베네수엘라 차베스정부의 국유화 정책과 국민여론

조돈문(Cho Don-Moon) 한국라틴아메리카학회 2011 라틴아메리카연구 Vol.24 No.4

The politics of nationalization tended to evolve in the mode of direct confrontation between government and capitalists as the Chavez government began to push ahead with its nationalization policy after winning a referendum in February 2009. Once nationalization measures came to reach the food industry which in turn further sharpened socio-political conflicts, the tide of public opinion began to exercise influence on the form and direction of nationalization policy. However, public opinion on the nationalization policy has not been well studied by social scientists. It is the aim of this study to analyze public opinion on the nationalization policy, and identify significant causes and causal mechanisms in the formation of public opinion so as to make sense of the background and implications of the strategic choices made by the protagonists of nationalization policy. This study of public opinion came up with three findings. First, an overwhelming majority are in opposition to the nationalization policy, siding with capitalists in their confrontation with the government. Second, Chavez’s reputation exerts greater influence on public opinion about the nationalization policy in comparison with the capitalists’ reputation, a factor with countervailing effect against the capitalists’ edge in reputation. Third, among the various explanatory variables the evaluation of Chavez’s performance turned out to be most influential, while not only Chavez’s evaluation but also his ideological orientation has exerted significant effects on citizens’ opinion about the nationalization policy. The current tide of public opposition to the nationalization policy demonstrates the failure of the Chavez government to form a national consensus on the issue of nationalization. It implies that calls for nationalization based upon the need to deal with poor working conditions, violations of basic labor rights, the problem of industrial monopolies, the possible consequence of productivity improvements, and the public good and workers’ control fell short of convincing the Venezuelans of the inevitable need for nationalization measures. The failure of the Chavez government to form favorable public opinion largely owes to the strategic choices made by Chavez and his government. They chose to take advantage of Chavez’s high popularity which far exceeds the proportion of public opinion in favor of nationalization policy. They intended to persuade Chavez’s supporters to endorse Chavez’s transformative policies such as the nationalization policy rather than to engage in dialogue with those who give low approval ratings to Chavez. It was a rational choice for their strategy. However, this typical dichotomization strategy could make it difficult to build up public opinion in favor of the nationalization policy because it could alienate those who don’t give a positive rating to the performance of the Chavez government. As a result, the nationalization policy may face serious national resistance as the political polarization of Venezuelan society intensifies further.

