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This paper empirically investigates the effect of capital structure on investment decision. According to the agency theory on capital structure, the relation between leverage and investment decision is negative because firms use less debt in order to reduce the agency cost derived from under investment. But in the signalling model on capital structure the relation of those indicates positive that the increase of leverage implies the increase of future profitability in firms The analysis is conducted with listed companies of securities exchange throughout the years 1993 to 2000. In the regression model of investment equation, investment is capital expenditure divided by total assets and leverage is defined as the ratio of total debts to the book value of total assets. Control variables include Tobin's Q ratio, firm size, equity ownership, cash flow, dividend, firm's size, tangible assets, sales growth. Ordinary least squares regression results suggest that capital structure affects negative significantly on investment decision in high and low growth firms. This means that the agency theory on capital structure is applied to listed companies in Korea. On the other hand, investment is also negatively correlated with leverage in capital structure model. The evidence shows that capital structure affects investment, and vice versa.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between the investment opportunity set and capital structure, dividend policy, and executive compensation policy variables, as a major corporate policy. Using the data of 150 listed firms from 1987 to 1996, the factor analysis has been conducted in order to classify as growth firms and non growth firms, then the regression analysis has been used between corporate policy variables and the investment opportunity set. The results of empirical test indicate the investment opportunity set has a significantly negative relation to debt financing. This means because equity financing controls the potential underinvestment problem associated with risky debt, firms with more growth options have lower debt/equity ratios than nongrowth firms. This relation is consistent with contracting arguments and inconsistent with signaling hypothesis. Also as expected, firm size is positively related to the use of debt financing. The dividend policy variable has a negative relation with the investment opportunity set. This provides qualified evidence that growth firms pay lower dividends than nongrowth firms due to lower free cash flow. Firm size is significantly positively related to dividend payout. The results for compensation policy present that growth firms pay higher levels of remuneration to their executives than nongrowth firms. The estimated coefficient on investment opportunity is significantly positive on the regression of compensation.
This paper is to examine the relevance of banarptcy Costs (BC) to Capital Structure with three related purposes: whether or not BC are trival, a proxy methodology for estimating BC, the present value of expected BC vs tax benefit's trade off. For these purposes, the samples includes 19 industrial firms which went bankrupt over period 1970-78 and secondly seven large Companies which went bankrnpt recently in the U.S. The results are quite strong that BC are not trival. In many cases they exceed 20% of the value of the firm measured just prior to bankruptcy. Direct BC are explicit and administrative costs paid by debtor in reorganization/liqaidation process. Indirect BC are essentially defined as unexpected losses and estimated in two way : a regression method and security analyst's forcasts. The present value of expected BC for many of the bankrupt firm is found to exceed the present value of tax benefits from leverage. This implies that firms were overleveraged and that a potentially important ingredient in the discussion of optimum capital structure is indeed the BC factor. Therefore, BC are relevant to the cost of capital stracture decision and sohuld be considered seriously.
This study investigates theoretically the factors that firms consider when choosing the maturity of their liabilities. The debt maturity decision is one of main financing choiecs and is when future cash flows should be paid out to debtholders. The literature includes four types of hypotheses about the determinants of corporate debt maturity structure. A firm's agency costs of debt, signals about quality risk, liquidity risk, tax status provide reliable predictions about its debt maturity. The agency cost hypotheses suggest that a firm's debt maturity decreases the larger the proportion of growth opportunities in its investment opportunity set, and the smaller its size. The signaling and liquidity risk arguments predict that high-quality firms use shorter-term debt, and firms with high or very low credit ratings use shorter-term debt, while other firms use longer-term debt. The tax hypotheses predict that debt maturity increases as a firm's effective tax rate increases, and firm value volatility decreases, and the slope of the term structure increases. In the empirical study with a sample of 328 firms, proxies for signaling, liquidity risk hypothesis are generally significant determinants of debt maturity choice, as predicted. But the agency cost and the tax hypotheses receive mixed support : the coefficient estimates on the variables are either insignificant or have the wrong sign inconsistent with the hypothesis.
