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      • KCI등재

        북한 군사력의 해부 : 위협의 정도와 수준-남북 군사력 균형 평가를 중심으로 Assessment on the Degree and Level of the Threat by Measuring the Balance of Military Capabilities between South and North Korea

        이영호 한국전략문제연구소 1997 전략연구 Vol.4 No.3

        The fall of communism and collapse of the cold war regime in the international arena, it seems, cannot keep North Korea from concentrating all her efforts building the legitimacy of Kim Jung-il' s political succession by maintaining and strengthening the monolithic ideological thought of Kim Il-sung. Despite of the strained national economy having created more difficulties for regime's preservation, North Korea has been domestically indulged herself into building the cult of personality for Kim Jung-il since the death of Kim Il-sung last year: needs for the demonstration of his abilities as a "general" and "Highest Commander-In-Chief of the North Korean Peoples Armed Forces(NKPA) seems to have made the Border Guards be under the direct control of defense ministry. NKP A now is consisted of more than one million personnel in active service: armed with more than 3,800 tanks, 10,000 artillery pieces, 850 combat aircrafts and 460 various naval combatants: which has been continuously reinforced by the deployment of newly built tanks, amphibious combat vehicles, APCs, hovercrafts, long range artillery pieces at the front, the introduction of newly tested ballastic missiles and forward redeployment of combat aircrafts; all of which will eventually enhance the NKPA's capabilities for surprise attack. Since an assessment of balance between two rivals' military capabilities is perhaps more important in judging the probability of a war than any other factor because national capabilities (including military capabilities) are relatively more static or constant than national intension (including political intension) when you presume war is functional outcome of both variables, national capabilities and intension, this paper will mainly focus on quantified comparison of forces' capabilities to provide general outline on the degree and level of North Korean military threat to South. And if the dictum, "war is an extension or a tool of politics", is an acceptable hypothesis, some what reversed hypothesis "military capabilities will set the boundary of political intension" is perhaps acceptable one since national capabilities will often decisively work in setting the political goals and means. If so, then, the correct analysis and assessment of military balance between two Koreas can provide significant symptoms for the boundaries of North Korea's political intension in near future. It is goes without saying that even the fundamental problems inherited in he quantified analysis of military capabilities using such method as ADE(Armor Division Equivalent) Scoring, which this paper applies, is remained unsolvable.: however. this is the only available method that, in a current warfare, quality factor of weapons system and intangible factors of military capabilities such as C3I, which appear to be very important at the contemporary war such as Gulf War, can be counted. In case of ground forces' capabilities, NKPA is armed partly with some obsolete weapons system of PRC and Soviet Union and in large part with self produced weapons system of relatively high quality. The total ADE scores of NKPA's ground forces is about 1.4~1.8 times of those of ground forces of Republic of Korea Armed Forces (ROKA). More significant is that the force structure of NKPA's ground forces is formed to exercise its combat fighting capability more effectively than ROKA's ground forces: Of its total ADE scores, 65.7% are composed with major attack weapons system which is consisted of fire powers and maneuver capabilities at the ratio of two to one. In comparisons with this, of total ADE scores of the ROKA's ground forces, 60% are composed with major attack weapons system and 40% with foot soldiers, 5% higher than that of NKPA's. In addition, NKPA already reorganized its Spear Head Units for infiltration and break-through operations into formidable numbers of brigades. after having had field maneuver tests of brigade's size units that is optimally operational under condition of the Korean terrains and its main forces with large scale mechanized units which can. perhaps. be used at the maneuver operations at the step of both exploit and pursuit after the break-through. Accounting all of these. it can be said that NKP A may be capable of exercising its own ''britz- krieg". perhaps North Korean's prototype of OMG against South Korea. In case of naval capabilities. the ratio of ship fire power index between North and South is about 100 to 90 which