The Impact of the Uruguay Round on International Trade Laws and the Resulting Implications for Korea

Sun,Joun-Yung 고려대학교一民국제관계연구원 1996 국제관계연구 Vol.1 No.1

새로운 국제질서와 한미동맹

김재창 고려대학교一民국제관계연구원 2003 국제관계연구 Vol.8 No.1

The U.S.-ROK alliance was established during the Korean War and formalized by the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty after the war. The alliance was the basic framework that guaranteed security on the Korean peninsula during the Cold War. To the U.S., South Korea was perceived as a critical forward base in Northeast Asia for containing the Soviet Union, while protecting free world. At the same time, to South Korea, the U.S. was the most reliable patron In the process of building a free democratic country, while protecting itself from North Korea's military threats. During the Cold War, the U.S. and South Korea have maintained the status quo as the best strategy on the Korean peninsula and that supported Interests of the two countries. In this period, North Korea ceaselessly carried out military provocations against the U.S-ROK alliance, violating the armistice agreements. Nevertheless, the alliance took patience instead of retaliation against North Korean armed provocations. The main reason that North Korea's provocations failed to trigger the second Korean War was because the U.S.-ROK alliance focused on maintaining status quo on the Korean peninsula. And the reason why the alliance opted for status quo was due to the Cold War structure. In the last part of 20^th century, the Cold War ended with the demise of the Soviet Union, and the U.S. remained a sole superpower. The new international order began to emerge, so does the fundamental change in strategic environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Under the new strategic setting, the U.S.-ROK alliance no more has to deal with North Korean issue as a part of hi-polar global system, but a matter of one rogue state in Northeast Asia The U.S. began to demand North Korea to take change out of the Cold War practices. Depending upon how North Korea responds to the demand, the height of tension on the Korean peninsula varies. Considering the rigidness of North Korean regime, it is highly probable that the U.S.-ROK alliance will face unpredictable and drastic change in North Korean threat in the coming years. Nevertheless, it is expected that the first part of 21^th century will witness the transition of the Korean peninsula from division to unification and unified Korea. The role of the U.S.-ROK alliance in the period of transition is far more important than that of the Cold War During the Cold War, since the alliance took just defensive strategy, each partner was required mostly to hold its position based on the initial plan. When the alliance is in the period of transition, it has to manage the change, which may occur on and around the Korean peninsula. Timely and more frequent coordination between two partners of the alliance, the U.S. and South Korea, is required. First, the U .S. and South Korea need to adjust their perception of threat from North Korea. Second, the two partners of the alliance need to share the same strategic goal so that they can create best synergy effect out of the alliance. Third, both need to share the same strategic concept so that they can divide roles for the effective implementation of the strategy. Under the new strategic environment, the U.S.-ROK alliance will manage the transition on the Korean peninsula and pave the road for broader role of regional stability in the longer period.

이라크전과 새로운 군사안보패러다임

홍성표 고려대학교一民국제관계연구원 2003 국제관계연구 Vol.8 No.1

Iraqi war, conducted by the U.S. as a part of counter-terrorism strategy, has demonstrated the rise of a new military security paradigm. With disapproval of the UN and strong antiwar demonstration worldwide, the U.S. started war against Iraq under a very difficult situation, However, the U.S. won a victory against Iraq with a dominantly superior military power in an unprecedentedly rapid offensive campaign for three weeks after successfully defeating intermittent resistances from the Iraqi Republican Guards. Throughout the Iraqi war, we witnessed several emerging military security paradigms as follows: 'Shock and Awe' that paralyze enemy in a rapid offensive air campaign with superior air and space power; Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) that ground campaign carried out at almost same time with air campaign; Effect-Based Operations (EBO) that focussed on paralyzing the enemy's system rather than destroying all the enemy military power; Long range precision strikes with newly advanced precision guided munitions; and network-centric warfare with enhanced C4ISR capability. Iraqi war influenced Korea's security environment. First, the U.S. raised the possibility of partial reduction and redeployment of the U.S. forees in Korea as part of U.S. Foreign military policy Second, the U.S. also raised the possibility of military sanctions against North Korea's nuclear initiatives. And finally Korea should cope with the newly emerging international security order. In conclusion, ROK military should actively pursue revolution in military affairs (RMA) to actively cope with these shifts in war paradigm. The final goal of the RMA is to raise quality elite military forces and to equip them with advanced weapon s'ystems. In particular, quantitative reduction of the military can be a determining solution for all accumulated problems in the ROK military. It cannot be done in a day, rather it should be pursued gradually as a long-term plan. In audition, Korea should strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance to cope with the newly emerging international security order and to enhance combined military operations capability with the U.S. forces, And ultimately, Korea should build up self-defense forces in order to defend the nation through Its own defense capability.

