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경주 교동 최씨가 소장 추수기(秋收記)·수세기(收稅記) 자료의 전존 현황과 특성
최주희 ( Choi Joo Hee ) 한국고문서학회 2021 고문서연구 Vol.59 No.-
Over 330 historic materials on harvest season possessed by ‘Rich Men’ Gyeongju Choi clan in Gyeongju Gyodong are important documents that can be used to reveal Rich Men Choi’s unique landowner management cases. Among which, 274 are the data written during harvest season for the purpose of receiving rent from the land distributed sporadically in Gyeongju and northern part of Ulsan. The major characteristics identified in Rich Men Choi’s historic house are as follows. First, when estimating the whole data, it showed chronological distribution from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century to the first half season of Japanese occupation. Second, different types of harvest materials written during the same year co-existed and a certain correlation between them is identified. Third, up to the Japanese colonial period, most paddy fields of Gyeongju Choi clan applied ‘Tajo(打租: receiving a rent with a half-dividing of the harvest)’method. Rent acquisitions identified in other regions in contemporaries were ‘Jipzo(執租: adjusting rent rates before harvesting)’ or ‘Dojo(賭租: receiving a rent with a certain amounts of harvest)’. However Rich men Choi clan shared in half of seeds and rice straws with tenant farmers. So among tenant farmers in Gyeongju, Rich men Choi’s rent acquisition method was called as ‘Dangalim(indicating 5:5 allocation).’ On the other hand, Rich men Choi wrote separate materials to menage barley-farm product and bean harvest and there were now 62 of them have been remained. Various case studies on harvest records of paddies have been published, but few rent aquisition cases from harvest of bean and barley have been identified. Rich men Choi’s average rent identified during harvest season does not show a big difference from the rent amount in other regions, although it reviewed a part of all cases. But the average rent of barley and bean collected from the tenant farmers is significantly low despite the difficulties in guessing the absolute production because they received rent in the way of Dojo. This is considered as a result of lending the rest fields except the arable lands of Rich men Choi to tenant farmers and receiving the minimum rent. Like this, Rich men Choi’s landowner management has a difference from the cases of other regions. In this paper, the focus is on analyzing the current status of the entire data and how it was written. So further studies need to complement the insufficient parts that were not resolved in this paper and reveal the specific historic points of view about Rich Men Choi’s landowner management case.
1826년 『예식통고(例式通攷)』의 편찬과 왕실재정의 정비 노력
최주희(Choi Joo-hee) 한국역사연구회 2018 역사와 현실 Vol.- No.107
Yeshik Tong’go(例式通攷) is an Expenditure record compiled in 1826 (26th year of King Sunjo’s reign), and was a document similar to another sister record named Takji Jeong’rye, compiled during the reign of King Yeongjo. Yeshik Tong’go was different, however, from Takji Jeong’rye as the former was created for internal use only, to help the Jeon’rye-bang office -of the Hojo Ministry (in charge of central expenditure)- manage resources (which were to be delivered to the royal family) or materials collected from individual offices. To serve such purpose, Yeshik Tong’go assumed a slightly different form from Takji Jeong’rye. If we compare types of items and figures (indicating their spent amount) recorded in Yeshik Tong’go with those in Takji Jeong’rye, we can see the former only documented far lesser items, reflecting the real expenditure at the time (around Yeshik Tong’go’s compilation). Unlike Takji Jeong’rye, Yeshik Tong’go only revealed the names of royal family members who received materials from tributes around 1826, as well as the number of personnel who served them[宮屬]. Throughout King Sunjo’s reign, the basic foundation for central revenue -the “Chulse Shil-gyeol(出稅實結)” lands- continued to diminish, and the revenue of major financial offices (such as the Hojo Ministry and the Seon’hye-cheong office) continued to drop accordingly. On the other hand, central expenditure was something the government could not reduce at will, as for example, the Hojo Ministry had to spend money for essential purposes while creating new principles[定式] to accommodate certain needs. As a result, items spent for the royal family and (by) individual offices became less and fewer than what was spent and recorded at the time of Takji Jeong’rye. Items delivered to the royal family usually occupied the largest percentage of the government’s general spending, yet the number of types (of items) recorded as spent in Yeshik Tong’go is only half of what is recorded in Takji Jeong’rye. Other records, such as chronological documentation of the government’s court deliberations (for example, Shillok), also seem to be concurring with the figures recorded in Yeshik Tong’go. In other words, Yeshik Tong’go vividly shows us the government’s efforts (up until the early half of the 19<SUP>th</SUP> century) to cut spending for the royal family. Previous studies attributed the financial deficit of the government in the 19<SUP>th</SUP> century to the supposedly increasing expenditure of the royal family, but examinations in this article prompt us to search for other reasons that would have contributed to such deficit, as well as elements that could have affected the government’s both revenue and expenditure in this particular century.