베네수엘라의 좌파정권과 노동조합운동의 딜레마

조돈문 ( Don Moon Cho ) 한국산업노동학회 2010 산업노동연구 Vol.16 No.2

친노동적 좌파 정권인 차베스정권 하에서 베네수엘라 노동조합 운동은 차베스정권과의 강력한 유대관계 속에서 조직력을 강화할 것으로 기대되었었다. 하지만 노동조합운동은 분열을 거듭하며 조직력을 강화하지 못했고, 정권퇴진을 요구하는 총파업투쟁이 전개되는 등 차베스정권과의 관계도 원만하지 않은 것으로 나타났다. 왜 친노동적 좌파정권 하에서 베네수엘라 노동조합운동이 조직력을 강화하지 못하는지, 왜 차베스정권과 갈등하게 되는지, 어떤 딜레마에 직면하여 어떤 전략적 선택을 취하게 되는지를 분석·설명하는 것이 본 연구의 목적이다. 차베스정권은 제4공화국과의 단절을 강조했지만, 노동조합 활동 및 노사관계에 대한 정부의 적극적 개입과 노동조합운동의 정당에 대한 높은 호응성에 있어 연속성을 보여주었다. CTV는 제4공화국 지배정당들에 대한 호응성 관계로 인해 차베스정권과 대립하며 총파업투쟁을 전개했다. 결국 친차베스 블록이 UNT를 결성하여 독자세력화하며 조직규모를 확대함으로써 노동조합운동의 이중구조가 형성되었으며, 그 점에서 노동조합운동이 CTV의 패권 하에 통합되어 있었던 제4공화국 시기와 차별성을 보여주었다. 친차베스 좌파성향 UNT는 제4공화국 기득권세력들의 정권전복 시도들에 맞서 차베스정권 수호에 앞장서는 동시에 노동자들로 조직된 이익집단·계급조직으로서 노동조합의 자율성을 확보할 것을 요구받고 있었다. 좌파정권 수호라는 정치적 과제와 노동조합 자율성 확보라는 계급적 과제는 동시에 실현하기 어려운 모순적 관계에 있다는 점에 UNT의 딜레마가 있다. 이러한 딜레마는 정치적 과제를 우선시하는 FSBT 중심의 코포라티즘파와 계급적 과제를 우선시하는 CCURA 주도의 계급주의파카 UNT의 지도부 장악과 운동전략을 둘러싸고 갈등과 대립을 지속하게 되었다. 이러한 조직적 분열은 UNT의 내적 통합과 조직력 강화를 어렵게 했다. 결국, UNT내 다수파인 계급주의파 CCURA마저 분열되면서 UNT는 코포라티즘파의 지배력을 강화하게 되었지만 내적 조직력은 크게 약화되었고 노동계급 계급형성을 이루기 더욱 어렵게 만들었다. The labor union movement was expected to strengthen its organizational capacity in a close relationship with the pro-labor leftist Chavez regime in Venezuela. The labor union movement, however, has gone through incessant internal strife and organizational division, while a series of general strikes in demand for the resignation of president Chavez have manifested its relationship with the government far from being a cordial one. It is the objective of this study to explain why the labor union movement couldn`t grow stronger under a pro-labor leftist regime, why the labor union movement got involved in conflict with the government, and what kind of dilemma the labor union movement faced with and which strategic choice it tended to take. Although the Chavez regime kept highlighting its break with the 4th Republic, it couldn`t hide a significant extent of continuity regarding government`s active interference in labor union activities and industrial relations as well as the strong accountability of labor union movement to political parties. Owing to its accountability to the ruling parties of the 4th Republic, the CTV has waged general strikes against the Chavez regime. After all, the pro-Chavez forces built its own labor union confederation, UNT and thus formed a dual structure of labor union movement in Venezuela In this regard, the Chavez period presents a striking contrast with the 4th Republic with the monopolistic status of CIV. The pro-Chavez UNT was required to take the initiative of defending the Chavez regime against the incessant overthrow attempts while it was required to secure the autonomy of labor union movement from external forces including political parties and the Chavez regime above all. The UNT was forced to fall into a dilemma in the sense that the political imperative to defend the leftist regime and the classist imperative to secure union autonomy could contradict each other as both could not be realized at the same time. Owing to this dilemma, the UNT couldn`t avoid conflict between two blocs over the control and strategic position of UNT: one is the FSBT-led corporatist bloc which prioritizes the political imperative and the other is the CCURA-led classist bloc which prioritizes working class questions. This type of underlying organizational division makes it difficult for the UNT to strengthen its organizational capacity. In the end, the classist CCURA itself was divided into two segments over the formation of a new pro-Chavez party, so that the UNT came to lose its organizationa resources further for its own revitalization and working class formation, while the corporatist bloc came to consolidate its control further over the pro-Chavez labor union movement.

