http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.
변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.
개별검색 DB통합검색이 안되는 DB는 DB아이콘을 클릭하여 이용하실 수 있습니다.
통계정보 및 조사
예술 / 패션
<해외전자자료 이용권한 안내>
- 이용 대상 : RISS의 모든 해외전자자료는 교수, 강사, 대학(원)생, 연구원, 대학직원에 한하여(로그인 필수) 이용 가능
- 구독대학 소속 이용자: RISS 해외전자자료 통합검색 및 등록된 대학IP 대역 내에서 24시간 무료 이용
- 미구독대학 소속 이용자: RISS 해외전자자료 통합검색을 통한 오후 4시~익일 오전 9시 무료 이용
※ 단, EBSCO ASC/BSC(오후 5시~익일 오전 9시 무료 이용)
Since 1980s, Chinese diplomacy has experienced a profound transformation, with its characteristics being gradually shaped. To a certain extent, China's diplomacy toward the Korean Peninsula during this period symbolizes the whole course, with all the following factors converging: China's strategic consideration of security and regional power equilibrium in Northeast Asia, its growing economic integration into the world in general and the Northeast Asian region in particular, its domestic political and ideological factors as both Chinese and North Korean regimes struggling for survival in the wake of a world-wide falling of state-socialism, and finally, China's adaptation to international norms and the "New World Order". During the 1980s, while pushing economic reform and a policy of opening to the outside world, China started to readjust its external relations by asserting is "peaceful and independent foreign policy". Beijing's new policy toward North Korea is centered on maintaining peace and furthering stability in the region in order to assure "a peaceful environment" for China's development. To do this China has taken a "dual track" approach: on the on hand, maintaining its traditional ties with Pyongyang; on the other hand, actively yet cautiously promoting its relations with Seoul. However, during the whole course of the Korean nuclear crisis, China's behavior pattern could be described as "conditional disengagement", which was characterized by some as "the most problematic member" of the intentional coalition to curb Pyongyang's nuclear program. "Conditional" here means two thing: 1. China was for denuclearization of the Peninsula; 2. but Beijing also contended that "the only way for a proper sttlement" of the Korean nuclear issue is for the "parties directly concerned" to conduct negotiations, and, therefore, opposing of using any pressure(particularly sanctions) angainst the North Korea. Looking ahead, it is important and urgent for Beijing, taking into account the global main streams view, to reconsider and redefine its proper role in these nuclear regimes. If china both wants to maximize its national interests in the international community and contribute to a better world, then the lessons and the concerning analyses of its Korean nuclear diplomacy can be of help.
The Republic of Korea, the United States and the Japan should respect the inter- national law in their relations between the North Korea. However those three Nations who suspect that the latter is developing nuclear weapon system including nuclear war- heads and long-range missiles often reveals their intentions to repress the latter's program by pre-emptive strikes on her alleged nuclear and missiles producing facilities. On the hypothesis that it is not easy to verify whether the North Korea renounced her nuclear weapon system development program, this paper, in the extents of rules of international law, considered about the limits of measures to repress her program. In the legal aspects, the most serious problem, in seeking the solutions to repress the nuclear weapon system development program of the North Korea, is that of sanctions. However, a legal sanctions of the United Nations are not likely realized because of the China's veto-power in the security council. Therefore, when the North Korea's nuclear problems emerged as the hot issue and military tension is heightened in the Korean Peninsular, one of the above-said three nations has suggested to resort to the right of anticipatory self-defence. On the military strategical viewpoint, the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence has greater potential relevance to conflicts between smaller or potential nuclear powers and non-nuclear powers, where the assumed aggressor's delivery system may be vulner- able to a first-strike, and where he lacks a second-strike capability. In this circum- stances, the temptations to take "pre-emptive defence" measures may, as in the Israeli 1981 pre-emptive strikes on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, prove irresistable as for the Republic of Korea or the Japan. Moreover, the United States may be in the sympathy with the two States as an military ally with both of them. However, not only in this situation that the North Korea's renunciation of nuclear weapon system development program is not easily verified but also in the possible future situation where she may have succeeded in the development of that system, if one of the above-said nations solely or together with another launches pre-emptive strikes on the alleged or proven nuclear materials and missiles producing facilities of the North Korea, he shall not escape from severe condemnation by the international community. Furthermore, the strikes may be recorded in hitory as the prelude to the second Korean War where participate all the Super Powers for, under the modern inter- national law, the use of force is legitimate only when the security council authorizes it or it is the resort to the right of self-defence. Of Course, we can not conclusively say that the modern international law expelled the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence. However, under the positive rules of modem inter- national law, the pre-emptive action may be justified only when the necessity for action must be instinct, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means and no moment of deliberation. With thorough analysis of the writings of jurists, state practices and international judicial decisions after the Charter of the United Nations, we can not draw any more generous conclusion than above. To launch pre-emptive strikes, asserting the resort to the right of self-defence, on the alleged or proven nuclear materials and missiles producing facilities of the North Korea would not be an legal or realistic solution in this stage. In 1991, when a high official of the Republic of Korea is suspected to have suggested that a commando raid might be necessary for removal of possible nuclear menace from the North Korea, the present writer, in an international symposium, had indicated the illegality of his suggestion and proposed to submit the North Korean nuclear problems to the consideration of the security council of the United Nations. After that, fortunately, the problem was submitted to the consideration of the security council and through the consideration of that organ, we had succeeded in making the issue of repressing the nuclear development program as a common concern of the international community. However, we should not ignore the fact that international community urged us to seek the solution not in the military context but in the political and diplomatic context patiently.