지적재산권과 군교수의 신분보장에 관한 연구 - 2009년 상반기 법률자문사례를 중심으로-

김회동 육군사관학교 화랑대연구소 2009 한국군사학논집 Vol.65 No.2

The "rule of law" grow up and mature in the Korea society, the military also can not help administering themselves in the light of legalism. And it is unforgiven to commit faults just because it happened in the military unique situation. Therefore, the military should accept the system of legalism. The maturity of legalism make people pursuit individual right much more than the past, and the same things happen among military members. However, we can nor deny the military do not and can not accept legalism or rule of law system without delay as civilians do. In addition, the military is apt to understand legalism as not genuine but cursory constitutionalism. As seen above, the copyright cases and military professor's tenure test clause of MOD's( Minister Of Defence's) order No. 986 are very appropriate example of the military attitude concerning rule of law, legalism or constitutionalism. If the military change or innovate voluntarily in their overall systems, they will be faced enormous external pressure, the reason that "we are military" no longer be forgiven in our national and global societies. I sincerely hope that our Korea military become not the object but the subject of change or innovation.

군사법에서의 상관개념 개정 검토

김회동 국회입법조사처 2022 입법과 정책 Vol.14 No.2

Compared to other crimes in the Military Criminal Act, crimes against superior are punished more harsh or severely. This is not only because the Act protect superior's authority or superiors themselves who are victim, but also because it protect the Discipline of the military. Article 2 of the Military Criminal Act provides that "The term superior means a person who has the authority of command in a command-obedience relationship. If a command-obedience relationship does not exist, a higher-ranking person or a person in a higher order of precedence shall be treated as a superior;" According to this provision, the higher order of precedence person even in same rank is defined as the superior. In addition, unnecessarily, the crimes against this kind of person would be expanded as Crimes against military superior and punished more severely. In this regard, the definition on superior should be advised to be amended in order not to expand unnecessarily aggravated or severe punishment by abstract definition as now it provides. 국가안보와 직결된 국가적 법익을 보호하는 군형법의 목적은 존중되어야 한다. 그러나 군인이라는 이유만으로 과도하게 처벌하는 것은 정의나 사회질서 유지에도 부합하지 않 는다. 국가안보의 궁극적 목적인 국민의 자유와 권리를 해하는 결과를 초래한다. 이와 같은 이유에서 군형법상 대(對)상관 범죄 폐해를 막기 위해서는 가장 먼저 상서열자까지 도 준(準)상관으로 포섭하는 있는 현행 상관의 범위를 명확하게 제한하여야 한다. 위와 같은 이유에서 현행 상관의 개념을 규정하고 있는 군형법 제2조 1호는 “「상관」이란 명령복종 관계에서 명령권을 가진 사람을 말한다. 명령복종 관계가 없는 경우 상위 계급 자는 상관에 준한다. 단, 병 상호 간에는 명령복종 관계에서 명령권을 가진 사람만이 상 관이다.”로 개정되어야 할 것이다.

西獨의 東方政策과 우리의 包容政策에 대한 小考

김회동 명지대학교 북한연구소 1999 북한연구 Vol.2 No.-

제44회 산레모 원탁회의 참가 보고서

김회동 대한적십자사 인도법연구소 2021 人道法論叢 Vol.- No.41

무력사용에 관한 유엔헌장 검토

김회동 국제법평론회 2023 국제법평론 Vol.- No.66

Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force and the threat of force in principle. Only the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter and the use of force approved by the United Nations Security Council are allowed as exceptions. However, there are many differences in the interpretation of Article 2(4), which prohibits the use of force in principle. Traditional interpretation which Professor Brownlie supported is that the use of force should be strictly restricted according to the purpose of the establishment of the United Nations. However, there is also the argument that the use of force should be allowed additionally if it meets the purpose of the United Nations through literal interpretation. In addition, there is an argument that Article 2 (4) should be interpreted through teleological interpretation to settle the situations such as genocide which Professor Reisman, Yale Law school argued. Nevertheless, Aforementioned theories do not provide complete logic to be able to fill a gap between the United Nations' ideology and reality. The gap between Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and reality is not based on the essential flaws of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. For almost 80 years after the signing of the U.N. Charter, the revision of the U.N. Charter has been amended only in procedural matters. The time has come to consider seriously the revision of the United Nations Charter in response to the development of science and technology and the resulting changes in human society. In the case of Article 2, Paragraph 4, the same aspect was encountered.