17~18세기 중반 중앙정부의 各司員役 감축 노력과 그 의의
최주희 ( Choi Joo-hee ) 조선시대사학회 2020 朝鮮時代史學報 Vol.94 No.0
This paper is a review on how the service of Won-yeok(minor officials, 員役) who belonged to the central government[各司] from 17th century to the mid-18th century had changed and how the number of Wonyeok increased in this process was adjusted. In the late Joseon, the service of Wonyeok for government offices was converted from ‘Beonsangje(番上制)’ indicating that local farmers returned and gave a service for the government to ‘Geupgagoripje(給價雇立制)’ indicating that the central government paid wages to receive services. And the number of Wonyeok tended to increase than that specified in 『Gyeongguk-daejeon經國大典』 until the former half of the eighteenth century. The central government prepared Byeoldan to reduce the number of Seori[書吏減額別單] in 45th year of King Sukjong (1719) and reduced the number from 1,443 to 1,221 individuals, which was just an increase by 230 from 991(+α) individuals in 『Gyeongguk-daejeon』. However, if the number of Seori was reduced suddenly, it threatened even the livelihood of his 4~500 dependants. So even if there was a vacancy, the personnel was not supplemented, for the purpose of adjusting the number of Seori in byeoldan. However, this was also not kept well. In the former half of the eighteenth century, this increased again. As 『Sokdaejeon續大典』 was prepared, the number of Seori(書吏) and Seowon(書員) specified in byeoldan in the year of Gihae[己亥] was largely reflected and the quota was finalized as 1,227(+α) individuals. But the reality was that more number of these people than this were serving at central government. So in the 32nd year of King Yeongjo (1756), Byeoldan (「各司員役存減別單」) was newly prepared to maintain or reduce the number of Wonyeok for central government. This byeoldan is significant in that it reduced the number of minor officials like Saryeong(使令), Gojigi(庫直), and soldier as well as that of the existing Seori. Through this Byeoldan, the number of Wonyeok for central government was adjusted from 3,454 to 3,186 and the number of Seori and Seowon was reduced from 1,349 to 1,221. This measure was in line with the financial policy of King Yongjo who hoped to realize tight financing policy, but the problem of reduced administrative transparency and expertise was exposed by arranging Goripgun(雇立軍) for major administrative affairs at central government.
최주희 ( Choi Joo-hee ) 조선시대사학회 2019 朝鮮時代史學報 Vol.89 No.0
During the Imjin Wae’ran war, the term “Dang’ryang(唐糧)” referred to a collected supply of grain transported from Ming China to the Korean peninsula, in order to feed the Ming troops that had come to Joseon as a relief force. The Joseon government relayed all these Dang’ryang grains -which had been transferred initially to Joseon’s Euiju area in the North- to southern locations of the peninsula, in order to address all kinds of local grain shortages throughout the country. And when the war ended, Dang’ryang grains were no longer needed. It naturally disappeared for the time being. Then later, to aid the Mo Mun-ryong army, the Joseon government began collecting taxes from local Gun/Hyeon units under the name of, again, ‘Dang’ryang(唐糧).’ In 1622(14<sup>th</sup> year of King Gwang’hae-gun’s reign), Mo Mun-ryong’s troops camped in the Gado area and demanded food and grain from Joseon. The Joseon government had no other choice but to comply, and levied additional taxes throughout the country, with 1 Du 5 Seung of grain from every Gyeol unit of land in the dynasty. Because of the fact that these grains were delivered to Mo Mun-ryong, the grain was also called as “Mo’ryang(毛糧).” Interestingly enough, this quasi-tax continued to be collected even after 1629(7<sup>th</sup> year of King Injo’s reign), when Mo was finally arrested and beheaded. In 1634(12<sup>th</sup> year of Injo’s reign) the Gabsul-year land survey was conducted and completed, and more than one hundred thousand of Gyeol units were secured in the three Southern provinces of the Korean peninsula. With new sources of taxation established as a result of such effort, other miscellaneous taxes were summarily abolished. But for some reasons the Dang’ryang tax was not and continued to be collected. Later, during the Byeongja Ho’ran war these Dang’ryang grain was used as military provision to be stacked at the Namhan Sanseong fortress. And after the war, they were sent to Shim’yang-gwan (where Crown prince Sohyeon was staying). With dynastic crises continuing, the presence of Dang’ryang was continuously required, and discussion of abolishing it only began in the 23d year of Injo’s reign. Dang’ryang, which was first formed with foreign Ming grain that was transferred from China to Joseon in the early phase of the Imjin Wae’ran war, continued to exist for quite some time because of all the external variables disrupting Joseon dynasty’s security, and remained during that time as a relatively huge diplomatic & military cost the Joseon government had to pay. Only in the mid-17<sup>th</sup> century when Dang’ryang tax was finally abolished, the Joseon dynasty was able to truly overcome the aftermath of both wars and redesign its tax structure.