이라크전과 남북한의 전략적 교훈

이정민 고려대학교一民국제관계연구원 2003 국제관계연구 Vol.8 No.1

The second Iraqi conflict continues to have major repercussions for the United States as post-conflict management has run into key hurdles. Nevertheless, despite on-going operational challenges In Iraq after the downfall of the Saddam Hussein regime, the Iraqi conflict demonstrated new strategies, technologies, and overall advances in the conduct of modern warfare. Seen from this perspective, It is logical to assume that North Korea (and for that matter, South Korea as well) cannot but have paid close attention to the coalition forces' strategies and tactics throughout the phase of the second Gulf War. Therefore, this article examines some of the potential lessons North Korea could have drawn from the Iraqi conflict including the need to harbor asymmetrical capabilities (including weapons of mass destruction) in order to offset disadvantages stemming from the unprecedented military superiority of U.S. forces. Taking into account lessons learned from the first Gulf War and other post-Cold War conflicts such as Kosovo and Afghanistan, it stands to reason that the North Korean military leadership must have taken certain steps to upgrade their defense capabilities. Atime the South Korean military establishment has also carefully reviewed the major lessons from the recent Iraqi conflict such as heightened operational tempo, the critical factor of combined arms operations, and real-time battlefield intelligence as it continues with its own force transformation efforts.

제2의 북한 핵 위기 : 합의냐 파국이냐 Settlement or Catastrophe?

현인택 고려대학교一民국제관계연구원 2003 국제관계연구 Vol.8 No.1

Even though we are in the process of the so-called "six-party talks," the modality of dialogue among countries involved, this paper argues that the future of the North Korean nuclear crisis is still uncertain and rather pessimistic, because we have amjor obstacles to overcome. They are. (1) the high level of North Korea's intransigence; (2) the lack of consensus within the U.S. government; (3) South Korea's subtle position; (4) difficulties to achieve effective verification regime; and (5) Russia's uncertain role. This paper sketches out three paths that North Korea would take in the process of negotiation: (1) the complete dismantling of the North Korean nuclear development program; (2) North Korea's continuous brinkmanship with nuclear ambiguity; and (3) the announcement of North Korea's nuclear status. This paper then identifies several different scenarios for each path. The first path, the complete dismantling one, discerns three different scenarios: (1) North Korea's reluctance to reform and the continuation of conflict on the Korean peninsula In the post- dismantling stage; (2) the success of North Korea's economic reform and the peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas; and (3) the failure of North Korea's economic reform and regime collapse. The second path, the continuous brinkmanship with nuclear ambiguity, is a similar one that North ]Korea has sustained for the last several years. Under this path, we can identify severat scenarios. However, since North Korea has announced its nuclear status, albeit informally, in the three-party talks among the United States, China, and North Korea in Beijing in April,2003, the situation seems to have entered into path three. Interestingly enough, the United States has not yet accepted it as it was. Thus, it is not clear whether the North Korean nuclear situation is still under this assumption. The third path, the announcement of North Korea's nuclear status, has three different scenarios: (1) accepting it as a fait accompli by other states; (2) economic sanctions against North Korea; (3) military response against North Korea, The major implications of this analysis are four-fold. First, it should be noted that there is no such scenario as the most desirable and feasible one at the same time among the above-mentioned scenarios, For the United States and South Korea, the most desirable scenario would be the second one in the first path. However, it would not be the most feasible one. For North Korea, the situation would be the same, Therefore, both parties need more realistic strategic judgment. Second, sanctions, either economic or military, should not be excluded as an option to deal with this situation. In that case, North Korea would try to stay in the second path or go into the third path. Third, for the Kim Jong Ⅲ regime, the collapse scenario is still highly feasible. In order for the Kim regime to avoid the scenario, it has to rely on risk-taking, that is, "reform gamble," but not "nuclear gamble." Fourth, during the last several years, China has played a constructive role in the North Korean nuclear question. China's future role is more crucia. It is necessarv that China send stronger message to North Korea than before, that there would be no alternative except dismantling its nuclear program. The pendulum of the North Korean nuclear issue has swung back from optimism to pessimism during the last 10 years. It seems now that the pendulum is somewhere at the middle point of this spectrum since we agreed to have the six-party talks. It remains to be seen, however, whether this mechanism of dialogue would eventually bring about peace and stability in this region, settling the issue and creating a new strategic environment on which every party would safely rely.

