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RISS 인기검색어
- 검색키워드
- 저자 : Dmitry Shapiro (검색결과 5 건)
- 무료
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- 유료
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Evaluating Casual Impact of Microfinance: Challenges and Results
Dmitry Shapiro 서울대학교 경제연구소 2021 經濟論集 Vol.60 No.1
In this paper, I survey the literature that studied the impacts of microfinance. The survey consists of four parts. First, I describe the methodological challenges associated with the impact evaluation of microfinance and how the randomized control trial (RCT) approach can address those challenges. I then present the results of six highly influential RCT studies published in the Special Issue of the American Economic Journal: Applied Economics in 2015. All six studies reached a similar conclusion that the overall impact of microfinance was modest and not transformative. Second, I describe the reasons suggested in the literature explaining why the impact is limited. Third, I survey two recent RCT studies that found a positive impact of microfinance and then discuss why these two studies differ from those in the Special Issue. Finally, I survey evidence of the negative impacts of microfinance.
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Cheap-Talk Disclosure of Negative Information and Risk-Averse Buyers
Dmitry Shapiro,Seung Huh 서울대학교 경제연구소 2021 Seoul journal of economics Vol.34 No.3
In this paper, we study the incentives of low-quality sellers to separate them from high-quality sellers. We consider a framework with asymmetric quality information where the only way to communicate quality is via cheap-talk messages. In this framework, any separating strategy pursued by high-quality sellers can be imitated costlessly by low-quality sellers. We show that in the duopoly setting with risk-averse buyers, equilibria exist, where lowquality sellers voluntarily disclose negative information about their products. If the seller is a monopolist or buyers are risk-neutral, such equilibria do not exist.
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Theoretical Analysis of Hospitals’ Response to a Per Diem Prospective Payment System
Dmitry Shapiro 서울대학교 경제연구소 2021 Seoul journal of economics Vol.34 No.2
Japan has one of the longest average length of stay in hospital (ALOS) among developed countries. To curb the high ALOS, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare has launched a payment system reform where instead of the pre-reform fee-for-service system (FFS) a new per-diem prospective payment system (DPC/PDPS) has been gradually adopted. We develop a theoretical framework to model hospitals’ incentives under different payment systems and to study the impact of the reform on the ALOS. We show that hospitals with a longer (shorter) pre-reform ALOS shorten (lengthen) their post-reform ALOS. Furthermore, hospitals with longer prereform ALOS have stronger incentives to use planned readmission to decrease the post-reform length of stay associated with a single admission. The theoretical predictions of our model match empirical evidence from the literature.
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( Dmitry Shapiro ) 한국경제학회 2020 The Korean Economic Review Vol.36 No.2
This paper develops a theoretical framework to explain the limited effect of business development programs (BDPs) on entrepreneurs’ profits. We argue that a mismatch between a BDP’s narrow focus on business-promoting strategies and the wider context in which microentrepreneurs operate can limit the impact of business training. In our framework, entrepreneurs are ambiguity-averse and have multiple sources of income (e.g., business and wage incomes.) We show that for a sufficiently ambiguity-averse entrepreneur with multiple income sources, efficient training can result in a decline in expected profit. Notably, when the wider context (multiple income sources, ambiguity-aversion) is considered, the businesstraining impact is limited and can result in a post-training expected profit decline. This limited impact is caused by the diversifying role that the business income plays in household finances.
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독점 및 복점시장 판매자의 부정적 정보 공개에 관한 실험 연구
( Dmitry A. Shapiro ),이재선 ( Jaesun Lee ) 한국경제학회 2022 The Korean Economic Review Vol.38 No.1
본 연구는 독점 및 복점시장에서 판매자가 상품에 대한 품질정보를 독점하여 구매자가 알 수 없는 상황에서의 정보공개에 대한 결정을 경제학실험으로 살펴보았다. 본 실험에서 판매자는 상품 정보에 대한 정직한 혹은 부정직한 cheap-talk 메세지를 소비자에게 보냄으로써 품질에 대한 정보공개 여부를 결정한다. 실험 결과, 낮은 품질의 상품 판매자가 품질정보에 대한 기만 없이 정직하게 정보를 공개하는 경향이 존재하며, 판매자가 낮은 품질정보를 기만 없이 제공할 때, 이는 복점시장에서 상품차별화로 귀결되어 소비자가 높은 비율로 상품을 구매하는 결과로 이어졌다. 한편, 이러한 낮은 품질 정보의 제공이 판매자 이익에 부정적인 영향을 주는지는 분명하지 않았다: 대체로 부정적인 영향은 통계적으로 유의미하지 않았고, 어떤 시장조건들 하에서는 오히려 긍정적인 영향을 보였다. 낮은 품질정보의 공개는 상품 구매율을 향상시킴으로써 독점시장에서 긍정적인 후생 효 과를 가져온 반면, 복점시장 하에서는 비효율적인 낮은 품질 상품의 구매율을 높임으로써 전체 후생에 미약하거나 부정적인 영향을 보였다. We provide an experimental analysis of the setting where a seller, either a monopolist or a duopolist, sells a product with quality that is unobservable to buyers. The seller can send either an honest or dishonest cheap-talk message to buyers about the product quality. We show that low-quality sellers have a positive propensity to communicate their low-quality to buyers. Communicating low-quality results in buyers’ higher-propensity to purchase the product and introduces product differentiation in a duopoly. We do not find strong evidence that communicating low-quality information negatively affects sellers’ profit: the effect is often insignificant, and in some treatments it becomes significantly positive. Finally, revealing negative information has a strong positive welfare effect in a monopoly, where it raises the likelihood of product purchase; but a weak or negative effect in a duopoly, where it boosts the likelihood of purchasing a socially inefficient low-quality product.
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