최주희(Choi Joo-hee) 한국역사연구회 2009 역사와 현실 Vol.- No.71
This article is originated out of an intention to understand the economic system and fiscal situations of the 16th century through the Yangban officials' custom of exchanging gifts. For five centuries, the Joseon dynasty maintained a strong convention of using currency that had actual material-values, from the society's top to the bottom. The Yangban Sajok figures, who rose to become the political leaders of the country in the 16th century with their own Neo-Confucian political agendas, practiced the principle of mutual aid and beneficiary cooperation among themselves, by frequently exchanging gifts, in both the central political arena at the capital and inside local communities. By doing so they solidified their political alliance. Such gifts that were exchanged between Yangban officials and Sajok figures, were mostly 'political gifts' arranged to facilitate one's own receiving of a recommendation for a governmental seat, yet such gift exchanges constituted a flow of some 'economic meaning' as well. Gifts that were provided to Yangban officials and Sajok figures were in many cases obtained through official revenue sources. From the royal family they were provided in the format of bestowal(either Bongyeo/封餘 or Sasong/賜送), and from the official bodies they came in the form of provisions(either Gonggwae/供饋 or Jigong/支供). In the 16th century, when both the Sajok figures and governmental officials coexisted to constitute a dual-layered leadership in both the capital and local societies, the financial system operated with several kinds of expenditure being made without any clear distinction among them in terms of resources, like whether it came from an official revenue sources or private revenue sources. The concepts of a 'gift' and a 'bribe' were put somewhere in the middle, in such gift exchanging customs and habits.
17~18세기 왕실ㆍ정부의 연료 소비 증대와 땔감 조달 방식의 변화
최주희(Choi, Joo-hee) 한국역사연구회 2014 역사와 현실 Vol.- No.94
In the early half of the Joseon dynasty period, a pre-designated amount of Gong-Somok(貢燒木), firewood that was required to be submitted to the government as tax, was alloted to the Eub counties everywhere inside the country, and Gi’in(其人) workers were charged with the responsibility to (extract them and) provide the government with needed amount of firewood in a regular fashion. This practice, however, began to change in the 17th century when the Daedong-beob order was first issued. The submission of Gong-Somok decreased and was later abolished, while the Gi’in workers became tributary retailers who were provided with resources from the Financial Ministry(Ho-jo) and the Seon’hye-cheong office to ‘purchase’ firewood from the market. The central government found itself paying a lot of money and a significant part of its revenue in securing firewood, and began to reduce general spending of it, but it was difficult to reduce firewood that had to be used in ritual ceremonies held by the royal family or used by governmental offices. To make matters worse, with the Ondol practice becoming more popular, the firewood that had to be provided to the royal family and offices only continued to increase. The central government had to keep purchasing needed amount of firewood from the market in the capital, while also distributing firewood ranges(柴場) and charcoal mountains(香炭山) as designated bestowals(折受地). It was nearly impossible for the government to prevent the firewood consumption from increasing.
