1989년 이후, "프랑스혁명"에 대한 연구사적 검토

이주천,김진환 원광대학교 인문학연구소 2006 열린정신 인문학연구 Vol.7 No.-

Above all, the French Revolution was one of the most popular topics among the Korean scholars whose majors are the European history, because the French Revolution itself had deeply influenced the course of the European modern history and the world history. Considering this reason, two writes Lee, Ju Cheon and Kim, Jin Hwan have analyzed most of the articles with the topic of the French Revolution which have been written since 1989 and have divided these articles with three sectors; the Characters of the French Revolution, the various aspects of the French Revolution and the viewpoint of the cultural history. Finally, Lee and Kim will remark future's prospect in indicating the articles which show the methodological research trend and the significant meaning. According to the retrospect and the prospect from which Lee and Kim have summarized these articles, three points below are emphasized. First, not only the object of study and the viewpoint have been diversified and but also the study manpower has been gradually increased. Especially, some remarkable scholars whose major are literature and politics participate and analyze the French Revolution with new and fresh viewpoint. Secondly, the new aspects and the new method with which many scholars have challenged the traditional interpretation of the French Revolution. For example, the volume of articles which deal with women affairs, and the approach of historical film, and the semiotic analysis. have been increased. These new trends have the research areas of the Western history more wide and more deep. Finally, many articles are empirically or positively well-written, but theoretically speaking, they are lacking of the creative interpretation.

開戰 初期 루즈벨트의 對蘇政策과 「제1차 소비에트 의정서」

李柱天 전북대사학회 1997 전북사학 Vol.19ㆍ20 No.-

美國의 對中國軍事援助(1942~1944) : General Joseph W.Stillwell's war efforfs in China Joseph W.Stilwell將軍의 활동을 중심으로