고속철도터널에서 발생하는 파동현상에 관한 연구

김회동,엄용균,松尾一泰 대한기계학회 1994 대한기계학회 춘추학술대회 Vol.- No.-

영공침입 사건에 관한 대응 검토: 북한 무인기 영공침범 사건을 중심으로

김회동 서울국제법연구원 2023 서울국제법연구 Vol.30 No.2

북한 정찰 무인기가 2022년 12월 26일 불법으로 MDL 이남으로 침범하였다. 그중 1대는 서울 대통령실 상공 인근까지 침범하여 대한민국의 평화와 안전을 명백히 위협하였다. 이에 군은 침범한 정찰 무인기를 요격하려하나 실패하였고, 같은 날 대통령의 지시로 북한에서 투입한 무인기와 유사한 아군 무인기를 북한의 불법 영공침법에 대한 상응조치로써 북한 영공으로 침투시켰다. 이에 대해 유엔군사령부 군사정전위원회는 2023년 1월 26일 북한과 남한 모두가 정전협정을 위반하였다는 조사결과를 발표하였다. 정부는 유엔군사령부의 조사결과가 우리 군의 상응조치를 국제법상 불법이라고 판단한 것은 아니며, 우리 군의 조치는 ‘자위권 차원의 상응조치’로 정당한 대응이며 이에 대해 평가하는 것 자체가 적절히 않다는 의견을 표명하였다. 본고는 이와 관련하여 정부가 시행한 ‘자위권 차원의 상응조치’의 성격이 국가책임법상 대응조치에 해당하는지와 현행 국제법상 대응조치로서 무력복구(armed reprisal)가 허용될 수 있는지 검토하였다. 현행 국제법상 무력복구는 대응조치에 해당할 수 없다는 것이 명백하다. 그러나 국제법의 흠결을 이용하여 자위권의 발동이 불가능한 정도의 무력을 행사하는 북한의 국제법 위반행위에 대해서 최근 일부 학자들은 유엔헌장 제2조 4항에 의해 허용되는 무력의 행사에 해당하지 않지만, 예외적으로 무력복구가 허용된다고 주장하고 있다. 북한으로 무인기를 투입한 행위 그 자체만을 단편적으로 평가할 것이 아니라 지속해서 정전협정을 위반하는 북한에 대해 정전협정 위반이라는 방식으로 정전협정 이행을 요구하는 방식이 넓은 의미에서 대응조치에 해당할 수 있다는 의견에 대해 진지하게 검토할 필요가 있을 것이다. On 26 December 2022, the case in which 5 North Korean UAVs invaded territorial airspace of ROK and one of which reached and retreated near the sky of The ROK Presidential Office, took place. 26 January 2023, The UN Command Military Armistice Commission decided that both North and South Korea committed or constituted a violation of the Korea Armistice Agreement through the press release. But the ROK Government denied violating the Armistice Agreement and asserted that she just exercised the counter-action as self-defense legally and legitimately. This article would like to review whether armed reprisal is permitted exceptionally alleged that the ROK Government exercised as the response of self-defense. In conclusion, even though armed reprisal is effective in dealing with the use of force by North Korea that does not reach the armed attack provided in Article 51 UN Charter, practical international law, as lex lata, does not permit armed reprisal on peacetime against UN Charter 2(4) and as the countermeasure on the State Responsibility law. However, it should be necessary to review carefully the argument that the infiltration of ROK military UAVs in North Korean airspace is not armed reprisal but a countermeasure against the violation of the Armistice Agreement by North Korea through the breach of the Agreement just as same manner.

우크라이나전쟁과 민간군사기업

김회동 대한적십자사 인도법연구소 2023 人道法論叢 Vol.- No.43

우크라이나전쟁과 PMCs(민간군사기업)

김회동 영남대학교 법학연구소 2023 영남법학 Vol.- No.57

With the full support of the West, the Ukrainian military succeeded in defending, leaving Russia facing a severe shortage of troops. Although Russia ordered the mobilization to solve this problem, Putin's leadership was greatly affected by rising public dissatisfaction. Accordingly, the Russian government seems to be actively using private military enterprises. It is unclear whether Russia's PMC operation is contractual or voluntary. Therefore, it is not easy to clearly distinguish the legal status of the Russian PMCs. However, the coup led by the Wagner Group led the Russian government to issue a decree to directly control the PMCs, and a new evaluation is needed regarding the legal status of the PMCs, its relationship with the Russian government, and Russia's state responsibility. Before the Presidential Decree and the Ministry of National Defense's Decree were proclaimed, owing to a lack of clear evidence that it forms part of the Russian regular army, as far as the PMC's legal status is concerned is either civilians (armed groups) who took directly participation in hostility or is volunteer corps. On the other hand, after the promulgation of laws concernd, it is evident that command and control relations have established between the Russian government and the PMCs, and as a result, it is operating either as an institution of the Russian government or a part of the Russian military at least by contract. In this case, the Russian PMC will have the privilegy of a combatant when captured. Regarding PMCs acts and Russia's state responsibility, Russia will not have state responsibility because the PMC acts cannot be regarded as an act of the Russian government prior to the promulgation of related laws. However, Russian government would have state responsibility for that she knew the violation of the war law by PMCs but did not take appropriate action. After the promulgation of the Decrees, it would be that the command and control relationship between the Russian military and the PMCs has been formed. Thus Russia will have state responsibility for the PMC's actions.

‘중국해상민병’의 법적 지위와 각국 대응 검토

김회동(Kim, Hoe-dong) 서강대학교 법학연구소 2023 서강법률논총 Vol.12 No.2