최주희(Choi Joo-hee) 한국역사연구회 2016 역사와 현실 Vol.- No.102
With the implementation of the Gyun’yeok institution, the amount of textile materials(“Gapo”) collected from households by the military offices(“Gunmun”) was reduced from 2 ‘pil’ units to 1, but the Hullyeon Dogam office, compared to other offices such as Geum’wi-yeong and Eo’yeong-cheong, was rather well compensated(“Geubdae”) for its losses. At the time, Hullyeon Dogam was having trouble securing grains that would be distributed to the soldiers as salary(“Ryomi, 料米”) and military demands[軍需], but was provided with ‘Geubdae’ by the Gyun’yeok-cheong office, in the form of Daedong rice(“Daedong-mi”). Also, it was provided with interest which was generated by the Sangjin-gok(常賑穀) reserve, operated by the Gyun’yeok-cheong office as part of the Hwan’gok(還穀) practice. Other than this, Hullyeon Dogam was offered the right to collect taxes from Gungbang(宮房) bodies’ lands, which had actually been exempted from taxation(“Myeonse-gyeol”). And when the Hullyeon Dogam soldiers had to step in as Geum’wi-yeong and Eo’yeong-cheong soldiers were unable to post their shifts in the capital area, those two offices were obliged to provide the Hullyeon Dogam soldiers with compensation, in the form of Yeosu-jeon(旅需錢). Finally, since 1758, the 34th year of king Yeongjo’s reign, Hullyeon Dogam was authorized to annually take advantage of the grain under the jurisdiction of the Finance “Hojo” Ministry, in case it needed additional resources to pay their Bokma-gun soldiers with Ryomi salary. It should also be noted that during the time the Gyun’yeok institution was in operation, Hullyeon Dogam continued to create over 100,000 ‘nyang’ units of coins, and earned more than 60,000 nyang units from that venture. With such newly garnered profits, Hullyeon Dogam purchased silver, loaned it to soldiers and brought in additional income. And in the meantime, monitoring the Yang’hyang-cheong office’s failure to collect adequate amount of taxes from the garrison farms(“Dunjeon”), Hullyeon Dogam also newly rented, purchased, or even initiated reclamation efforts of those farms, to use it as another source of income that could be diverted to resources which would facilitate the Hullyeon Dogam’s sub-offices. In short, Hullyeon Dogam was continuously aided and supported by central financial offices even when other central military offices were suffering from the government’s overall [financial] retrenchment policy. As a result, Hullyeon Dogam, which was operated by rotated servicemen(“Jangbeon-gun”), became a liability to the Joseon government’s financial management. Yet, in order to protect the king and the population from foreign threats, and foster political stability by managing internal social strifes, maintaining Hullyeon Dogam as it is was more than an imperative task for the government. The way the Hullyeon Dogam office secured necessary budgets for itself was a little complicated, but it was also a policy-based effort intended to minimize financial pressure upon the government, sanctioned by the government itself which had to operate a military full time.
19세기 전반 중앙재정의 실태와 다산 정약용의 재정개혁안
최주희(Choi, Joo Hee) 충청남도역사문화연구원 2018 충청학과 충청문화 Vol.24 No.1
정약용은 『주례』를 모델로 중앙관제를 관체제로 정비하고, 정전제적 토지질서 하에 부세체계를 정비함으로써 民産과 國用을 진작시키는 개혁방안을 제시하였다. 정약용의 토지제도개혁안은 당시 토지 사유화 경향이 심화되는 가운데, 향촌에서 급재결을 불법적으로 늘리고 궁장토, 둔토 등의 면세결을 확대해가는 상황을 타개하기 위한 방안으로 모색되었다. 정약용은 중앙에 경전사를 설치하여 경무법에 따른 경지구획을 정리하고, 사전 매입을 통해 구일세를 적용할 공전을 확보하고자 하였다. 그러나 조속의 실제 수취액을 따져보면, 세입을 파격적으로 늘릴 수 있을지 장담하기 어려운 점이 있었다. 이에 정약용은 평부사를 설치하여 부세자원을 발굴하는 한편, 가난한 백성에게 잡역이 편중되는 현실을 개선하고자 하였다. 우선 재산을 고려하여 6부의 호구에 부가지정, 택전지정, 옥속지정을 차등 과세하는 한편, 시장과 산림·천택을 국가의 관리 하에 두고 관시지부, 산택지부, 폐여지부를 부과하는 안을 모색하였다. 특히 그는 정전을 경작하지 않는 백성들도 9職내에서 직을 부여받고, 옥속의 부세를 바쳐야 하는 점을 강조하였다. 창고운영론은 정약용이 제시한 가장 현질적인 대안이라 할 수 있다. 그는 향촌에서 자행되는 환곡의 폐단을 신랄하게 비판하면서도, 한편으로 환곡창과 상평창의 운영을 확대허여 진휼과 재정보용에 활용하는 방안을 제안하였다. 정약용은 중앙관서와 지방감영에서 자의적으로 운영하는 잡다한 환곡을 정비하여 호조와 지방감영에서 일원적으로 관리하고, 반류 반분의 원칙 하에 2할의 모곡을 수취하여 중앙경비와 지방관수에 보용하도록 하였다. 이와 더붙어 환곡의 일부를 상평창곡으로 각도에 분치하여 환곡을 보조하는 기능을 담당하도록 하였다. 요컨대, 정약용의 재정재혁얀은 周禮의 차용과 古制의 활용으로 현실과 다소 괴리되어 보이는 듯하지만, 실상은 19세기 당대를 현실감 있게 고민한 데서 나온 개혁방안이었다고 평가할 수. 있을 것이다.