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          1927년 조선공산당의 분열과 그 성격

          임경석 ( Lim Kyong-sok ) 수선사학회 2017 史林 Vol.0 No.61

          The purpose of this paper is to identify the background of the split of the Korean Communist Party in 1927 and clarify the nature thereof. The 3rd Congress of the Korean Communist Party was held in two venues. One was held on December 20, 1927, and the other was held on February 27, 1928. One reason for the split was psychological. It was a sense of betrayal that they felt when they learned that certain party personnel secretly made their own inner circle and deceived the others. The anger they felt when they learned that they were deceived was the reason for the split of the party. Yet another reason for the split was a difference in policies. There was controversy surrounding the scope of applying the national united front. The mainstream of the party took a broad attitude. They did not hesitate to partner with pro-Japanese leaders. On the contrary, the non-mainstream group regarded alliance with pro-Japanese leaders as treason that disturbed the national united front movement. The two parties exclusively asserted their legitimacy. However, neither of them was superior in terms of legitimacy. The two parties can be considered to have divided the Korean socialist movement for many years.

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          해방직후 3.1운동 역사상의 분화

          임경석 ( Lim Kyong-sok ) 수선사학회 2018 史林 Vol.0 No.63

          After Korea's liberation, the historical perception on the March First Movement is not single. Three types of perception emerged. One of them was advocated by the political group that selected Rhee Syngman and Kim Gu as leaders. The perception is the view that thirty-three representatives of Koreans as a whole led the March First Movement, and that the provisional government of Korea inherited the legitimacy of the Movement The second one is the view that the March First Movement was led not by national bourgeoisie but by the populace. This view was advocated by the political bloc including socialists. The populace is understood to have included laborers, farmers, and petite bourgeoisie. Third view is to admit that, although 33 representatives of Koreans had various weak points, they played positive roles in conducting the March First Movement. The view saw that March First Movement was participated in by the four classes, laborers, farmers, petite bourgeois, and national bourgeoisie. This view was advocated by the group that pursued the unified March First memorial event.

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          1922년 베르흐네우딘스크 대회의 결렬

          임경석(Lim Kyong-sok) 고려사학회 2007 한국사학보 Vol.- No.27

          이 글의 연구 대상은 베르흐네우딘스크에서 열린 고려공산당 통합대회다. 1922년 10월 19일부터 28일까지 개최된 이 대회는 한국의 초창기 사회주의자들이 통일 공산당을 조직하기 위해서 열었던 큰 회합이었다. 이 대회는 결국 결렬되고 말았다. 대표자 자격 문제 때문이었다. 이르쿠츠크파는 러시아 령 소재 공산단체에서 파견된 대표자에게 의결권을 부여하자고 주장했다. 상해파는 그 반대의견을 내세웠다. 이견은 끝내 좁혀지지 않았다. 소수파의 위치로 전락한 이르쿠츠크파는 대회장에서 탈퇴해 버렸다. 대회장에는 두 그룹에 속하지 않는 신흥 사회주의 세력의 대표자들이 참석했다. 서울의 중립 조선공산당과 재일본 조선공산단체가 통합 공산당 결성 과정에 합류했던 것이다. 그들은 중립을 표방했다. 그러나 두 신흥 그룹의 대표자들은 중립적인 지위에 머물지 않고 이르쿠츠크파와 행동을 같이했다. 그들의 가세 덕분에 탈퇴파는 연합반대파의 외형을 띄게 됐다. 초창기 사회주의 운동의 내분 과정에는 코민테른과 러시아공산당의 조선문제 담당관들이 개입했다. 코민테른으로부터 대회 지도원으로 임명된 러시아공산당 극동국 간부들은 상해파를 지지했다. 불과 1년전인 1921년에 코민테른 극동비서부 임원들이 이르쿠츠크파를 지지한 사실과 대비된다. 초창기 사회주의 운동의 분쟁은 코민테른과 러시아공산당에 의해서 더욱 증폭되는 경향을 보였음을 알 수 있다. We are here concerned with the Convention of the Goryeo Communist Party, which was held at Verkhneudinsk on October 19-28. 1922. There were 128 delegates present. They came to this convention for the purpose of organizing the sole communist party. But the purpose never materialized because of the different opinion between two factions. The Shanghai faction proposed to eliminate all Russianized Koreans from the convention. This was not acceptable to the Irkutsk faction, which consisted mainly of Russianized Koreans. A Three-man delegation from Comintern, headed by Kubyak, were present at the convention. They supported the Shanghai faction's claim. Oweing to Kubyak the Shanghai faction occupied the majority. Conseqently all of the members of the Irkutsk faction walked out of the convention. They went to Chita, and resumed its meeting. It is necessary to keep in mind that delegates of two neutral groups-the Jeoseon Communist Party and Korean Communist Group in Tokyo-came to Verkhneudinsk. They represented the newly-rising communists in Korea and Japan. But acctually they didn't take a neutral attetude. They cooperated with the Irkutsk faction.