브라질 대통령선거와 계급투표

조돈문(Don-Moon Cho) 한국라틴아메리카학회 2009 라틴아메리카연구 Vol.22 No.1

It cannot be denied that the tendency of left-wing governments to gain political power in Latin America is due to the failure of neoliberal economic policies as well as social structural conditions such as high inequality level and widespread poverty, Despite the fact that this macro level causality is made from voting behaviors of individual citizens at the micro level, there hasn't been enough research on this subject. This study aims to provide a micro foundation for the explanation of the macro phenomenon of left-wing government revival, and thus conducts a comparative analysis of voting actions in 2002 and 2006 Brazilian presidential elections, which led the trend of Latin American left-wing government revival. Out of a comparative analysis of Brazilian presidential elections, this study came up with the following facts. First, both 2002 and 2006 presidential elections have shown the existence of class voting phenomenon at a significant level, and the tendency towards class voting was strengthened in 2006 presidential election, which proves the empirical validity of the class voting theory. Second, it can be said that true class voting took place in 2006 presidential election. In addition to the fact that the class voting tendency grew stronger, there was a bi-polarization between the pro-Lula bloc composed of non-privileged class categories and the anti-Lula bloc composed of privileged class categories, which strengthened the congruence of class location and class position. Third, in the case of class categories which showed a change in support rate for Lula between year 2002 and 2006, the support rate of non-privileged class categories went up, while the support rate of privileged class categories declined. This can also verify the class nature of Lula government indirectly. Fourth, bi-polarization between the privileged bloc and the non-privileged bloc regarding Lula government, and the subsequent strengthening of class voting tendency was shown not only among class categories, but also within each class category. Finally, relatively stronger bi-polarization in 2006 presidential election compared with year 2002 means that ideological bi-polarization developed under the left-wing Lula government, while social and economic bi-polarization developed under neoliberal economic policies.