can be said almost even. The capabilities of component operations. however. differ each other. The ship fire power index of NKPN in missile boat and submarine out-numbers ROKN as much as 4 times. while in case of destroyer and patrol craft, ROKN out-numbers the NKPN from 2.5 to 5 times. NKPN is so structured withlarge numbers of small combatants as to exercise ''hit and run" operations around coastal area; and in the fields of short distance surprise landing, infiltration support. sea lane harassment, mine laying and coastal defense NKPN can probably perform the operations more effectively than ROKN; except for the submarine attack. as the high-sea operation capabilities are very limited. KKPN' s main fleet perhaps cannot but avoid direct confrontation against South Korean Fleet at high sea. As for ROKN have more capabilities of high sea operations than NKPN, it is expected for ROKN to conduct relatively independent naval operation with more effectiveness than KKPN in the areas of anti-submarine warfare. some what large scale landing support. and cutting the line of communications on the sea. As for the case of air forces capabilities. even if fire power index of Air force of North Korean Peoples Armed Forces(NKPAF) appears to be about 10% to 20% higher than that of Air Force of ROK Armed Forces (ROKAF). disparity of capabilities between two Korea's air forces may be neglect able when technologically advanced electronic equipments and higher skill of pilots of ROKAF were considered. And in case of the force structure, NKPAF is consisted by 44% of its total fire power index with obsolete type of aircrafts, MIG-17/19 in contrast to ROKAF of which total fire power index only 31% is consisted by the relatively obsolete type of aircraft F-5C/D. This well indicates ROKAF is more modernized than its rival. Considering the disadvantages posed by the inferior qualities of weapons system and pilots' skills of NKPAF as well as the advantages of absolute superiority in the quantities of aircrafts, NKPAF may believe that in case of war, to maximize the effects of initial surprise attack is the only way to preserve the parity, if not superiority, of air power. And to achieve this goal. NKPAF can, most likely, utilize those obsolete aircrafts as the suicidal commando forces infiltrating deep into South to strike strategic targets such as communication posts, air fields or aircrafts at lots and perform "dog-fighting" with large scales of wings to disrupt the effectiveness of electronics. Then, as for the ROKAF, early warning capabilities and counter measures to the initial surprise attack as well as break-down of "dog-fighting" will be the key for achievement of air superiority at the initial stage of war. Of other North Korean military capabilities, not-neglectable are both the chemical warfare and the infiltration capabilities. Since NKPA has formidable amounts(1.000 tons to 3,000tons) of all kinds chemical agent in stock. but also large numbers of delivery means such as IL-28 bombers, 150mm/170mm artillery pieces, FROG-5/7 and SCUD missiles, it is highly possible that NKPA in case of war will launch a chemical warfare in order to make a break-through at front or to achieve a strategic goal by direct attack on Seoul. capital city with high density of population. In contrast to North Korean capabilities of chemical warfare, South Korea's protective capabilities remains at the very rudimentary level. The individual protective equipment at combat field under CBR warfare is proved with very limited sustainability of combat fighting and group protection and regional counteraction system for the high densely populated area is turned out to be in need of urgent improvement. NKPA is accounted of its capabilities to infiltrate all at once about 3 brigades by aireal and naval means and 6 to 7 brigades through ground routes. These units, after having infiltrated just into ROKA's front or/and deep into South, can work decisively, it is believed, for securing the high speedy maneuver of the main attack forces, NKPA's ground forces by opening up the routes for their maneuver and by checking free advance of ROKA's combat reserves through the assault or occupation of strategic position of operation. ROKA's counter-infiltration operations which in general is due to rely on much to the reserve forces's operations, seems mainly to focus on counter measures against the operation of the infiltrated troops within South Korean regions instead on early detection and strike on the way of initial infiltration movement. Of various fields of military capabilities, advantageous area for South Korea includes such intangible factors as logistics, C3I. training and exercises, morale which are often regarded as the multiplier for