李柱天 圓光大學校 1989 論文集 Vol.23 No.1

This study is intended to deal with the different expectation between the United States and the Republic of China, especially the conflict between Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and General Joseph W.Stilwell in the proceeding of the American military aid to China during the World War Ⅱ. In doing this, I will search for what Stiwell's reform plans of the Chinese Army were and why Chiang refused his ideas. Consequently, I will reinterpretate Stilwell's activity and his plans for the Chinese Army. In July of 1937, as the fighting in China intensified developing in a major war, the Untied States re-sponse in China remained cautious. However, a number of Americans were helping to develop a militaty aviation in China. Chief among them was Colonel Claire L. Chennault, who retired from the American Army Air Force in 1937. The Lend-Lease Act became law in March 11, 1941, and Chennault started to organize the American Volunteer Group(AVG). The difficulties that arose in processing Chinese request of Lend-Lease arms suggested to several officers that the War De-partment take some positive action to improve the handling of Lend-Lease to China. On July 3, 1941, the American Military Mission to China was sent to China by the War Department. The head of the mission, General John Magruder reported to the Wat Department in tones of mild optimism regarding the creation of an effective Chinese Army. On December 7, 1941, the Japanese suddenly attacked the Pearl Harbor. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill created a China-Burma-India Theater, and they appointed Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as Supreme Commander of China Theater. Chiang asked that an American be sent to act as chief of his Allied staff. So President Roosevelt sent General Stilwell to China, because Gen-eral George C. Marshall recommanded Stilwell as a suitable officer to reorganize the Chinese Army. The War Department ordered to improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army. Stilwell was given four posts:Joint Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander, China Theater;Commanding General of a U.S.task force,"U.S."Forces in China-Burma-India Theater";U.S.Representative on the Al-lied militaty council in Chungking;and Representative of the President of Lend-Lease affairs. When Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek sent General Stilwell to Burma to conduct the firstBurma campaign, Stilwell was unprepared for the situation which he found there. Neither the Chinese nor the British commanders wished to sacrifice their men and material. In the spring of 1942, the Japanese quickly overran Burma and effectively isolated China. Stilwell attributed this militaty defeat in Burma to Chiang's intervention. The military debacle in Burma convinced Stiwelll that China could only play an important role on the war if its armies were thorouhgly reorganized and used to reopen Burma. When he returned to Chugking, he presented Chiang with "notes"calling for complete reorganization of the Chinese Army. However, Chiang could not easily accept Stilwell's reform propesals, because of China's military structure and its relation to political power. The Chinese Army a coalition army, but not a uni-fied national force. The Chinese forces were in reality large bands of lightly armed and poored trained men, who were not in contact with the Japanese, and could not maintain fighting against the Japanese. The Generalissimo directly controlled only about thirty divisions, meaning that the bulk of his power rested on the skillful balancing of competing interests. He attempted to manipulate reginal com-manders by making vital funds and supplies dependent of their obedience. Furthermore, the Chinese system of conscription was neither fair nor impartial. Stilwell believed that the Hump airlift was an emergency routes. The long term solution, he knew, was to cut off the Japanese blockade so that a supply-flow great enough to equip entire armies could begin. Burma was the logical place, and the retaking Burma became his singly-minded passion. By the end of May, 1942, Stilwell planed the detail of reconquest. Nine thousand Chinese troops had escaped from the Burma disaster, and he wished to make these the nucleus of a well-trained Chinese-American force which would strike back at the Japanese on China's flank. A military camp in Cen-tral India, called Ramgarh, was established to train these troops. At Kumning, within China, another training center would be established;here Americans would organize a thirty division Chinese force to strike down the Burma road into Burma with the Ramgarh Chinese force striking from India. A third center for training Chinese was to be established in eastern China, at Kweilin. These three forces were called respectively X, Y,and Z. Chiang, while fully knowledgable of Stilwell's proposals, continued to delay the reforms because they would reduce his power structure. So Chiang did everything to prevent to this, and eliminate the troublesome American. On the other hand, Stilwell's attitude toward Chiang and his regime became increasingly contemptuous and impatient. Chiang soon found General Chennault as a strong rival to Stilwell. On April 30, 1943, President Roosevelt, hearing of the disagreements between Chiang and Stilwell and realizing the damage they were causing to the war effort aganinst Japan, recalled Stilwell and Chennault to washington. Chennault's plan was to use China as a platform for mounting an air of-fensive against vitals of Japan. He described the type of aircraft he would breed to accomplish the mission. Stilwell replied, "Any increased air offensive that stung the Japs enough would bring a strong reaction that would wreck everything and put China out of war. The first step was to get a ground force capable of seizing and holding airbases, and opening communications to China from the outside world." The president endorsed to Chennault's plan because of his political support of Chiang and be-cause he believed the air program would encourage Chinese morale. The president's decision made Stilwell's plan delayed and damaged. Stilwell started the second Burma campaign in January, of 1944. He had to deal with the three ob-stacles;the British's lack of cooperation, Chiang's refusal of using Y-force, and the Japanese strong resistance. After the Middle of May, the battle areas became a nightmare because of the monsoom weather. So the decisive victory, which Stilwell hoped, could not be obtained. In the mean time, the strong Japanese offensive operation, known as operation Ichigo stroke the Chi-nese forces back to the interior land. The japanese also wiped out American airbases in eastern China used by the B-29's for raids of Japan. The Generalissimo appealed to the President for emergency help. Stilwell saw the moment to suggest again that Chiang should give him full commander power. He wanted full authority to conduct China's war effort and even to utilize Communist forces, which Chiang stubbornly refused. So relations between Stilwell and Chiand became beyong repair. General Patrick Hurley was sent to China as the presidential emissary to solve this crisis. Hurley finally re-quested to Roosevelt, "Stilwell should go out." Roosewelt faced a election for a fourth term in just a few weeks, and to break with Chiang, on the eve of election, might be a political risk. Therefore he chose Chiang, and recalled Stilwell. Stilwell's recall was a major event affecting Chinese-Americam relations. In 1943, the President had a strong faith for China and the Generalissomo. But after Stilwell's recall, the President and his militaty advisors became to lose interest in a major effort to support China. The strategic situation in the Pacific and the possibility of the Soviet participation to the war against Japan also greatly lessened the possibility of the Soviet participation to the dependence of the United States on Chinese cooperation. The event of 1944 helped to formulate the Yalta agreement. After Chiang's regime collapsed in 1948, many historians argued that Stilwell's plan would be a wiser alternative to save China from the postwar internal crisis. However, in my opinion, Stilwell's reform plan was merely a military solution. Therefore Chiang's regime would not have survived for a long time, even if Stilwell's plan had been accepted by Chiang, because the political system and economic chaos in China even made the postwar situation more deteriorated.

