국제학술대회 동아시아의 평화와 한반도의 통일 : 토론요지 ( 정영화 )

정영화 국제헌법학회 한국학회 1997 世界憲法硏究 Vol.2 No.-

합성형의 Prestressing 보강

정영화 한국강구조학회 1991 韓國鋼構造學會誌 Vol.3 No.1

한국고고학의 반세기 : 구석기시대

정영화 한국고고학회 1995 한국고고학전국대회 발표문 Vol.- No.19

'스콜라' 이용 시 소속기관이 구독 중이 아닌 경우, 오후 4시부터 익일 오전 7시까지 원문보기가 가능합니다.

가변 스텝 크기 MSAG-GMMA 적응 블라인드 등화 알고리즘의 성능 평가

정영화,Jeong, Young-Hwa 한국인터넷방송통신학회 2018 한국인터넷방송통신학회 논문지 Vol.18 No.3

본 논문은 가변 스텝 크기를 가지는 MSAG-GMMA(modified Stop-and-Go generalized multi modulus algorithm) 적응 블라인드 등화 알고리즘의 성능 분석에 관한 것이다. 제안한 알고리즘은 등화 계수 갱신 식에서 고정 스텝 크기에 결정지향 알고리즘의 오차신호의 크기를 곱하여 오차크기에 따라서 스텝 크기가 변하도록 하였다. 또한 결정지향 알고리즘의 오차신호의 크기를 판단하여 어느 임계값 이상에서는 정상상태로의 빠른 수렴 속도를 유지하도록 스텝 크기가 고정인 값을 가지는 MSAG-GMMA가 동작하고, 미만일 때는 스텝 크기가 가변되는 MSAG-GMMA가 동작하도록 하였다. 제안한 알고리즘의 성능을 평가하기 위하여 성능 지수로 앙상블 ISI, 앙상블-평균 MSE, 그리고 등화기의 출력으로 얻어지는 등화 후 신호점도를 사용하였다. 모의실험을 통하여 제안한 알고리즘이 MMA, GMMA, 그리고 MSAG-GMMA보다 빠른 수렴 속도와 정상상태에서 작은 잔류 오차를 가짐을 확인하였다. This paper is concerned with the performance analysis of a modified stop-and-go generalized multi-modulus algorithm (MSAG-GMMA) adaptive blind equalization algorithm with variable step size. The proposed algorithm multiplies the fixed step size by the error signal of the decision-oriented algorithm in the equalization coefficient update equation, and changes the step size according to the error size. Also, the MSAG-GMMA having a fixed step size is operated so as to maintain a fast convergence speed from a certain threshold to a steady state by determining the error signal size of the decision-directed algorithm, and when the MSAG-GMMA to work To evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm, we use the ensemble ISI, ensemble-averaged MSE, and equalized constellation obtained from the output of the equalizer as the performance index. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm has faster convergence speeds than MMA, GMMA, and MSAG-GMMA and has a small residual error in steady state.

[내 마음속 목자] 화를 못 내시는 신부님

정영화 미래사목연구소 2021 사목정보 Vol.14 No.3

韓國의 舊石器

鄭永和 한국고고학회 1986 韓國考古學報 Vol.19 No.-

'스콜라' 이용 시 소속기관이 구독 중이 아닌 경우, 오후 4시부터 익일 오전 7시까지 원문보기가 가능합니다.