한반도에서의 예방외교와 조기경보 : The Case of the Korean Peninsula

이신화 고려대학교一民국제관계연구원 2003 국제관계연구 Vol.8 No.1

In preventing and effectively responding to post-Cold War conflicts and related humanitarian crises, early warning studies and measures of preventive diplomacy were actively pursued by researchers and policy-makers. Several research projects are currently underway with the objective of developing early warning concepts (i.e. "early warning of what") and models, which are generally derived from theories of causation, often with the anticipation of guiding future policies of preventive diplomacy. For example, the United Nations (UN) is now coordinating a global humanitarian early warning system with its mission of maintaining peace and security in the international arena, as well as conducting various activities for conflict prevention. In this context, this paper is intended to examine the significance of preventive diplomacy and early warning in international relations, with special reference to the case of the Korean peninsula. First, the paper will discuss the concepts of preventive diplomacy and early warning systems and examine how these concepts have developed in the international community since its conception. Second, while the threat from the reactivation of North Korea's nuclear program requires serious and coordinated attention from South Korea and the international community, it is also important to ensure that the North does not undergo what is commonly referred to as a "hard landing," or a sudden collapse. Also, we must remember. that humanitarian concerns are also intricately related to security issues as evidenced by the tensions raised by the incidents of North Korean "famine refugees" seeking asylum in foreign embassies in China. Under this context, this paper will emphasize the importance of early warning in both traditional and non-traditional security issues relevant to the Korean peninsula. Finally, this paper will suggest ways to conduct timely and effective early warning measures in the case of security or humanitarian crisis situations around the world, and the peninsula in particular.

KEDO as a Semi-Institutionalized Security Organization in Northeast Asia

Hong, So-Il 고려대학교一民국제관계연구원 2003 국제관계연구 Vol.8 No.1

냉전종식 이후 아태 지역에 유럽의 OSCE 그리고 NATO와 같은 효과적인 전지역적인 안보협의체의 필요성에 관한 활발한 논쟁이 있어 왔다. 아태 지역의 전략환경은 대규모전쟁을 유발할 수 있는잠재적 갈등의 문제들로 인해 유동적이고 불확실하기 때문에 분쟁을 예방하고 지역 내 국가들 사이의 안보관계를 다루기 위해 전지역적인혹은 최소한 지역을 아우르는안보협의체가 필요하다고 말한다 아세안 지역안보포럼(ARF)에 관해서도 학자들은 그것이 지역안보문제를 다루는 효과적인 안보협의체인지 혹은 심지어 안보제도인지에 관해 논쟁을 벌인다. 이는 아태 지역의 안보협의체가 서구적 관점에서 볼때 구조화된 혹은 제도화된 타자안보협력체제로 간주되지 않기 때문이다. 아태 지역에서의 다자안브협정에 관한 논의들은 필연적으로 왜 ARF와 같은 지역안보협의체조차도 동북아시아에 존재하지 않는가라는 문제로 귀결된다. 흥미로운 것은 아태 지역의 다자안보제도 혹은 기구들에 관한 대부분의 논의들이 KEDO를 무시하거나 배제해 왔다는 것이다. 상식적으로 볼 때, KEDO는 북한에 경수로와 중유 제공이라는 기능을 수행하는 기술적인 기구이다. 수행하는 업무가 가지는 중요성과 독특함에도 불구하고 KEDO는 지금까지 큰 관심을 끌지 못하고 있다. KEDO가 여론의 주목을 받았던 적이있어다면, 북한이 합의된 현 체제의 대의를 위반하고 동 기구의 원활한 활동을 위협하는 등의 자극적인 행동을취했을 때 신문의 머리글에등장하는 정도였었다. 창립 된지 8년이 지난 시점까지도 KEDO의 형태적인 특징을 어떻게 규정해야 하는가에 대한 합의가 전무하다. 정책입안자들과 국제관계학자들은 KEDO의 성격을 재정적 국제 콘소시엄, 신뢰구축수단, 기술적 또는 에너지 기구. 제도 등으로 특징짓는의견들로 나뉘어져 있다. '' 본 논문의 목적은 KEDO가 동북아시아의 '구조화되고' (structured). ·원칙화되고' (principled) 준제도화된 다자안보기구이며, 단순한 기술적인 또는 에너지 기구가 아님을 증명하는것이다. 또한 KEDO의 설립과 사업진행과정은 창설 회원국으로부터 단순한 협력(cooperation)이 아닌 상당한 정책조정(coordination)을 요구해 왔다는 점도 강조할 것이다. 최근 제네바 합의문과 KEDO 사업에도 불구하고 북한이 농축우라늄 핵개발 프로그램을 추진하고 있다는 것이 세상에 알려지면서. KEDO 회원국들은 사업을 잠시 중단하느냐 아니면 완전히 종결하느냐 라는중요한 기로에 서 있다. 동 논문은 중단 혹은 종결 외에 또 다른 대안이 있다는 주장을 한다. 북한 핵 문제의 해결 여하에 따라, KEDO를 더 강화시키는 방법도 있을 것이다. 즉, KEDO의 몇 가지 약점이 보완될 경우. 동 기구는 동북아시아의 완전히(full-blown) 제도화된 안보기구가 될 수 있다는 주장을 펼칠 것이다.

