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이 논문에서는 왕경의 핵심부인 도성지역, 특히 왕궁과 그 주변지역을 중심으로 7세기 신라 왕경의 변화상을 살펴보았다. 신라의 왕궁은 월성이었다. 이는 현재의 반월성을 가리키는데, 7세기 중엽 신월성으로 새롭게 정비되었다. 왕궁과 제 시설에 대한 정비는 삼국통일기에 집중되었다, 이는 통일왕국에 걸맞은 중국식 왕궁과 왕경으로의 개조였다. 왕경 내의 도성에서는 조방제가 시행되었다. 조방제가 본격적으로 시도된 시기는 삼국통일 직후인 7세기 후반이지만, 최종적으로 완성된 것은 7세기를 지난 8세기 중엽의 경덕왕대였다. Focused on the area of the capital castle, the central part of the capital, of the 7th century Silla Dynasty, this paper examines changes that had occurred in the palace and its vicinities. Wolseong was the palace and it is what is called Panwolseong (half moon wall) nowadays. The palace was renovated as Shin-Wolseong (new Wolseong) in the middle of the 7th century. Extensive renovations to the palace including its buildings and other facilities were made in the period when Silla Dynasty achieved Unification of three countries. Renovations were made to transform the palace and the capital into those of Chinese style, which could well demonstrate glorification of the Unified kingdom. The chobang system, by which the 井-shaped roads were constructed, was pursued within the capital castle. The system was pursued further from the second half of the 7th century immediately after the Unification of three countries. However, the system was made complete under the reign of King Kyongdok in the middle period of the 8th century.
The fall of communism and collapse of the cold war regime in the international arena, it seems, cannot keep North Korea from concentrating all her efforts building the legitimacy of Kim Jung-il' s political succession by maintaining and strengthening the monolithic ideological thought of Kim Il-sung. Despite of the strained national economy having created more difficulties for regime's preservation, North Korea has been domestically indulged herself into building the cult of personality for Kim Jung-il since the death of Kim Il-sung last year: needs for the demonstration of his abilities as a "general" and "Highest Commander-In-Chief of the North Korean Peoples Armed Forces(NKPA) seems to have made the Border Guards be under the direct control of defense ministry. NKP A now is consisted of more than one million personnel in active service: armed with more than 3,800 tanks, 10,000 artillery pieces, 850 combat aircrafts and 460 various naval combatants: which has been continuously reinforced by the deployment of newly built tanks, amphibious combat vehicles, APCs, hovercrafts, long range artillery pieces at the front, the introduction of newly tested ballastic missiles and forward redeployment of combat aircrafts; all of which will eventually enhance the NKPA's capabilities for surprise attack. Since an assessment of balance between two rivals' military capabilities is perhaps more important in judging the probability of a war than any other factor because national capabilities (including military capabilities) are relatively more static or constant than national intension (including political intension) when you presume war is functional outcome of both variables, national capabilities and intension, this paper will mainly focus on quantified comparison of forces' capabilities to provide general outline on the degree and level of North Korean military threat to South. And if the dictum, "war is an extension or a tool of politics", is an acceptable hypothesis, some what reversed hypothesis "military capabilities will set the boundary of political intension" is perhaps acceptable one since national capabilities will often decisively work in setting the political goals and means. If so, then, the correct analysis and assessment of military balance between two Koreas can provide significant symptoms for the boundaries of North Korea's political intension in near future. It is goes without saying that even the fundamental problems inherited in he quantified analysis of military capabilities using such method as ADE(Armor Division Equivalent) Scoring, which this paper applies, is remained unsolvable.: however. this is the only available method that, in a current warfare, quality factor of weapons system and intangible factors of military capabilities such as C3I, which appear to be very important at the contemporary war such as Gulf War, can be counted. In case of ground forces' capabilities, NKPA is armed partly with some obsolete weapons system of PRC and Soviet Union and in large part with self produced weapons system of relatively high quality. The total ADE scores of NKPA's ground forces is about 1.4~1.8 times of those of ground forces of Republic of Korea Armed Forces (ROKA). More significant is that the force structure of NKPA's ground forces is formed to exercise its combat fighting capability more effectively than ROKA's ground forces: Of its total ADE scores, 65.7% are composed with major attack weapons system which is consisted of fire powers and maneuver capabilities at the ratio of two to one. In comparisons with this, of total ADE scores of the ROKA's ground forces, 60% are composed with major attack weapons system and 40% with foot soldiers, 5% higher than that of NKPA's. In