The Reforms for the Market Economy of Korea Constitution

정영화 세계헌법학회한국학회 2009 世界憲法硏究 Vol.15 No.3

This Paper is concerned with the limits between rule-of-law and economic development, and a trade off an economic democracy and political democracy in South Korea from 1945 to 2010. In chronically five stages of the economic development and law is analysized as followings: The first stage(1945-1960): the command economy had the provisions of Constitution and had relied upon three elements. Putting off a privatization to expropriate Japanese properties and Authoritarianism and dictatorship in political system and no establishment market incomplete administration and infallible scarcity The second stage(1961-1987): the beginning of a mixed economy in according to the Coup. A Strong State on the basis of 5-year-Economy-Development Planning focused on a principle of free enterprise and private initiative, but practiced a direct intervention in private economic actions and a indirect guide to industry and import policy. In particular, there were insufficient intermediary institutions to sustain a market economy, because government paid attention to foster private enterprises and economic market. The dictatorship replaced a rapid economic development of political democracy as its safety-net of political regime in 1970s. The third stage( 1980-1987): this period was so called a post-mixed capitalism. The second Coup's government caught a slogan "small government", it breached the rule of law and was against a political democracy at that time. That government managed economic policy under the direct and Indirect Control on the private enterprises such as ‘social market economy’. However government enacted the anti-monopoly Act of 1980 to check the market competition against big companies. In particular, amendment of constitution was due to of Citizen’s Protest in 1987 and is compromise between Leftism and conservatism in political area resulted in “Economic Democracy” provision (Article 119) of Constitutional Law. The fourth stage (1988-1997): this period was called Post Democracy. In 1992 ‘Civil Government reformed institutions to foster market economy and political democracy as followings: Cleaning off “Coup military group”, preparing for “Globalization” and “Open Economy” to take part in OECD. However civil government did not realized an Institutional reform to establish "Rule-of-Law State, and Market Institutions of ‘hard state’, but it confronted with ‘foreign currency crisis’ 1997. The excessive political democracy resulted in an economic crisis and hard state. The fifth stage(1998-2007): This period was called an Economic Democracy and Populism. Market Economic Democracy could not guarantee national prosperity, but brought about populism, and it distorted the role of law and market mechanism i.e., regulation policy of real property, imposed an excessive taxation in the name of neo-liberalism and recycling from economic democracy to political populism. Economic Populism leads to soft-state (centralized government), sequentially failed in both market and government and informed the value of rule-of-law State to next government! Populism breached the limit of rule of Law and market economy in 2000s. The Conclusion is examined the perspectives and value of Rule-Of-Law State as follow: Market is democratic & objective mechanism of resource distribution. Market matters more than State! Law has inherent Tension with Economy and Polity. For Prosperity of State in Democracy, Government should be more limited, but Market should be more free. This Paper is concerned with the limits between rule-of-law and economic development, and a trade off an economic democracy and political democracy in South Korea from 1945 to 2010. In chronically five stages of the economic development and law is analysized as followings: The first stage(1945-1960): the command economy had the provisions of Constitution and had relied upon three elements. Putting off a privatization to expropriate Japanese properties and Authoritarianism and dictatorship in political system and no establishment market incomplete administration and infallible scarcity The second stage(1961-1987): the beginning of a mixed economy in according to the Coup. A Strong State on the basis of 5-year-Economy-Development Planning focused on a principle of free enterprise and private initiative, but practiced a direct intervention in private economic actions and a indirect guide to industry and import policy. In particular, there were insufficient intermediary institutions to sustain a market economy, because government paid attention to foster private enterprises and economic market. The dictatorship replaced a rapid economic development of political democracy as its safety-net of political regime in 1970s. The third stage( 1980-1987): this period was so called a post-mixed capitalism. The second Coup's government caught a slogan "small government", it breached the rule of law and was against a political democracy at that time. That government managed economic policy under the direct and Indirect Control on the private enterprises such as ‘social market economy’. However government enacted the anti-monopoly Act of 1980 to check the market competition against big companies. In particular, amendment of constitution was due to of Citizen’s Protest in 1987 and is compromise between Leftism and conservatism in political area resulted in “Economic Democracy” provision (Article 119) of Constitutional Law. The fourth stage (1988-1997): this period was called Post Democracy. In 1992 ‘Civil Government reformed institutions to foster market economy and political democracy as followings: Cleaning off “Coup military group”, preparing for “Globalization” and “Open Economy” to take part in OECD. However civil government did not realized an Institutional reform to establish "Rule-of-Law State, and Market Institutions of ‘hard state’, but it confronted with ‘foreign currency crisis’ 1997. The excessive political democracy resulted in an economic crisis and hard state. The fifth stage(1998-2007): This period was called an Economic Democracy and Populism. Market Economic Democracy could not guarantee national prosperity, but brought about populism, and it distorted the role of law and market mechanism i.e., regulation policy of real property, imposed an excessive taxation in the name of neo-liberalism and recycling from economic democracy to political populism. Economic Populism leads to soft-state (centralized government), sequentially failed in both market and government and informed the value of rule-of-law State to next government! Populism breached the limit of rule of Law and market economy in 2000s. The Conclusion is examined the perspectives and value of Rule-Of-Law State as follow: Market is democratic & objective mechanism of resource distribution. Market matters more than State! Law has inherent Tension with Economy and Polity. For Prosperity of State in Democracy, Government should be more limited, but Market should be more free.

