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Beyond Formal Structure: A Mechanistic Perspective on Computation and Implementation
Marcin Miłkowski 서울대학교 인지과학연구소 2011 Journal of Cognitive Science Vol.12 No.4
In this article, after presenting the basic idea of causal accounts of implementation and the problems they are supposed to solve, I sketch the model of computation preferred by Chalmers and argue that it is too limited to do full justice to computational theories in cognitive science. I also argue that it does not suffice to replace Chalmers’ favorite model with a better abstract model of computation; it is necessary to acknowledge the causal structure of physical computers that is not accommodated by the models used in computability theory. Additionally, an alternative mechanistic proposal is outlined.
( Witold M Hensel ),( Marcin Miłkowski ) 서울대학교 인지과학연구소 2014 Journal of Cognitive Science Vol.15 No.3
The paper is a critical review of the book Godel, Putnam, and Functionalism: A New Reading of Representation and Reality by Jeff Buechner, which isa defense of computational functionalism against arguments formulated by Putnam, Searle, Fodor, Lucas and others. Buechner, after having meticulously analyzed these arguments, concludes that all of them fail to show that computational functionalism is not a viable strategy to model the mind in cognitive science. As such, it is a defense of a mathematically-informed version of computational functionalism. We discuss Beuchner`s strategy in quite a bit of detail and make some comments.