프랭클린 루즈벨트 (Franklin D. Roosevelt) 大統領과 冷戰의 起源

李柱天 圓光大學校 1988 論文集 Vol.22 No.1

This study is intended to examine Franklin D. Roosevelt's foreign policy toward the Soviet Union during the Second World War in order to determine how and why the Cold War started. To find the origins of the Cold War, I try to focus on Roosevelt's personal diplomacy to Stalin and his decisions made at the Yalta Conference. Without the understanding of the Yalta Conference, it would be impossible to discuss the Cold War issues. The "Big Three" met in February 1945, at the Russian Black Sea resort of Yalta.At the time the three leaders met at Yalta, the Anglo-American armies were still west of the Rhine, recovering from the Hitler's last winter offensive, 'Battle of the Bulge,' while the Red Armies were within 100 miles of Berlin. Therefore, at Yalta Stalin was to be in a doubly advantageous position, for the conference took place not only on the morrow of a severe allied reverse and at the moment of the Red Armies great military victories, but also at a time of Anglo-American suspiction and discord. To President Roosevelt and his American advisors of the Yalta delegation, Britain's imperialism seemed a more dangerous obstacle to the postwar peace than the Soviet Union. The establishment of the United Nations was a major American preoccupation at Yalta. Knowing that American public opinion would not permit him to commit troops to Europe for any length of time after Germany's surrender, Roosevelt wanted to draw the Big Three into a postwar international organization before particular issues could divide them into opposing camps. Through the United Nations, he hoped to achieve a selfenforcing peace settlement that would not require American enterprise could work freely. The immediate issue was the question of the treatment of Germany after her defeat. The Big Three reaffirmed their agreement that Germany must surrender unconditionally, be disarmed, and be denazified. Occupation zones were brought in to occucy one zone at the insistence of Churchill, who foresaw Britain left alone facing Russia in Europe. But no agreement could be reached on reparations either. Stalin supported by Roosevelt, proposed that a total of $20 billion in reparations from Germany plus forced labor be drawn from all the occupation zones: Russia get halt of this total. While the German question had the most serious repercussions in Europe during the postwar period, the problem which occupied the most time at Yalta was Poland. Roosevelt found himself in no position to gain from Stalin's concessions for the Polish Government in London. Stalin made it clear that Russia required a "friendly" Polish Government to guatrantee the future security of the Soviet Union. The Russians had tried to pretermine the Polish settlement by recognizing a hand-picked government in the areas already occupied by Soviet troops. Roosevelt and Churchill got Stalin to accept the "reorganization" of this new government to include some pro-Western Poles, and to promise future elections. While Roosevelt's greatest wish was to provide for the creation of international security organization, Churchill and Stalin desired only a permanent alliance between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union: they hoped to create relative spheres of influence in postwar Europe. They thought that Roosevelt's design for the international organization would be naive and unrealistic. Roosevelt's design for United Nations was heavily weighted with members friendly or subordinate to the United States, and it provided for the right of veto over any actions taken against the wishes of any one of the Big Three. Stalin accepted Roosevelt's design, without showing much interest, after a compromise had been reached on Poland and after the addition of two Russian states-the Ukraine and White Russians voting members. Churchill accepted the design on the condition that the trusteeship provisions for United Nations supervision of former colonies would apply to "not one scrap of British Territories." Roosevelt agreed to hold the U.N. general conference in the United States. The place set was San Francisco: the time, April 25, 1945. United Nations was based on the assuption, as Roosevelt said, that the great powers would consider themselves "morally bound not to go to war against other nation." The choice America faced was either to work to achieve cooperation within the framework of the United Nations or to meet the developing threat of Soviet expansionism by force. Roosevelt and his advisors chose the former alternative. Althoght the President seemed preoccupied with military and political affairs in Europe, he was, in fact, very interested in the situation of the Far East. The United States had been the Allied power which had been most involved in the war against Japan. American military leaders generally believed that Soviet help would shorten the Pacific war and save an incalculable number of American lives. They expected to lose as many as 1 million men in another D-Day, an amphibious landing in the Japanese home islands. Roosevelt therefore agreed to an expanded Soviet role in Far East-possession of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, a share in postwar influence in Korea, and support in negotiating two warm water ports and railroad rights in Manchuria with the Chinese in return for a promise of Soviet military assistance against Japan and Soviet's recognition of Chiang Kaishek's regime in China. No single act of President Roosevelt's career has been more harshly criticized than his Far Eastern agreements with Stalin at Yalta. After the war, the Yalta showed that "the high point of Soviet diplomatic success and correspondingly the low point of American appeasement." Why did Roosevelt agree to the Far Eastern pact? It is clear that the agreement motivated primarily by military and not political considerations. Deciding that China was too weak and disorganized to be given a strong role in the settlement of Asian affairs, Roosevelt decided a secret agreement with Stalin designed to win the war against Japan and to set the pattern of Sino-Soviet relations in the postwar era. It can be said that the responsibility for the failure of the peace after the First World War falls more on the Senate than on Wilson. But the failure of peace after the Second World War, with the Cold War and the victories of Communism in China, rests primarily on Roosevelt. Roosevelt's conception about communism was incredible. He ignored Russian history and communist ideology and simply thoght that Soviet Russia and the United States, because they both desired the defeat of the Axis, had identical expectations for the future. He saw no need to fear communism if an international organization existed, and believed that if Russia could be given security through such an organization, the Communist regime would gradually accomodate itself to the general society of nations. The damage to the interests of the West was done when the frames of American political and military policy decided the military strategy of the war in terms of military efficience only, without giving adequate consideration to the political implication that would grow from the distribution of military power at the end of the war. Consequently, President Roosevelt met Stalin at Yalta with the wrong assuptions and the false intelligences, and then could not check Stalin's postwar expansionim. This failure became one of the most vital causes of the Cold War. The President much overestimated his ability to influence Stalin, and put excessive hope on the possibility of solving the Russian issue through international organization. He miscalculated Stalin's political ambition. The United States should have taken a much stronger line.