This paper attempts an integrated explanation of the wealth experience of the bidder and target shareholders in terms of the synergy and ownership structure as a kind of agency problem while controlling for the bid dynamics variables. The synergy effects in mergers and acquisitions(M&A) include operational, managerial and financial synergy. The ownership structure is the status of the shares showing to the extent of equity for the interest parties. The synergy effects and ownership structure impact significantly on shareholder returns. Through the literature research, the effects of these factors on the abnormal returns to the shareholders are as follows; 1) the positive effect of the size of the synergistic benefits from M&A suggests the smaller the target the greater the wealth gains to target and bidder shareholders, but the industry relatedness is not significant for abormal returns of shareholders and does not lead to operational synergy. 2) the managerial efficiency is the positive impact on target shareholder returns and supports the managerial synergy hypothesis, but it is the significant negative coefficient to the bidder returns. 3) as the proxies for the financial synergy, the complementarity of the mismatch of resources and growth opportunities is the positive effect and a source of added value in mergers, but the difference between bidder and target in the ratio of liabilities to assets is the negative impacts on both shareholders groups. 4) although not significant, the managerial shareholdering has a positive coefficient to shareholder wealth gains. 5) large shareholdings decrease abnormal returns to both bidder and target shareholders whereas bidder toehold decreases the returns to target shareholders.
Recently there have been many efforts to explain the capital structure in terms of agency factors based ownership structure. Aqency theory is concerned with the study of contractual relationships that involve the delegation of some degree of decision making authority to one or more parties to the contract. Conflicting interests among parties to the contractual relationships may lead to suboptimal allocation of resource within the oganization. Agency costs are defined as the welfare loss caused by agency problems. The purpose of this study is to examine the significance of agency costs and whether agency costs are critical determinants of capital structure. In order to pursue the puspose of this study, literature survey has been made only. Advocates of the importance of agency costs argue that firms may be able to minimize the costs associated with external financing by carefully balancing the relative amounts of equity and debt in its financing strategy. Thus optimal debt-equity ratio may esist either as a result of trading off the relative agency costs associated with debt and equity or as a result of balancing the benefits and costs of debt capital alone. As a consequence, agency costs of equity and debt are minimized at the point where the marginal costs are equal, this point provides the internal optimal ratio of debt to equity for the firm. Therefore a marginal agency costs function for either debt of equity capital is a necessary condition for an optimal capital structure
The ether, methanol, and physiological saline extracts of the dried carpophores of ten basidiomycetous fungi, which were collected in the conifer woods of Chungnam National University at Taechon and Keyryoung Mountain Area in Chungcheungnamdo, were subjected to an antibiotic activity test by disc-plate method. Among them, the methanol extracts of Inocybe trechispora, Lactarius velumis, and Laccaria laccata and the ether extracts of I.trechispora showed antibiotic activities against Sarcina lutea; and the methanol extracts of I. trechispora and L. velumis and physiological saline extract of Coriolus versicolor showed antibiotic activities against Staphylococcus aureus; and the methanol extract of L. velumis showed antibiotic activity against Escherichia coli. None of the extracts, however, showed any activity against Serratia marcescens and Proteusvulgaris.
The purpose of this study is to examine the determinants effect of capital structure in the Listed Firms and Registered Firms. To this purpose, both literature survey and empirical test have been made. in theoretical parts, the recent theory of capital structure since MM have been briefly reviewed. In empirical analysis, firm attribute and agency factors considered significantly in previous theoretical and impirical researches estimated in 44 ways. PCA is made of the estimated variables and MRA is made of the final selected 7 variables. The results are summerized as follow; Firstly, firm's size and profitability among firm attribute factors have significant correlationship with capital structure, as pointed out in traditional finance theory. Secondly, business rick and non-debt tax shield variables have been found not to be significantly correlated with capital sturcture. Thirdly, growth opportunity and insider-equity ratio have been negatively correlated with capital structure and the firms which are high in these variables have to tendency to make less use of debt in order to reduce agency cost. Fourthly, asset formation variable has negatively significant correlationship which is different from the theoretical prediction. As pointed out above, the capital structure of Korean firms has been partially correlated with firm attribute variables as well as agency variables. Therefore agency theory in relation to the capital structure seems to have validity in Korean firms.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the promotion device of export industry for extending the trade with China in the situation that the change of international trade environment and the trade conflict among advanced countries are deepened. For this, this study surveys the actual conditions of local economy and industrial structure and analyzes the situations of export and import and export industry in Kwangju-Chonnam regions. To extend the trade with China, the following are required; (1) Priority of technology over China should be secured, (2) High added value ade differentiation of export goods are needed.(3) Thorough understanding of character and structure of Chinese market and (4) the consolidation of maketing system for private demand are required. To the promotion of esport industry, the governmental support devices are as follows; (1) Improvement of export support system and extension of support for improving competitiveness,(2) Adjustment of export industry structure for increasing added value,(3) Consolidation of cooperation for overseas trade and promotion of technology introduction, (4) Selection and cultivation of import substitute items and (5) Stabilization of interests and price and easy fund raising. As the devices in the side of enterprise, (1) the extension of technical development, (2) settlement of quality management system, (3) development of goods with high added value and (4) the construction of prfessional marketing system are required.