the capabilities. It can be said that NKPA is outstripped to ROKA in the fields of logistics, communications. and combat intelligence, even to it in the fields of discipline and commanding ability, but still inanimate relatively to ROKA in the fields of morale and training and exercises. It can be presumed that in field of the intangible capabilities as the multiplier, ROKA will be weighted 20% to 30% more than its rival. The net assessment, relied on static analysis of the military balance between South and North Korea shows that ROKA's capabilities is about 73% to 75% of NKPA's and will reach to 85% to 87% of it when we weight ROKA 20% to 30% more with the multiplier of intangible factors. Even if war is an extension of politics and the causes of war vary in accordance with the political purposes, it also can be said that no rational politics of a nation can make a reckless war without close and enough accounts in advance on the winning. So, even though static analysis provides presumption of no expectation for winning to both South and North, still, additionally necessary is the dynamic analysis which enables the close examination on the level and contents of the threat and the war probabilities through a realistic analysis of war game models or war simulations under realistic combat condition and war situation presumed from both rivals' strategies, tactics, military postures, terrain and even climate conditions. Dynamic analysis of the South and North Korean military capabilities is believed to be conducted by the experts within the military services and the outcomes of it is presumed to be used for complement for OP 5027, the defense plan for ROK and eventually applied for force improvement plans. Since it needs more spaces for details of outcomes of any war game. this paper provides. instead of detailed dynamic analysis. only the fundamental frame-work of scenarios for North Korea's offense and its expected outcomes. The NKPA is known to deploy about % of its total ground forces southward Pyongyang-Wonsan line. This posture can be considered as flexible one for both offensive and defensive operation with the ratio of front to reserve forces at 2:1 rather than it is usually understood as one of offensive only. ADE scores of the front units of both side ground forces maintain almost parity in general. although slightly different in accordance with each approach: therefore. in the case of a usual attrition warfare. it might be difficult for anyone side. either South or North. to make any strategically significant break-through of the Front within a short time. There is not, however. little possibility for NKPA to make an unexpected break through of the Front. if not by an unexpected force concentration. by a successful surpTIse attack invaliding early warning system of ROKA (and its allied forces, U.S. Armed Forces), making a significant break-through with the help of the chemical offensive operations and/or large scale infiltration operations followed by the maneuver operations of large scale mechanized units consisting the maneuver group for the exploitation and pursuit before the intersections of the ROKA's reserve forces either directly to occupy the capital city, Seoul or to closely encircle it. Yet. it seems that this doesn't impair much the deterrent provided by the south Korean military capabilities when the available counter measures are considered. Although not with- standing to account other deterrent factors such as allied force capabilities, especially U.S. force's C31 and war-time reinforcements, it can be insisted that two Koreas maintain so highly dense military forces as to enable the mutual deterrence even if current military capabilities is in favor of the North at the Hone) to 0.75 ratio over the South. If both two Koreas continue to improve their military capabilities during next half decade in a manner similar to those they did past decade. south Korea may be hardly able to gain the parity of military capabilities with north before the beginning of the 21'st Century. This slow improve- ment of the disparity of military capabilities between two Koreas seems rather not to impair much the military stability on the Korean peninsular. than to increment the high density of forces confronting each other. Since the confrontation between two high strengths maintains to create a strained condition against each other, it is presumable that the pendulum of the relations between south and North Korea will keep swinging between the high military tension and the political rapprochement and the dangerousness of a war out-break will remain as in the past if not incremental. out of the mutual misunderstandings,miscalculations on the opponent's capabilities or unexpected incidents.