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          조봉암의 모스크바 외교

          임경석(Lim Kyong Sok) 역사비평사 2011 역사비평 Vol.- No.95

          In this paper I aim to explain the diplomatic activities of Jo Bong-Am toward Comintern. The assistant representative of Korean Communist Party, Jo Bong-Am performed the diplomatic feat. Actually he initiated the September Decision, adopted by the presidium of ECCI on September 21, 1925. The Korean Communist Party became the provisional branch of Comintern by the decision. On the other hand, the Preparatory Committee for establishing Korean Communist Party in Vladibostok(PCKCP), which had been in stiff competition with the KCP, was dissolved. The main cause of his achievement was the right-about-face of his competitor, Nam Man-Chun. He was sent by PCKCP to improve relationship with Comintern. Nevertheless, he betrayed PCKCP's trust in him and worked for the opposite party. Futhermore, a group of high-ranking Comintern officials, such as Voitinsky, Basiliev, supported Jo Bong-Am as best as they could. They was called ‘the Zinoviev group' in Comintern. Without their assistance, the adoption of the September Decision would have been impossible.

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          국민대표회의 원내 대표원단 연구

          임경석(Lim Kyong-sok) 고려사학회 2013 한국사학보 Vol.- No.51

          In this article, I would like to explore the decision making process of the Korean National Convention. Several studies state that the representatives determined their attitude based on their native places. Another study showes that the representatives determined their attitude on a voluntary basis. I disagree with these opinions. Not a representative but the floor negotiation group is the decisionmaker. There were 7 floor negotiation groups in the Korean National Convention: Gukminuihoi group, Irkutsk communist party group, Shanghai communist party group, Double Western group, Double southern group, Provisional government group, Peking group. The Korean National Convention broke down over the conflicting fractions: Gai-jo fraction and Chang-jo fraction. Each fraction was the united floor negotiation groups. For example, Gai-jo fraction was made up of three floor negotiation groups: Shanghai communist party group, Double Western group, Double southern group. On the other hand, Chang-jo fraction was comprised of three floor negotiation groups: Gukminuihoi group, Irkutsk communist party group, Peking group.

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          국민대표회의 폐막이후 창조파의 동향

          임경석 ( Kyong Sok Lim ) 연세대학교 국학연구원 2013 동방학지 Vol.0 No.163

          '스콜라' 이용 시 소속기관이 구독 중이 아닌 경우, 오후 4시부터 익일 오전 7시까지 원문보기가 가능합니다.