노사관계 : 삼성그룹의 노동자 통제와 원형감옥

조돈문 ( Don Moon Cho ) 한국산업노동학회 2007 산업노동연구 Vol.13 No.2

산업재구조화와 노사관계 : 브라질 사웅파울루지역의 산업활성화를 위한 노사정 협력모델

조돈문 ( Don Moon Cho ) 한국산업노동학회 2007 산업노동연구 Vol.13 No.1

정보화와 노동과정의 변화 : 자본의 전략적 선택과 딜레마

조돈문 ( Don Moon Cho ) 한국산업노동학회 1996 산업노동연구 Vol.2 No.2

정규직 노동조합과 비정규직 정규직화의 정치 : 타타대우상용차 사례 연구

조돈문 ( Don Moon Cho ) 한국산업노동학회 2010 산업노동연구 Vol.16 No.1

비정규직 투쟁과 정규직 노동조합의 딜레마 : 캐리어와 지엠대우 창원공장의 사례연구

조돈문 ( Don Moon Cho ) 한국산업노동학회 2009 산업노동연구 Vol.15 No.2

스웨덴 노동시장의 유연성-안정성 균형 실험: 황금삼각형과 이중보호체계

조돈문 ( Don Moon Cho ) 한국산업노동학회 2015 산업노동연구 Vol.21 No.2

유연안정성 모델의 경험적 준거가 되었던 덴마크가 경제위기 속에서 노동시장의 유연성-안정성 균형을 유지하는데 실패했다는 비판이 제기되며, 유연성-안정성 균형의 실천에 대한 의구심이 커지게 되었다. 이렇게 제3의 사례를 통한 유연안정성 모델의 실천에 대한 경험적 연구의 필요성이 대두되었다. 본 연구의 목적은 유연안정성 정책 요소들의 황금삼각형이 스웨덴에서 유연성과 안정성을 동시에 구현하고 있는지, 부르주아 정부 출범과 경제위기 발발로 어떤 변화를 겪었으며, 여전히 유연성과 안정성의 균형을 유지하고 있는지를 분석하는 것이다. 스웨덴 노동시장은 높은 유연성과 높은 안정성의 결합이라기보다 높은 고용안정성과 높은 소득안정성을 동시에 보장하고 있다. 이는 전국 수준의 법규정에 의한 보호 층위와 산업ㆍ사업장 수준의 노동조합에 의한 보호 층위로 구성된 이중적 보호체계의 결과이다. 스웨덴의 황금삼각형이 노동자들에게 높은 수준의 고용안정성과 소득안정성을 보장해 주고 있지만 노동력 활용의 유연성을 원천적으로 금지하지는 않는다. 노동조합은 임시직 사용을 중심으로 한 노동력 활용의 유연성을 허용하되 철저하게 규제하는 전략을 취하고 있으며, 유연성의 부정적 효과를 최소화하기 위해 적극적 노동시장정책을 통한 직장보장 방식의 고용안정성과 사적 소득보장제도의 보완을 통한 소득안정성을 보장한다. 황금삼각형 정책요소들 가운데 가장 논란이 많은 것은 실업자 소득보장체계로서 총선시기마다 주요 선거쟁점으로 부각되었다. 논란의 핵심을 구성한 공적 실업자 소득보장제도의 자율적 실업보험제는 2007년 부르주아 정부의 노동시장 개혁 조치로 실업보험 수급요건 강화와 소득대체율 인하 등 큰 변화를 겪었다. 황금삼각형 정책요소들은 2007년 이후 경제위기 속에서도 별다른 변화를 겪지 않았다. 2007년 변화도 스웨덴 모델의 기본원칙이라 할 수 있는 긴축재정정책과 노동우선주의를 벗어나지 않은 것으로서 스웨덴 모델을 훼손하기보다 변화된 외적 여건에 대응한 조정 과정이라 할 수 있다. 또한 자율적 실업보험제의 변화에도 단체협약에 기초한 실업자 보상기금제 등 노동조합이 구축한 사적 소득보장제도의 완충역할로 인해 노동자들의 소득안정성에 미치는 부정적 효과가 최소화됨으로써 ‘관리된 유연성’과 함께 노동시장의 유연성-안정성 균형은 유지될 수 있었다. The criticism that Denmark, of which the flexicurity model had been an empirical standard, failed to maintain the flexibility-security balance during the financial crisis has cast doubts on the practice of the flexibility-security balance. That’s why we need to conduct empirical studies concerning the practice of flexicurity model with a third case. The present study aims to analyze whether the golden triangle of flexicurity policy factors realizes both flexibility and security at the same time, how the launch of bourgeois government and the outbreak of economic crisis has influenced the golden triangle, and whether the flexibility-security balance is being maintained. The Swedish labor market, rather than being a combination of high flexibility and high security, guarantees high security in both terms of employment and income. Such features are the results of the dual protection system which consists of the protection layer of nation-level legal regulation as well as the protection layer of industry-level labor unions. The Swedish golden triangle, while guaranteeing high employment security and income security for workers, does not outright deny the necessity of flexibility in labor utilization. Labor unions allow yet strictly regulate the flexibility of labor utilization mainly via temporary worker employment. In order to minimize the adverse effects of flexibility, labor unions try to guarantee employment security and income security through active labor market policies and complementation of private income protection measures. The income protection system for unemployed workers, as most controversial among those three policy factors of the golden triangle, has kept emerging as one of the core campaign issues during recent general election times. The voluntary unemployment insurance policy of the public income protection system for unemployed workers, has undergone major changes such as strengthened eligibility requirements or the reduction of the replacement rate, as part of the 2007 labor market reform. The policy factors of the golden triangle has not changed much since 2007. The 2007 reform, which reinforced the fiscal austerity policy and the labor principle as basic principles of the Swedish model, was rather a process of adjustment in the face of changing external conditions. Moreover, the adverse effects of changes in the voluntary unemployment insurance policy were minimized by the buffering role of the private income protection measures, so that the flexibility-security balance of the labor market along with ‘managed flexibility’ could be maintained.