      • 학문과 생활24:이대 이영호 교수

        이영호 북한연구소 1977 北韓 Vol.- No.61

        '스콜라' 이용 시 소속기관이 구독 중이 아닌 경우, 오후 4시부터 익일 오전 9시까지 원문보기가 가능합니다.

      • KCI등재
      • 제대혈 채취 후 유로키나제의 첨가가 제대혈 적혈구 제거시 조혈모세포의 수득률에 미치는 영향

        이영호,박현우,이영아,한훈,김경희,한진영 대한조혈모세포이식학회 2000 대한조혈모세포이식학회지 Vol.5 No.1

        목적:제대혈 채취 후 24시간이 경과하여 적혈구를 제거하는 경우에 제대혈내의 응고계 및 섬유소 융해계의 변화로 인하여 clumping이나 미세혈전 등이 생겨 유핵세포나 CD34+ 세포의 수득률이 감소될 수 있다. 따라서 비록 항응고제가 처리된 제대혈이라 할지라도 제대혈 분리 전에 urokinase를 첨가하면 조혈모세포의 수득률을 높일 수 있을 것으로 생각된다. 그러나 현재까지 이에 대한 연구가 전혀 없는 상태이므로, 본 연구에서는 시간이 경과된 제대혈에 urokinase를 첨가하는 것이 효과가 있는지, 있다면 얼마의 용량이 적절한지 알아보기로 하였다. 방법:1) 채취한 후 48시간 경과된 제대혈에 대한 분석: 15례의 제대혈을 채취하여 채취 직후와 48시간 후에 10% pentastarch로 적혈구를 분리한 다음, 총유핵세포수와 CD34+ 세포수를 측정하여 수득률을 비교하였다. 48시간이 경과한 검체에 대하여 urokinase는 제대혈 분리 30분 전에 첨가하였으며, urokinase를 첨가하지 않은 군과 urokinase 5,000 IU/mL, 10,000 IU/mL, 50,000 IU/mL을 첨가한 네군으로 나누어 각각의 수득률을 비교 분석하였다. 2) 채취한 후 24시간이내의 제대혈에 대한 분석: 12례의 제대혈을 채취한 직후에 적혈구를 분리하여 총유핵세포수와 CD34+ 세포수, CFU-GM 집락수를 측정하였다. 동일한 검체를 6시간, 12시간, 24시간 동안 실온에 방치한 후 상기 실험 결과 가장 효과적인 용량의 urokinase를 첨가한 군과 첨가하지 않은 군으로 나누어 각각 적혈구를 분리한 다음, 총유핵세포수와 CD34+ 세포수, CFU-GM 집락수를 측정 비교하였다. 결과:1) 제대혈 채취 48시간 후에 urokinase를 첨가하지 않은 경우와 urokinase 5,000 IU/mL를 첨가한 경우 총유핵세포수의 차이가 없었지만, urokinase 10,000 IU/mL, 50,000 IU/mL를 첨가한 경우에는 urokinase를 첨가하지 않은 경우에 비하여 총유핵세포수의 의미있는 증가를 보였다(P=0.0024, P=0.0009). 2) 제대혈 채취 48시간 후에 urokinase 5,000 IU/mL이나 50,000 IU/mL를 첨가한 경우에는 urokinase를 첨가하지 않은 경우에 비하여 CD34+ 세포수의 차이가 없었지만, urokinase 10,000 IU/mL를 첨가한 경우에는 urokinase를 첨가하지 않은 경우에 비하여 CD34+ 세포수의 의미있는 증가를 보였다(P=0.0402). 3) Urokinase 10,000 IU/mL를 첨가하였던 군이나 첨가하지 않았던 군 모두에서 제대혈 채취 즉시 적혈구를 분리하였던 경우에 비하여 6시간, 12시간, 24시간이 경과할수록 총유핵세포수, CD34+ 세포수, CFU-GM 집락수가 약간씩 감소하였으나 시간경과에 따른 통계적 차이는 없었다. 또한 제대혈 채취 24시간 이내에는 각 시간대별로 urokinase 10,000 IU/mL 첨가 유무에 따른 총유핵세포수, CD34+ 세포수, CFU-GM 집락수의 통계적 차이를 나타내지 않았다. 결론:채혈한지 48시간 경과된 제대혈을 냉동 보관해야 하는 경우에는 urokinase 10,000 IU/mL를 첨가하고 30분 후에 적혈구를 분리하는 것이 유핵세포와 CD34+ 세포의 수득률을 높일 수 있는 방법이며, 24시간 이내에 적혈구를 분리하는 경우에는 urokinase를 첨가할 필요가 없을 것으로 생각된다. Background:We assessed whether the urokinase could increase the yield of progenitor cells during processing in elapsed, even anticoagulated, cord blood after collection, and also determined the optimal dosage of urokinase. Methods:Twenty-seven cord blood samples were collected with ACD-coated syringes from umbilical cord vein after full-term vaginal delivery, and red cells were depleted with 10% pentastarch. We assessed the effect and optimal dosage of urokinase by comparing total nucleated cell (TNC) counts and CD34+ cell counts between fresh and 48 hour-elapsed cord bloods. The urokinase was administered to the 48 hour-elapsed cord bloods 30 minutes before separation as the dose of 0 IU/mL, 5,000 IU/mL, 10,000 IU/mL and 50,000 IU/mL, respectively. Thereafter, by using the most effective dosage of urokinase, we also assessed the effect of urokinase in the 6, 12 and 24 hour-elapsed cord bloods. Results:The TNC counts after separation in 48 hour-elapsed cord bloods were significantly higher in 10,000 IU/mL and 50,000 IU/mL of urokinase treated samples than untreated and 5,000 IU/mL treated samples. The CD34+ cell counts were significantly higher in 10,000 IU/mL of urokinase treated samples than untreated and 5,000 or 50,000 IU/mL treated samples. In 6, 12 and 24 hour-elapsed cord bloods, however, there were no significant differences of TNC count, CD34+ cell count and CFU-GM count between 10,000 IU/mL of urokinase treated samples and untreated samples . Conclusion: The addition of 10,000 IU/mL of urokinase before separation of 48 hour-elapsed, even anticoagulated, cord bloods could increase the yield of progenitor cells. However, there are no advantage of urokinase for processing of cord bloods not elapsed 24 hours after collection.