고급인력 양성으로 산업발전에 기여

이주천,Lee, Ju-Cheon 한국과학기술단체총연합회 1981 과학과 기술 Vol.14 No.12

박정희 시대에서 경제발전과 민주주의의 양립성 문제 : 비교사적 고찰

이주천 원광대학교 인문학연구소 2009 열린정신 인문학연구 Vol.10 No.1

This study is intended to reevaluate the achievements and problems under the regime of President Park Jung Hee in the period of 1961-1979 on which many historians have revealed the opposite opinions. Conservative and right-wing scholars have generally agreed that Park Jung Hee’s authoritarian rule had achieved some remarkable economic development, because President Park desperately tried to solve the tremendous poverty, social chaos, and political unstability, while left-wing scholars criticized Park’s dictatorial leadership and even denied Park’s economic achievement, because Park had delayed and even made to retreat the democratic political system and oppressed the human rights. Was really it possible for any country to make progress in the two national goals of the democratization and the economic development together simultaneously without much trouble? I think it was impossible. It is also noteworthy that many Western scholars have respect President Park’s remarkable economic achievement. Firstly, I would like to analyze the historical examples in which the economic development and the democratic process in the Western democratic countries like England, France and the United StatesSecondly, with reexamining Park’s regime’s achievements and the rational criticisms on the his regime, I would like to estimate the age of Park Jung Hee.It seems true that president Park has encouraged the economic development and oppressed the human rights and democratic values in order to achieve his national goals. But the serious question remains. My conclusion is that a historical case in which democracy and economic development in any country have been never simultaneously progressed both in Europe and Asia during 19th and 20th centuries. In case of almost of the countries at first developing stage, after their economies conditions has achieved a remarkable progress, the democratic system like suffrage was gradually adapted. It is necessary for us to succeed to the positive aspects of Park Jung Hee’s legacy and to overcome his regime’s problems.

