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Syncretic Capitalism in Korean Textiles : Clientelism, Corporatism, and Contract
Mcnamara, Dennis L. 서강대학교 사회과학연구소 1997 社會科學硏究 Vol.6 No.-
The transition in textiles stretching across years of industry formation(1948-60), growth(1961-79), and maturity(1980-present) provides evidence of a synthetic capitalism distinguished by the interplay of clientelism, corporatism, and contract in relations between capital and the state. 1 first distinguish these three modes of interest representation, and then examine their bases in the history of the industry itself citing familism at firms, the structure of market opportunity, a partnership with the state, and constraints of international markets. A final section looks to the interplay of the three modes citing the prominence of clientelist networks in the years of industry formation, of state corporatism in the growth years, and of contract most recently as the industry moves to maturity and adjustment. More significantly, 1 point to the interplay among the modes and offer the hypothesis that excesses of corporatist collusion, clientelist corruption, or excessive competition can be balanced by the mutual interaction of clientelist networks, corporatist trade associations, and market competition. Williamson defined transaction costs as the "comparative costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task completion(1985:2)." One key to effective competition in international markets is effective governance in public and private sectors, which arrange, monitor and hopefully reduce such costs. Maintaining a consensus that exchange can be beneficial remains a necessary condition for effective market exchange. Contracts and covenants insure the mutuality necessary for effective market exchange. Mutuality or trust can be generated by either formal or informal institutions, but priorities of cost and efficiency demanding solidarity for assuming risks in fast-changing, imperfect global markets have brought renewed attention to social networks and norms explicit or implicit in the market exchanges of individual societies. If indeed trust can reduce transaction costs in economic development, then the formal and informal structures promoting or eroding trust deserve scholarly attention. Karl Polanyi(1944) had earlier brought to our attention the significance of exchange in markets as opposed to more traditional forms of reciprocity or redistribution. Trust or social capital denotes the ability of people to work together for common purposes, which might reduce transaction costs and ensure productive exchange across time. Peter Blau looked to the interpersonal networks defining a social exchange of networks and norms, spurring development of methodologies for tracking the non-contractual elements of contract, or the social fabric beyond the mutuality of economic exchange defined in contract. Emerson extended this theory of social exchange to include not only interpersonal networks, but larger institutional ties, as well as the norms and values defining those institutions(Cook and Whitmeyer 1992). Networks in this developing school of thought now include both interpersonal and institutional ties. Norms include both the interpersonal covenants assuring trust despite the risk of exchange, and the institutional procedures and understandings which permit enduring exchanges despite the vagaries of imperfect markets. What does this theory of social exchange tell us of the actual give and take of markets in contemporary market societies struggling with the structural adjustments necessary for competition in a global capitalist market? Extending theories of social exchange to the wider study of collective action, Antonio Multi focused on an exchange of interests which fostered trust in the "non-opportunistic" behavior of market partners(1990). Rational actor models then take center stage with trust as a method of insuring positive-sum interactions. James Coleman highlighted the rationality of educational strategies fostering social capital in American cities(1990), while Robert Putnam looked to civic associations in Northern Italy where coercive institutions to ensure trust would prove far more costly than the existing embedded web of associational life(1993). More recently, Francis Fukuyama compared transaction costs of creating efficient, larger private business organizations in different societies(1995). Efficiency of business organization in Japan and Germany led him to conclude these were high trust societies with plentiful social capital. The difficulty of creating professionally managed corporations in China and South Korea due to the reluctance of nonkin to trust one another, led him to term these two nations low-trust societies(1996). Fukuyama offers a theoretically and historically substantive and very controversial thesis about social exchange in Asian society, but from a broad comparative perspective that demands closer scrutiny of individual societies. Murakami and Rohlen looked in depth to transaction costs in Japanese business-state ties, labor relations, and sub-contracting ties(1992). Extending an earlier thesis of Ron Dore(1983), they argued that "relational transacting" distinguished such ties though acknowledged a recent trend towards more explicit, contract-based relations. Equally significant, they described a continuum between largely transparent, economic exchange defined by contract, and more embedded networks and norms of social exchange. The latter insight provides a basis for my own work on the bargaining of interests among capital, state, and labor in industrial change in the Republic of Korea. Rather than looking to economic versus social exchange immediately in areas such as ties between the business community and the state, I develop a mid-range conceptual frame of modes of exchange, and of their bases in society, state, and international market system, and finally of the interaction of these three modes of exchange in the textile transition. This paper provides an outline of the theoretical framework with which I have tracked the industrial adjustment in the Korean textile industry. 1 begin with three varieties in modes of interest exchange, including clientelism, corporatism, and the more pluralistic forms of contract-based exchange. What follows is an effort to specify the bases of such modes within and beyond Korea, looking to the organization of firms and markets within Korea, to the role of the Korean state, and to the effect of the international market system on the Korean political economy. To this point, the study largely situates Korean exchange within a comparative context of mixed modes of exchange in other societies. Corporatism and pluralism, for instance, appear prominent in northern European societies. Scholars have long recognized the significance of both clientelism and corporatism in Latin American societies. But the final section of the paper draws us beyond comparison to an argument for South Korea's relative success in meeting the challenges of change in textiles across some four decades. Here I focus on how borders are maintained among modes of clientelistic, corporatist, and contractual mediation to insure their interplay which constrains the excess of any one mode. Borders among multiple modes appears to me critical for insuring the trust necessary for effective exchange in the turbulent political and economic environment at home and abroad where South Korean entrepreneurs have learned to succeed.
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