의회개혁과 국가경쟁력- 양원제 도입의 논거로서 13대-17 총선거의 실증분석-

정영화 세계헌법학회한국학회 2005 世界憲法硏究 Vol.11 No.1

This paper is concerned with to what extent can political representatives exploit their political power to appropriate resources for themselves at the voters' expense. In particular, through analysis of total elections from 13rd(1988) to 17th(2004) showed a distorted representative for local or parties' interest instead of all nations' interest by those elections. The conflict of interest between local voters and rent-seeking political representative is an old theme of the public choice(virginia) school and is perhaps most clearly spelled out in Brennan and Buchanan's(1980) model of the government as a malevolent revenue-maximizing Leviathan. According to our interpretation of constitutional law, should the congress has been representative for all of nations? An analysis on 13th-17th total elections showed local electoral overcompetition as malfunction against a political democracy and aligned between the politicians' & political parties' interests and voters' interests consistently. we show that no electoral promises could be enforced in their local levels. The political constitution is viewed as an incomplete contract: politicians have complete discretion once in office, and all voters can do is oust them from office at the next elections. The central tension is still between policies and please the voters and rents appropriated by the politicians. But the role of elections is different from non-verificability, non-observability and non-enforcebility of electoral promises. I discuss two ways in which elections can discipline the incumbent. In the electoral accountability model, citizens vote retrospectively and deliberately punish bad removing misbehaving incumbents from office. In the constitutional customs, bicameral system is superior to unicameral system, we should take a consideration of bicameral system in order to be ready for the south-north korea integration someday.

남북평화번영을 위한 헌법적 과제 ―남북한 통합정책에 관한 헌법정책론의 검토―

정영화 한국공법학회 2005 公法硏究 Vol.33 No.5

This paper explores how such questions might be answered. We want to explain the interpretation of the legal status between South-North Korea in an existing modern constitutional law of South Korea; Who does determines political integration as a federal state or a unitary state; What and How can be formed an economic integration style such as an economic union or a common market between South and North Korea? When searching for an answer to these questions, we reach the boundary between theory of constitutional interpretation and theory of constitutional policy. When a constitutional interpretation theory can not take consideration a constitutional policy and fundamental jurisprudence for example, a legal justice or a peace principle, if these would be deteriorated by reason of situation, in consequently politicians would misuse constitutional interpretation to justify their political determination and constitutional law is little more than a name. We want to understand how integration policy decision of south-north Korea are made, what shapes the incentives and constraints of the policy-makers taking those decisions, and how conflicts these policy are resolved. It is popular to refer to research in this area as “constitutional law policy.” Sometimes that term is used to suggest an alternative analytical approach, as if the traditional tools of constitutional law interpretation were not appropriate to study political behavior and economic phenomena such as system integration

Platelet Activaiong Factor Acetylhydrolase의 대량 생산법 개발

정영화,장현욱,이태윤 대한미생물학회 2006 Journal of Bacteriology and Virology Vol.36 No.4