      • KCI등재

        기도하는 곳(προσευχή)에 대한 연구(행 16:11-15) Study on the “Place of Prayer”[προσευχή](acts 16:11-15)

        이영호 한국신약학회 2018 신약논단 Vol.24 No.2

        This study attempted to reveal the place of prayer in which Paul visited in Philippi. To accomplish this purpose, I first studied scholars' research on the προσευχή. The reason I used this method was to identify the point of controversy about προσευχή. Some scholars think that προσευχή is a Jewish synagogue. They provide the grounds as follow; First, all the word προσευχή that found in ancient literature and inscriptions point to synagogue. Second, there can be no synagogue because there were no Jews in Philippi at the time. And Third, It were women who Paul met in the προσευχή. On the other hand, there are scholars who claim that προσευχή are not synagogue. They provide the grounds as follow; First, προσευχή is not a synagogue but a place to pray in the book of Acts. Second, there were no synagogues because there were no Jews in Philippi at the time. And third, Paul met the women in προσευχή. I have found through discussion of these scholars that in order to determine what προσευχή is, I have to study the following: First, were there Jews in Philippi? Second, what Paul and the women did in προσευχή? Third, why did they translate προσευχή into synagogue in ancient literature and inscriptions? And fourth, was the synagogue the only place where the Jews gathered to hear and learn? I looked at these questions one by one in turn. As a result, I concluded that προσευχή in Philippi had the same function as the synagogue, but not the synagogue itself. And I also found that the Jewish synagogue is not the only place to hear and learn. Where there is no synagogue, προσευχή is a place where Jewish synagogues function. 본 연구는 바울이 빌립보에서 찾아간 기도하는 곳인 프로슈케가 어디인지에 대해 밝히려고 시도한 것이다. 이를 위해 먼저 필자는 지금까지 프로슈케에 대해 학자들이 어떠한 견해를 가지고 있는지에 대해 조사하였다. 필자가 이러한 방법을 사용한 이유는 프로슈케에 대한 논란의 핵심이 무엇인지를 규명하고자 한 것이다. 일부의 학자들은 프로슈케가 유대인의 회당이라고 생각한다. 그들은 근거로 첫째, 고대의 문학과 비문에서 발견되는 프로슈케라는 단어가 모두 회당을 가리킨다. 둘째, 프로슈케가 강가에 있다는 것이 당시의 유대인의 회당의 설명과 일치한다. 셋째, 바울이 복음을 선포하기 위하 찾아간 곳은 항상 회당이었다. 그리고 넷째, 프로슈케에서 바울이 한 일이 회당에서 하는 일과 동일하다. 다른 한편으로 프로슈케가 회당이 아니라고 주장하는 학자들도 있다. 그들은 그 근거로 첫째, 사도행전에서 프로슈케는 회당이 아니라 기도하는 곳이다. 둘째, 당시 빌립보에는 유대인들이 없었기 때문에 회당 또한 없다. 그리고 셋째, 바울은 프로슈케에서 여자들을 만났다. 필자는 이러한 학자들의 논의를 통해 프로슈케가 무엇을 하는 곳인지에 대해 결정하기 위해서는 다음과 것들을 연구해야 한다는 사실을 발견했다. 그것은 첫째, 빌립보에 유대인들이 있었는가? 둘째, 프로슈케에서 바울과 여자들이 무엇을 했는가? 셋째, 성경 이외의 문서들에서 프로슈케와 회당을 왜 동일하게 취급했는가? 그리고 넷째, 유대인들이 듣고 배우기 위해 모이는 곳으로 회당이 유일한 곳이었는가? 나는 이러한 질문을 차례대로 하나씩 살펴보았다. 그 결과 빌립보의 프로슈케는 회당과 동일한 기능을 하지만 회당 자체는 아니라는 결론에 도달했다. 그리고 유대인들이 듣고 배우기 위해 모이는 곳이 반드시 회당이 아니라는 사실도 밝혔다. 따라서 바울이 빌립보에서 찾아갔던 프로슈케는 회당은 아니지만 회당과 동일한 기능을 하는 곳, 유대인들이 듣고 배우기 위해 모이는 곳이라는 결론에 도달할 수 있었다. 프로슈케는 회당이 없는 곳에서 유대인들의 회당의 기능을 하는 곳이다.

