포소화약제 혼합장치의 개량화 방안

주승호,임만택,김혜원,공하성 대한안전경영과학회 2011 대한안전경영과학회지 Vol.13 No.2

Russia’s Policy on Nuclear Proliferation and National Unification on the Korean Peninsula

주승호 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2014 Pacific Focus Vol.29 No.2

As a Northeast Asian power sharing a 17-Km border with North Korea, Russia has a keen interest in Korean affairs. The future of Korea is of great concern to Russia both because of the Korean peninsula’s geostrategic importance and South Korea’s alliance relationship with the United States. This article addresses three primary questions: (i) How has Russia’s Korea policy evolved over the years? (ii) What position does Russia take on North Korea’s nuclear ambitions? and (iii)Will Russia support Korean unification? Russia professes its support for Korean unification. But there are important caveats. Given all the caveats, Russia will be neither active nor positive in supporting Korean unification, especially since it is likely to be achieved on South Korean terms. Will Russia then tolerate a Korean unification, which is likely to follow the German model of the South’s absorption of the North? Under the right circumstances, Russia might. In the German case, Mikhail Gorbachev as the Soviet leader and the cooperative relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union were the keys to the smooth sailing to Germany’s unification in 1989–1990. As with the German case, the state of US–Russia relations and the type of leader in the Kremlin will prove the most crucial factors in Russia’s acceptance or non-acceptance of a unified Korea. In this article, the author argues that Russia’s interests in and policy toward the Korean peninsula have been consistent over the years in two important ways. First, Russia opposes any power’s dominance in Korea. Second, Russia prefers a status quo on the Korean peninsula to a Korean unification. The author also argues that Russia will acquiesce to North Korea’s status as a de facto nuclear weapons state for lack of a viable alternative.

Russia on Korean Peace and Unification

주승호 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2002 Pacific Focus Vol.17 No.2

As a major power surrounding Korea, Russia has an inherent interest in the Korean peace and unification process. Will Russia support or obstruct Korean unification? This article analyzes this question from the viewpoint of Russia’s national interests. If we clearly understand Russia’s interests, we will be better able to predict Russia’s attitudes and policy toward Korean unification in the future. Specifically, this article discusses the following questions: What are Russia’s national interests vis-à-vis Korea? How can Russia contribute to the Korean peace process? Under what circumstances will Russia support or obstruct Korean unification?

Moscow-Pyongyang Relations under Kim Jong-il: High Hopes and Sober Reality

주승호 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2009 Pacific Focus Vol.24 No.1

With Putin’s arrival in the Kremlin, a new era dawned in Moscow-Pyongyang relations. After a decade of estrangement, the two neighbors finally reached rapprochement in 2000. Political relations improved dramatically, but the momentum did not lead to noticeable expansion in military and economic cooperation. High hopes gave way to sober reality, and the two countries adjusted expectations and attitudes to one another. This article is intended to explicate the sudden rise of Moscow-Pyongyang relations shortly after Putin’s inauguration and the rapid stagnation of the ties in subsequent years. Putin hoped to regain lost influence on Korean affairs by re-establishing ties with Pyongyang. He also wanted to use joint economic projects to develop the Russian Far East and in doing so, assert Russia’s position as a major power in Northeast Asia. He was not, however, willing to “pay the price.” Kim Jong-Il harbored unrealistic expectations of Russia as well. He was hopeful that Putin, as in the Soviet era, would readily grant his requests for military items, energy provision, and economic assistance, and provide them gratis. Repeated requests fell on deaf years, and every time the same response was heard, “cash only!” Moscow and Pyongyang soon lowered their expectations toward each other. While trying to stay on Pyongyang’s good side, Moscow seeks to project its image as an objective mediator and to promote multinational economic projects. Pyongyang, on the other hand, looks to Russia mostly as a counterbalance against the USA

Improving Performance of Foam Proportioner Utilizing Metering Venturi Type

주승호,공하성,공예솜 한국화재소방학회 2015 한국화재소방학회논문지 Vol.29 No.3

In this study, we have evaluated whether the mixing ratio is proper by creating a mixing device for foam proportionerthat mainly is employed in practice utilizing a metering venturi type. In case of the mixing ratio for 3%, water under pressureof 76 mm in diameter and the original liquid of a foam fire extinguishing agent of 31.75 mm in diameter haveshowed up the fluctuation rate just as much as 3.1~3.5% of the mixing ratio. Because water under pressure of 101.6 mmin diameter and the original liquid of a foam fire extinguishing agent of 38.1 mm in diameter have showed up 3.3~3.7%of the fluctuation rate, water under pressure of 101.6 mm in diameter and the original liquid of a foam fire extinguishingagent of 38.1 mm in diameter have satisfied 3.0~3.9% of performance criterion. And also, in case of the 6% of mixturerate, water under pressure of 76.2 mm in diameter and the original liquid of a foam fire extinguishing agent of 31.75 mmin diameter have showed up the fluctuation rate just as much as 6.4~6.8% of the mixing ratio. Because water under pressureof 101.6 mm in diameter and the original liquid of a foam fire extinguishing agent of 38.1 mm in diameter haveshowed up 6.0~6.8% of the fluctuation rate, water under pressure of 101.6 mm in diameter and the original liquid of afoam fire extinguishing agent of 38.1 mm in diameter have satisfied 6.0~7.0% of performance criterion.