한미동맹의 위기와 동맹관리역량의 평가

홍규덕 고려대학교一民국제관계연구원 2004 국제관계연구 Vol.9 No.1

This article attempts to draw from the vast literature of alliance politics and discuss the implications for South Korea's alliance relations with the United States. By using the term "alliance management" to describe the process of maintaining the cohesion of an alliance after it has successfully addressed its initial threat and has gone through a situation in which the comfortable calculus or rationale that guided the cooperative venture in its formative stage is no longer present, this study discusses the possibility of whether those strategies mainly drawn from the U.S.-NATO partnership can be applied to the case of the ROK-US alliance far emulation. Those, who have studied alliance politics, suggest that effective alliance management starts from the assumption that the cohesion or continuity of an alliance depends on the delicate balancing act between conflicting and diverging forces. Effective alliance management is necessary because an alliance is a political calculation based on the recognition that despite the differing and conflicting interests of allied states, the assistance of the other is still needed in order to gain or maintain their commone security interests. Authors agree that in order to halt and survive the drift, allies must quickly manage disagreements and prevent inter-ally disputes from turning into chronic dissent that might put the coalition in jeopardy. At least, two approaches need to be addressed: First, alliance scholars suggest that an effective alliance management must involve the reformulation of the raison d'etre or threat perception of the alliance in order to contain unavoidable disagreement on the changing calculus of the new and emerging security environment. They argue that the identification of a new threat helps produce a new accord by helping a counterpart realize that the cost of a non-compromise will be greater than the cost demanded by cooperation. Second, scholars emphasize that In order to prevent the differing opinions and interests of allies from evolving into chronic and dysfunctional disputes, the allies have to effect some policies to facilitate the process of institutionalization or transform the alliance inertia into cybernetic-like programmatic responses, the content of which reflects those policy instruments that decision-makers find to be familiar and accessible. They maintained that it is important to transform the alliance inertia into a dynamic force that can be used to strengthen and expand the alliance and to provide a new rationale to a coalition. However, this study concludes that both the South Korean and United States governments are unable to implement such effective problem-solving mechanisms that prevent a general loosening of alliance ties and thus pre-empt the disintegration of an alliance. The major reason is that Seoul and Washington have been unable to reduce the huge perception gap in addressing the threat of North Korea, which in turn have led to different opinions on what are the appropriate means and roles in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis. Moreover, American and Korean officials have not yet agreed upon how to address the problems of the increasing hyperactive Korean nationalism and the new democracy in Korea. According to recent polls, public criticism of He U.S, by Koreans has not dwindled. Moreover, President Roh and those politicians, who have continuously called for reforms, are not likely to turn a deaf ear to such a strong demand from the younger generation for a more equitable partnership, especially when the election is coming around the corner. Therefore, it is highly unlikely to that the South Korean government will come up with a compromising act to carry out proactive measures to create a new sense of belonging. Several authors who have studied the U.S.-NATO relationship suggest that constructing organs of communication that allow the parties to convey their genuine positions on issues is very important for alliance cohesion. Perhaps this is the most appropriate direction for both Washington and Seoul to pursue for the time being, at least for the sake of damage control. This study also briefly discusses Seoul's recent decision to send troops to Iraq. It could have been the golden opportunity to create anew kind of goal that would share the vision of alliance for the future. Yet, Seoul has failed to recognize the opportunity to demonstrate its value to the United States, the desperate partner that wanted Seoul's unique contribution, because the former was preoccupied by the domestic costs that such an endeavor would bring. Another point of concern is that the U.S. is still in a good position to make Seoul's defection costly for the Roh administration. The fact that the Japan-US alliance is capturing the primary position in America's 21st century security policy in East Asia will definitely reduce the value of the Seoul-Washington security relationship. Unfortunately, the South Korean government's ability to generate support for alliance continuity is extremely limited due to the pressure from domestic constituent groups that include reform-oriented National Assembly members, interest groups, the media, and some key officials of bureaucratic agencies. This study concludes with the observation that allies may be constrained from making an alliance that would have been preferable to the alternative. Seoul has every right in learning from its own mistakes and confusion, but it is out common duty to do our utmost in investing for the next generation and nurturing them to overcome the difficulties and endure the crisis by maximizing the joint benefits of both countries.