      • SM50A 강재 전자빔 용접부의 응고 및 미세구조에 관한 연구 : 험펑비드 형성에 미치는 초점위치의 영향 Effect of Focal Position on Humping Bead Formation

        이영호,양성호,김수성,박성두 충남대학교 공업교육연구소 1998 論文集 Vol.21 No.1

        The mechanism of humping bead formation in electron beam welding was investigated. In the first part, the process of humping bead formation was clarified by the high speed camera. In the second, the effect of focal position was discussed. The obtained results were as follows. 1. Humping bead was apt to be formed when the focal point was just on or slightly below the weld surface. 2. The reduction of surface bead width was apt to form humping bead and reduce the pitch of humping bead formation 3. The formation of nailhead-shaped welds at the focal position above the weld surface prevented to form the humping bead. 4. Nailhead-shaped welds were due to the melting by molten metal flow around the side walls, and to the melting or pre-heating effects by peripheral regions of Gaussian distribution type electron beam. 5. The instability of capillary molten metal at the weld surface formed the humping bead.

      • SCOPUSKCI등재

        급냉응고한 Al-Zn-Mg-Zr합금의 시효거동과 인장특성에 미치는 Mn의 영향

        이영호,장준연,유재은,문인기,맹선재,최종술,Lee, Yeong-Ho,Jang, Jun-Yeon,Yu, Jae-Eun,Mun, In-Gi,Maeng, Seon-Jae,Choe, Jong-Sul 한국재료학회 1997 한국재료학회지 Vol.7 No.1

        급냉응고법을 이용하여 고용한도 이상으로 Mn량을 첨가할 때 Mn량에 따른 인장특성의 변화와 시효특성을 조사하였다. 원심분무법으로 AI-4.7%Zn-2.5%Mg-0.2%Zr합금에 Mn량을 각기 달리 첨가한 급냉응고 분말을 제조 하였다. 이 분말을 냉간압축, 진공 탈가스처리를 한 후 15:1로 압출하여 봉상 시편을 만들었다. 분말의 미세조직은 $\alpha$-AI수지상과 수지상간 편석부로 이루어져 있으며 Mn첨가에 따라 조직의 변화는 관찰되지 않았다. 빠른 냉각속도로 인하여 2.0%Mn을 첨가한 경우에도 초정 Mn상을 발견할 수 없었다. 압출재의 미세조직은 아결정립으로 이루어져 있으며 약간의 제2상들이 관찰되었다. 대부분의 Mn 분산상은 압출후 용체화처리 과정에서 형성되었으며 시효경화량은 Mn양에 관계없이 일정하였다. 46$0^{\circ}C$에서 1시간 용체화처리하고 12$0^{\circ}C$에서 24시간 시효처리한 경우 최대의 시효경도값을 나타내었다. 인장강도는 Mn첨가량에 따라 증가 하였는데 이것은 Mn분산상의 밀도증가에 의한 것으로 확인되었다. 2.0%Mn을 첨가한 합금의 시효후 인장강도는 590MPa, 연산율은 4%를 보였다.

      • SHARE: 효율적인 출력 PHASE 할당을 이용한 PLA 최소화

        이영호,정정화 대한전자공학회 1993 전자공학회논문지-A Vol.30 No.12

        When realizing a multiple-output function by a PLA, there is often the flexibility to choose either uncomplementary or complementary phase for each output. In this case, it is possible to significantly reduce the number of product terms by fully exploiting the freedom. This paper presents a PLA phase for each output of a multiple-output function so that the product terms for each output are maximally shared with the other outputs. and then minimizes the multiple-output function with the assigned output phase assignment. The algorithm has been implemented on Sun4/330 in C language and compared with the previous approaches for 56 example PLA`s. The proposed algorithm has obtained better results for 18-32 PLA's, worse results for 1-5 PLA`s, and the same results for 23-33 PLA's. Moreover, the computation time is much less than for the previous approaches.

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