Russia and North Korea, 1992-2006: From Distant Allies to Normal Neighbors

주승호 한국학술연구원 2007 Korea Observer Vol.38 No.1

This article examines the metamorphosis of Russia-North Korean relations from alienated allies to normal allies from 1991 to 2006. This research begins with a discussion of the distant relationship under Yeltsin and the normalized relationship under Putin. It then examines Russia’s role in the midst of the North Korean nuclear crisis. This is followed by an analysis of Russia’s saber-rattling in connection with North Korea’s nuclear issue. By way of conclusion, this study makes a few observations on the current state and future prospects of the Russo-DPRK relations. After the implosion of the Soviet empire, the Russian Federation lost a global superpower status and has been groping to find a proper place in Northeast Asia as a great power. Evenhandedness and balance now characterize Putin’s Korea policy. With the convening of the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear issue in August 2003, Russia was for the first time allowed to sit at a multinational negotiating table to discuss the North Korean question. Russia’s role at the negotiating table has been marginal and its efforts for resolving North Korea’s nuclear issue have focused on good offices and mediation.

Russia and North Korea’s Second Nuclear Crisis

주승호 사단법인 한국평화연구학회 2008 평화학연구 Vol.9 No.4

Putin sought to make a dent in resolving North Korea’s nuclear crisis. In the process, Russia sought to cultivate its image as an honest broker, mediator, or facilitator. This article examines Russian policy on the second crisis over North Korea’s nuclear issue. Specifically, the research raises the following questions and tries to answer them: What role has Russia played at the six-party talks? What is Russia’s policy on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program? What are Russia’s contributions to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula? With the convening of the six-party talks in 2003, Russia acquired the first opportunity to make its imprint on North Korea’s nuclear issue. Russia facilitated dialogue and offered suggestions for compromise. Russia at the same time exerted a moderating influence on both the U.S. and North Korea, constantly urging them to return to the negotiating table whenever the talks stalled and patiently reminding them to take into consideration the other side’s concerns and needs during negotiation. North Korea’s denuclearization and peaceful resolution of North Korea’s nuclear crisis coincide with Russia’s interests. Russia’s influence in the six-party talks has been indirect and marginal. The U.S. and the DPRK were the principal actors in this showdown and the DPRK as a host and mediator played a key role in inducing agreements. Putin sought to make a dent in resolving North Korea’s nuclear crisis. In the process, Russia sought to cultivate its image as an honest broker, mediator, or facilitator. This article examines Russian policy on the second crisis over North Korea’s nuclear issue. Specifically, the research raises the following questions and tries to answer them: What role has Russia played at the six-party talks? What is Russia’s policy on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program? What are Russia’s contributions to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula? With the convening of the six-party talks in 2003, Russia acquired the first opportunity to make its imprint on North Korea’s nuclear issue. Russia facilitated dialogue and offered suggestions for compromise. Russia at the same time exerted a moderating influence on both the U.S. and North Korea, constantly urging them to return to the negotiating table whenever the talks stalled and patiently reminding them to take into consideration the other side’s concerns and needs during negotiation. North Korea’s denuclearization and peaceful resolution of North Korea’s nuclear crisis coincide with Russia’s interests. Russia’s influence in the six-party talks has been indirect and marginal. The U.S. and the DPRK were the principal actors in this showdown and the DPRK as a host and mediator played a key role in inducing agreements.

러시아의 정치문화와 민주화 전망

주승호 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 1997 한국과 국제정치 Vol.13 No.2

This article analyzes the origins and nature of Russian political culture and the prospects for democracy. It begins with a discussion of political and civic culture. It then extrapolates the authoritarian nature of Russian political culture in terms of social-psychology, geography-climate, history, Caesaro-Papism, and political leadership, and sheds 'light on the continuity of the authoritarian, egalitarian, and collectivistic nature of Russian political culture. 'The author's main argument is that since Russian political culture still retains authoritarian elements, the attainment of a civic culture and democratization in Russia is not likely in the short- and mid-term. In the long term, however, successful marketization and economic development will create favorable circumstances for democracy.

러시아의 정치문화와 민주화 전망

주승호 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 1997 한국과 국제정치 Vol.13 No.3

김정일,부시와 힘겨루기 나서나 ; 김정일의 러시아방문과 북,러간 군사,경제관계 -군사협력은 더디게,경제협력은 가속화

주승호 평화문제연구소 2001 통일한국 Vol.213 No.-