addition, NKPA already reorganized its Spear Head Units for infiltration and break-through operations into formidable numbers of brigades. after having had field maneuver tests of brigade's size units that is optimally operational under condition of the Korean terrains and its main forces with large scale mechanized units which can. perhaps. be used at the maneuver operations at the step of both exploit and pursuit after the break-through. Accounting all of these. it can be said that NKP A may be capable of exercising its own ''britz- krieg". perhaps North Korean's prototype of OMG against South Korea. In case of naval capabilities. the ratio of ship fire power index between North and South is about 100 to 90 which can be said almost even. The capabilities of component operations. however. differ each other. The ship fire power index of NKPN in missile boat and submarine out-numbers ROKN as much as 4 times. while in case of destroyer and patrol craft, ROKN out-numbers the NKPN from 2.5 to 5 times. NKPN is so structured withlarge numbers of small combatants as to exercise ''hit and run" operations around coastal area; and in the fields of short distance surprise landing, infiltration support. sea lane harassment, mine laying and coastal defense NKPN can probably perform the operations more effectively than ROKN; except for the submarine attack. as the high-sea operation capabilities are very limited. KKPN' s main fleet perhaps cannot but avoid direct confrontation against South Korean Fleet at high sea. As for ROKN have more capabilities of high sea operations than NKPN, it is expected for ROKN to conduct relatively independent naval operation with more effectiveness than KKPN in the areas of anti-submarine warfare. some what large scale landing support. and cutting the line of communications on the sea. As for the case of air forces capabilities. even if fire power index of Air force of North Korean Peoples Armed Forces(NKPAF) appears to be about 10% to 20% higher than that of Air Force of ROK Armed Forces (ROKAF). disparity of capabilities between two Korea's air forces may be neglect able when technologically advanced electronic equipments and higher skill of pilots of ROKAF were considered. And in case of the force structure, NKPAF is consisted by 44% of its total fire power index with obsolete type of aircrafts, MIG-17/19 in contrast to ROKAF of which total fire power index only 31% is consisted by the relatively obsolete type of aircraft F-5C/D. This well indicates ROKAF is more modernized than its rival. Considering the disadvantages posed by the inferior qualities of weapons system and pilots' skills of NKPAF as well as the advantages of absolute superiority in the quantities of aircrafts, NKPAF may believe that in case of war, to maximize the effects of initial surprise attack is the only way to preserve the parity, if not superiority, of air power. And to achieve this goal. NKPAF can, most likely, utilize those obsolete aircrafts as the suicidal commando forces infiltrating deep into South to strike strategic targets such as communication posts, air fields or aircrafts at lots and perform "dog-fighting" with large scales of wings to disrupt the effectiveness of electronics. Then, as for the ROKAF, early warning capabilities and counter measures to the initial surprise attack as well as break-down of "dog-fighting" will be the key for achievement of air superiority at the initial stage of war. Of other North Korean military capabilities, not-neglectable are both the chemical warfare and the infiltration capabilities. Since NKPA has formidable amounts(1.000 tons to 3,000tons) of all kinds chemical agent in stock. but also large numbers of delivery means such as IL-28 bombers, 150mm/170mm artillery pieces, FROG-5/7 and SCUD missiles, it is highly possible that NKPA in case of war will launch a chemical warfare in order to make a break-through at front or to achieve a strategic goal by direct attack on Seoul. capital city with high density of population. In contrast to North Korean capabilities of chemical warfare, South Korea's protective capabilities remains at the very rudimentary level. The individual protective equipment at combat field under CBR warfare is proved with very limited sustainability of combat fighting and group protection and regional counteraction system for the high densely populated area is turned out to be in need of urgent improvement. NKPA is accounted of its capabilities to infiltrate all at once about 3 brigades by aireal and naval means and 6 to 7 brigades through ground routes. These units, after having infiltrated just into ROKA's front or/and deep into South, can work decisively, it is believed, for securing the high speedy maneuver of the main attack forces, NKPA's ground forces by opening up the routes for their maneuver and by checking free advance of ROKA's combat reserves through the assault or occupation of strategic position of operation. ROKA's counter-infiltration operations which in general is due to rely on much to the reserve forces's operations, seems mainly to focus on counter measures against