IMF 와 김대중 정권의 向方

이주천 원광대학교 채문연구소 1998 역사와 사회 Vol.21 No.-

독일 통일후의 문제점과 전망 : The Problems of the Unified Korea Nation of the Korean Peopele

이주천 원광대학교 채문연구소 1992 역사와 사회 Vol.9 No.-

美國帝國主義와 필리핀의 獨立戰爭

李柱天 圓光大學校 1990 論文集 Vol.24 No.1

This study is intended to examine the emergence of American imperialism and the Philipino's resistence for their indepndence. I try to focus upon the American-filipino War(1898-1902), which many American historians largely have ignored for several decades. The Philippines had been for more three centuries suffered from the Spanish colonial rule, but they revolted again in the late nineteenth century. Spain brutally crushed the rebellion. When the Spanish brutal crackdown made the independent movement desperate, new charismatic leader, Emilio Aguinaldo reorganized the Filipinos and revolted again. Meanwhile, the relationship between the United States and Spain increasingly deteriorated, because many Americans felt that the revolts in Cuba would threathen the American lives and their properiety in Cuba. President McKinly decided to intervene the conflicts in Cuba to secure the American national interests and to save the American lives and their porperiety in Cuba. The Spanish-American War of 1898 was fought to free Cuba, but the first action took place on the other side of the golbe, in the Philippine Islands. On May 1, American Com modore George Dewey opened fire on the Spanish fleets. With the support of American military and naval forces in Manila, aguinaldo and American forces captured Manila. Aguinaldo declared the independence of the Philippines. However, at this time, Aamerican armed forces in Manila increased and many Filippinos began to suspect America's real intention. Now expansionists were earger to annex the entire archipelago. Even before the Spanish-American War, some Americans argued that the United States should adapt the 'imperialistic' policy. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan developed a starting theory about the importance of sea power. History proved, according to Mahan, that a nation with a powerful navy and the overseas bases necessary to maintain it would be inevitable in war and prosperous in time of peace. Applied to the current American situation, this meant that in addtion to building a modern fleet, the United Satates should obtain a string of coaling stations and bases in the Carribbean, annex the Hawaiian Islands, and cut a canal across Central America. Other Americans supported Mahan's theory, and urged McKinly adminstration to adapt the 'imperialistic' policy. However, and important minority objected strongly to the United States' acquiring overseas possesions. Persons as varied in interest and philosophy as the businessman Andrew Carnegie and the labor leader Samuel Gompers, and the pragmatist William Janes as the Republican Senator George Frisbie Hoar, together with writer like Mark Twain, and educator like president Charles W. Eliot of Harvard University united in opposing the annexation of the Philippines. These anti-imperialists insisted that since no one would even consider the possibility of future statehood for the Philippines. Senator argued that it would be unconstitutional to annex them. It was a violation of the consent of its inhabitants. President McKinly decided to take the Philippines as an American colony, partly because of the expansionists' pressures, with which be should deal wisely, and partly because of the international influence, which American peoples saw the japanese and European imperialism very jealous and impatiently. President McKinly realized that there was no alternative except the annexation. Public opinion would not sanction restoring Spanish authority in Philippines or allowing some other power to have them. To salvte the feelings of the Spanish, the United States agtreed to pay $20 milion for the archipelago, but it was a forced sale, accepted by Spain with resignation and under duress. The peace treaty faced a hard battle in the United States Senate, where a combination of partisan politics and anticolonialism made it difficult to amass the two-thirds majority necessary for ratification. The ratification of the treaty by a vote of 57 to 27 in February 1899 brought about the angry rebellion led by Aguinaldo. In open defiance of Washington, Aguinaldo and other prominent Filipinos organized a government at Malolos, wrote a constitution, and proclaimed the Fillpine Republic in late January, 1899. Now the American-Filippino War(1898-1902) started. A savage Guerrilla war resulted, one that cost far more in lives and money the the Spanish-American conflict. Before the insurrection collapsed in 1902, over 5,000 Americans and 200,000 Filipinos died. One hundred and twenty-five thousand American troops had to ve used to quell the insurection, which cost the United States at least $160 million. Indeed, it was one of the ugliest wars in American history and bothe sides committed atrocities. Americans burned barrios to the ground, placing villages in reconcentration camps like those so detested in Cuab. To placing villages in reconcentration camps like those so detested in Cuba. To get information, Americans conducted the "water cure" by forcing prisoners to swallow gallons of water and then stepping on or punching the swollen stomach to empty it quickly. The reelecition of McKinly in 1900 settled the Philippine question. McKinly sent a second commission, headed by William Howard Taft, an Ohio judge, to establish vivil government in the islands. Taft won from them a large measure of confidence;his policy of encouraging them to participater in the territorial government attracted many converts. In July 1901 he became the first civilian governor of the Philippines. Meanwhile Aginaldo was captured in 1901, and the war was over in 1902.

프랑스혁명의 해석사

이주천 국제문화학회 1989 역사와 사회 Vol.2 No.-