탈냉전기의 미일관계 : 일본 내 친미여론의 사회적 배경에 관한 연구

남궁곤 고려대학교一民국제관계연구원 2004 국제관계연구 Vol.9 No.1

This article aims to ascertain whether and to what extent the income, occupation and educational level of a Japanese individual separately or jointly affect their image of the United States. The paper concludes that there are some connections between the socioeconomic variables of the Japanese and their images of the United States. That is, the cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions of Japanese attitudes towards the United States are not independent from the socioeconomic status of respondents. Favorable images of the United States are far more common among the affluent Japanese than among the poor. Recognition of the importance of the United States to Japan and affective feelings towards the United States are also more widely shared among Japanese opinion?leaders such as decision?makers, professionals and management groups. Among the socioeconomic variables that are considered in this article, a higher educational level is most likely to signify a favorable image of the United States. Favorable images of the United States and the acknowledgment of the United States' importance to Japan's well? being are more widespread among the highly educated Japanese than the less-educated. Similarly, positive evaluations of the United States' role during the post-Cold War era are more frequently expressed among the highly educated and affluent than the less-educated and poor. It is argued that the attitudes of the attentive Japanese public towards the United States are different from that of the general public. This reasoning suggests that the attitudes of the attentive public towards the United States will be similar to those of the Japanese elite because the socioeconomic status and background of the attentive public are generally closer to those of the elite than to the rest of the mass public. This reasoning can also be applied to the fact that elements of the internationalist worldview are more widely embraced by the elite than the general public because better-educated people are more attentive to foreign policy and supportive of a more active Japanese role in the international community.

1960년대 북한의 숙청과 술타니즘(Sultanism)의 등장

류길재 고려대학교一民국제관계연구원 2004 국제관계연구 Vol.9 No.1

During the late 1960s, there were some significant purges in North Korea. While the one in 1967 was aimed at getting rid of some high-ranking party officials, the one in 1968 was meant to expel some top military officials. Conventional views had emphasized that Kim Il Sung's unlimited ambitions to seize ultimate power had caused these purges. These views, however, have failed to explain that these purges were closely related to shifts in the North Korean political system, which might have been a result of a complex process of policy competition, power struggle, and succession politics. Although some arguments have recently been made that the purges in the late 1960s were the outcome of conflicts on economic and military policies, there is still a lack of sufficient evidence that verify these claims. Therefore, this study seeks to uncover the actual reasons behind these purges. According to North Korean official documents Park Kum Chol and Lee Hyo Soon are alleged to be "anti-party factionalists," since they have attempted to challenge Kim Il Sung's authority, exert their own authority in their respective fields, be opposed to the state's economic policy, and spread reactionary notions such as feudalism and bourgeois ideas. Surprisingly, they were all purged at the 15th Plenum of the Sixth Party Central Committee in 1967. Their purge was astonishing because they were closely related to Kim Il Sung's anti-Japanese armed struggle, and they had both led the purge of anti-Kim Il Sung forces in August 1958. After a year and a half, Kim Chang Bong, Minister of National Security; and Heo Bong Hak, Commander-in-Chief of the Korean People's Army; were accused and purged for almost the same reasons as the top party officials that had been purged the year before. These two purges were not caused so much by policy conflicts as they were by the combination of power struggle and policy differences amid succession politics. Kim Joug Il, even though a junior party official at the time, wielded the power to get rid of his revolutionary seniors. By way of these purges, Kim Il Sung proclaimed and established a system of monolithic ideology over the society, and the minimal pluralist traces that remained in the decision-making process were thoroughly eradicated. As a result, the North Korean political system was rapidly transformed into a new one, a sultanistic arrangement in which individual leadership becomes the utmost political norm.