the operation of the infiltrated troops within South Korean regions instead on early detection and strike on the way of initial infiltration movement. Of various fields of military capabilities, advantageous area for South Korea includes such intangible factors as logistics, C3I. training and exercises, morale which are often regarded as the multiplier for the capabilities. It can be said that NKPA is outstripped to ROKA in the fields of logistics, communications. and combat intelligence, even to it in the fields of discipline and commanding ability, but still inanimate relatively to ROKA in the fields of morale and training and exercises. It can be presumed that in field of the intangible capabilities as the multiplier, ROKA will be weighted 20% to 30% more than its rival. The net assessment, relied on static analysis of the military balance between South and North Korea shows that ROKA's capabilities is about 73% to 75% of NKPA's and will reach to 85% to 87% of it when we weight ROKA 20% to 30% more with the multiplier of intangible factors. Even if war is an extension of politics and the causes of war vary in accordance with the political purposes, it also can be said that no rational politics of a nation can make a reckless war without close and enough accounts in advance on the winning. So, even though static analysis provides presumption of no expectation for winning to both South and North, still, additionally necessary is the dynamic analysis which enables the close examination on the level and contents of the threat and the war probabilities through a realistic analysis of war game models or war simulations under realistic combat condition and war situation presumed from both rivals' strategies, tactics, military postures, terrain and even climate conditions. Dynamic analysis of the South and North Korean military capabilities is believed to be conducted by the experts within the military services and the outcomes of it is presumed to be used for complement for OP 5027, the defense plan for ROK and eventually applied for force improvement plans. Since it needs more spaces for details of outcomes of any war game. this paper provides. instead of detailed dynamic analysis. only the fundamental frame-work of scenarios for North Korea's offense and its expected outcomes. The NKPA is known to deploy about % of its total ground forces southward Pyongyang-Wonsan line. This posture can be considered as flexible one for both offensive and defensive operation with the ratio of front to reserve forces at 2:1 rather than it is usually understood as one of offensive only. ADE scores of the front units of both side ground forces maintain almost parity in general. although slightly different in accordance with each approach: therefore. in the case of a usual attrition warfare. it might be difficult for anyone side. either South or North. to make any strategically significant break-through of the Front within a short time. There is not, however. little possibility for NKPA to make an unexpected break through of the Front. if not by an unexpected force concentration. by a successful surpTIse attack invaliding early warning system of ROKA (and its allied forces, U.S. Armed Forces), making a significant break-through with the help of the chemical offensive operations and/or large scale infiltration operations followed by the maneuver operations of large scale mechanized units consisting the maneuver group for the exploitation and pursuit before the intersections of the ROKA's reserve forces either directly to occupy the capital city, Seoul or to closely encircle it. Yet. it seems that this doesn't impair much the deterrent provided by the south Korean military capabilities when the available counter measures are considered. Although not with- standing to account other deterrent factors such as allied force capabilities, especially U.S. force's C31 and war-time reinforcements, it can be insisted that two Koreas maintain so highly dense military forces as to enable the mutual deterrence even if current military capabilities is in favor of the North at the Hone) to 0.75 ratio over the South. If both two Koreas continue to improve their military capabilities during next half decade in a manner similar to those they did past decade. south Korea may be hardly able to gain the parity of military capabilities with north before the beginning of the 21'st Century. This slow improve- ment of the disparity of military capabilities between two Koreas seems rather not to impair much the military stability on the Korean peninsular. than to increment the high density of forces confronting each other. Since the confrontation between two high strengths maintains to create a strained condition against each other, it is presumable that the pendulum of the relations between south and North Korea will keep swinging between the high military tension and the political rapprochement and the dangerousness of a war out-break will remain as in the past if not incremental. out of the mutual misunderstandings,miscalculations on the opponent's capabilities or unexpected incidents.