비정규직 문제와 정규직 노동자들의 내적 이질성

조돈문(Cho Don-Moon) 비판사회학회 2009 경제와 사회 Vol.- No.82

고용형태 균열은 노동계급의 내적 통합과 계급형성에 큰 걸림돌로 부각되고 있으며, 국내 선행연구들도 물질적 조건의 양극화, 정규직과 비정규직 사이의 위계적 사회관계와 함께 정규직 이기주의의 실체를 확인해주고 있다. 정규직과 비정규직의 잠재적인 상호적대성과 노동계급 계급형성의 미스매치 현상은 노동계급 계급형성 주체의 교체 필요성을 제기하고 있으나, 정규직 노동자들의 내적 이질성 여부에 대한 체계적 분석은 아직 이루어지지 않았다. 본 연구는 비정규직 문제에 대한 정규직 노동자들의 의식 편차를 분석하여 그 원인과 인과적 메커니즘을 규명하고자 했으며, 핵심적 연구결과는 세 가지로 정리될 수 있다. 첫째, 정규직 노동자들이 비정규직 문제에 관심을 갖지 않고 정규직 이기주의를 보이는 것은 물질적 이해관계에 기초한 개인적 합리성의 표현으로서 자연스런 현상이다. 그러나 이들은 특별한 계기들을 통해 계급적 합리성의 개입을 겪으면서 비로소 비정규직연대 의식을 배양하게 된다. 둘째, 정규직 노동자들이 비정규직 문제에 대한 무관심과 정규직 이기주의를 극복하는데 기여하는 특별한 계기들로는 노동조합 간부 활동, 노동시장 경험, 비정규직 접촉이 유의미한 것으로 확인되었다. 노동조합 간부 활동은 계급적 합리성을 일상적으로 실천하게 하며, 노동시장 경험은 비정규직 노동자 문제를 직 ? 간접적으로 경험하게 하고, 비정규직 접촉은 비정규직과 친밀한 인간관계를 형성하고 비정규직의 시각을 공유하게 한다. 셋째, 정규직 노동자들의 내적 편차는 비정규직 노동자들과 함께 노동계급 계급형성을 주도할 정규직 주체들을 확인해주며, 계급형성과 관련된 실천적 함의는 노동조합 간부 효과와 비정규직 접촉 효과에서 잘 나타난다. 노동시장 경험 효과는 연령 효과에 의해 상쇄될 수 있는 반면, 노동조합 간부 효과는 노동조합 실천의 직접적 결과이며 비정규직 접촉 효과는 노동조합이 비정규직과의 접촉 기회를 의도적으로 배치함으로써 비정규직연대 의식을 강화시킬 수 있는 것이다. Class cleavage along the type of employment emerges as a major obstacle to working class formation, and preceding studies have confirmed the existence of regular worker selfishness as well as the hierarchical character of regular-irregular worker relationship. Given the mismatch situation in working class formation as well as the potential contradiction of interests between regular workers and irregular workers, working class may need to change its core agent for class formation from regular workers to irregular workers. However, some regular workers are more willing to ally with irregular workers than others, although there has not been a solid set of studies on the possibility of significant heterogeneity among regular workers. It is the aim of this study to analyze variance of position among regular workers regarding irregular worker issues so as to identify major causes and causal mechanisms in explaining regular worker variance. Major findings of this study can be summarized as following. First, while it is not unnatural for regular workers to show indifference to the irregular worker issues and regular worker selfishness which is a manifestation of individual-level rationality based on immediate material interests, regular workers could cultivate the consciousness of class solidarity by internalizing class-level rationality through unnatural moments. Second, regular workers need particular moments such as union activist role, labor market experience of restructuring and everyday contact with irregular workers in order to overcome selfishness and enhance sensitivity to the irregular worker issues. Regular workers could practice class-level rationality through union activist roles, they could experience irregular worker hardship directly or indirectly in the process of restructuring in the labor market, and they could build up intimate relationship with irregular workers and share their viewpoints through everyday contacts. Third, the pattern of variance among regular workers could tell us who could join the group of core agents for the project of working class formation and give us some strategical guidelines regarding that project. Those with the experience of labor market restructuring are relatively older than others, so that their consciousness of irregular worker issues could be offset by the age effect. On the other hand, labor unions could keep providing opportunities for the rank-and-file regular workers to participate in union activist roles, and they could also encourage union members to accumulate contacts and thus build up cordial relationship with irregular workers through various union activities.