 cases and developed the topic based on the theory of general ethics. In the chapter 4, the writer has made a reference to the 4 conflict cases of the ethicality and the religiosity shown in the Old Testament according to the Christian point of view. In chapter 5, the writer has figured out if it is the at the point where the ethicality and religiosity can be reconciled with and introduce the features of Joseph Fletcher's 'Situation ethics Theory' from their meeting territory. Then 'Situation ethics' will be considered applying the ethics in a problem situation and consequently the main body of the text will be concluded with the answers to the objections which are expected. At last the writer will have to finish the text by studying the relationship between ethicality and religionism seriously.