          이 글의 목적은 국민대표회의 폐막이후 창조파의 동향을 추적하고, 그들의 노력이 결국 실패하게 된 원인을 파악하는 데에 있다. 창조파와 코민테른 사이의 외교 교섭은 두 국면을 거쳤다. 첫 국면은 1923년 9월 초부터 10월 10일에 이르는 시기로서, 국민위원회 측의 5인 협상단과 코민테른 측을 대표하는 고려총국 위원진 양자 사이에 교섭이 이뤄졌다. 양측은 국민위원회를 정당 형태의 민족통일전선 기관으로 변경하는 데에 합의했다. 두번째 국면은 1923년 10월 10일부터 이듬해 2월 18일에 이르는 시기로서, 양측이 각각 후속 조치를 실행에 옮긴 시기이다. 국민위원회는 총회를 소집하여 10월 10일자 잠정 합의안을 인준하는 절차를 밟았다. 그러나 코민테른 내부에서는 조선 문제를 둘러싸고 두개의 의견 그룹이 형성되었다. 하나는 한국국민위원회를 중심으로 민족통일전선 기관을 구축하자는 보이틴스키 그룹이고, 다른 하나는 국민위원회가 그럴만한 성질을 갖추지 못했으므로 조선 내지의 대중운동에 기반을 둔 새로운 민족통일전선 기관을 구축해야 한다고 주장하는 쿠시넨 그룹이었다. 양자의 대결은 후자의 승리로 귀결되었다. 러시아로 간 창조파 그룹이 실패하게 된 원인은 기본적으로 그 내부에 있었다. 민족통일전선을 구축하려는 주관적 지향과 민족해방운동 대열을 분열시켜 버린 방법이 상충됐다. 또한 창조파 그룹의 주체적 역량과 그들이 추구했던 목표 사이에도 모순이 존재했다. 이러한 불일치가 국민위원회에 대한 반대 여론을 낳는 근거가 되었다. In this article, I would like to explore the activity of Changjopa after the closing ceremony of the National Convention. ‘Changjopa' was the name given to a board of representativies who ignored the tradition of Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai. At the final day of the National Convention, the board established new governmental organ called ``Korean National Council``. Changjopa entered into a process of negotiation with Comintern in order to gain support of the latter. The negotiation between both sides went through the two-step process. In the first process lasted from the beginning of September 1923 until October 10th of that year, delegations from Changjopa and Korean Bureau of Comintern sat down at the negotiating. Both parties reached an agreement reorganizing the Korean national Council to the national united front in the form of political party. The second process lasted from October 10th 1923 until February 18th 1924. During this time period both parties took follow-up measures. Changjopa held its plenary session and approved bill of mutual agreenent. On the contrary Executive Committee of Comintern rejected approval of the bill. One of the leading causes of Cangjopa`s failure was the arrogance of their own. They regarded themself as the highest organization of the Indefendence movement, but really was not. In reality Changjopa was only part of the whole Korean revolutionaries. This disagreement provided a basis for the opposition to Changjopa.

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          반식민주의 역사인식과 마르크스주의 -박진순의 개벽 기고문을 중심으로-

          임경석 ( Kyong Sok Lim ) 수선사학회 2016 史林 Vol.0 No.56

          This study seeks to identify what role the socialist Park Jin-sun``s contributions to the magazine Gaebyeok played in Korean society under the rule of Japanese imperialism. He discussed the theories and methods of the Marxist Interpretation of history, and insisted that the history of Korea should be researched thereon. He based his understanding of history on the two keywords of people and scientification, and sought to put his thoughts to practice. His research on history focused on the exploration of the necessary conditions of Korean revolution. He was not a history scholar. Before specialist researchers emerged, he led the way in presenting the Marxist theories and methods for research on Korean history. Park Jin-sun``s articles represented the policies of the National United Front by the Shanghi communist group. His position confronted the main group of the Korean Communist Party, which did not regard the new faction of Cheondoism as a partner of the National United Front. However, Park Jin-sun took a different position. He regarded the new faction of Cheondoism as the true main force for constructing the National United Front, because the new faction had great influence among the farming people, and because it inherited the revolutionary tradition of March First Independence Movement. Thus, Park Jin-sun pushed ahead with the policy to enlist the farmer``s organization Joseon-nongminsa, a group of Cheondoism, in the Peasant International, and led the way in performing the organization``s Comintern diplomacy.

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