毛澤東과 中國의 「大躍進」政策 : 모택동과 중국의 「대약진」정책

김익도 부산대학교 1986 統一論叢 Vol.8 No.-

中·蘇 理念 對立에 關한 硏究 : 중·소 이념 대립에 관한 연구

김익도 부산대학교 1986 中國問題硏究 : 論文選 Vol.13 No.-

反스탈린運動과 毛澤東의對應 : 반스탈린운동과 모택동의대응

김익도 부산대학교 1987 統一論叢 Vol.9 No.-

中·蘇 理念 對立의 過程과 그 展望 : 중·소 이념 대립의 과정과 그 전망

김익도 부산대학교 1988 中國問題硏究 : 論文選 Vol.15 No.-

中國人民解放軍의 政治委員制度와 黨·軍關係

金益度 釜山大學校 師範大學 1994 교사교육연구 Vol.29 No.-

As Mao once said that political power is obtain through the barrel of a gun, the CCP established Red Army to accomplish the communist revolution in China. So the army was from the outset the agent and instrument of the party. The CCP had also done its best to keep the PLA under its firm control. They introduced the political commissar system from Soviet Union to control the military. The political commissar was party's representative within the army and had right to countersign all orders. The primary mission of the PLA's political commissar system is to assume that "the party control the gun". The institute of the political commissar in China was a two-man system of command. Not like Soviet Union, the principles of single command was never introduced in China. It was during the subsequent Yenan Period of the anti-Japanese war that the present form of political commissar system finally crystallized. In 1938, a "second united front" was established between the Kuomintang and the Chinese communist. Since then Mao has concentrated on the refinement of its military political system and doctrine. As a result, a unique political organization within the PLA Armed Forces has evolved, a mutant somewhat different from its Soviet predecessor. In fact, the Peoples Liberation Army under Mao Tse-tung was the first to succeed gaining the support of the populace. Their political commissar system served them well in this respect and it proved to be a major factor in the winning of the mainland. When Peng Teh-huai became the Minister of defense in 1954, he tried to professionalize the PLA and de-emphasize the political factor. He thought the cult of revolutionary war was to be obstacles to progress in bringing the PLA up to date. So he wanted to equate the PLA with the armies on the Soviet model. But his schems was rejected by Mao, and he was purge. Because Peng's plan was directly opposed to Mao's ambitious strategy to rebuild China as a powerful nation independent of the Soviet Union politically and militarily. During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the PLA led by Lin Biao was in the van of the campaign and even placed the Communist Party under its control. At the Ninth National Congress of Chinese Communist Party, the military made a striking advance into party organizations, including even the politburo and the central committee to hold many important posts. Though the large-scale military intervention was realized, the militaly did not openly assert dictatorship against the will of Mao or in place of the party. But this irregular party army relation did not last long and inevitably burst into an episode, known as the Lin Biao incident, as the party began its effort to rebuild itself. After Mao's death, Teng Shiao-ping was able to reestablish himself as the top power holder. He made every effort regularize the army. He tried to accomplish army-building policy of revolutionization, intellectualization, and professionalization. The size of the army had been reduced and impressive advances were also made in certain strategic weapon system. But to realize military modernization in China, Teng had to seperate the military force from the politics . Because a successful military modernization programs could not be achieved without reforming the PLA's political role. But Teng refused any attempt to reform the political commissar system and to chang the established party·army relations. So the realization of military modernization in China would be difficult for the time being.

中國의 軍現代化政策과 黨·軍關係

金益度 釜山大學校 師範大學 1996 교사교육연구 Vol.32 No.-

The Red Army was established to accomphish the revolution in China by the Chinesse Communist Party(CCP). Consequently, the CCP has always done its best to Keep the People's Liberation Army(PLA) under its firm control. So the PLA is the party's army, not the state's army, and the party and the PLA are skillfully combined. After the establishment of the communist regime in China, the CCP leaders were trying to regularize and modernize the army. But such efforts could not succeed because of Mao's opposition. When Teng Shiao-ping reestablished himself as the top power holder after Mao's death, he vigorously launched the military modernization policy to transform the PLA into the modern and regularized army. From that time on, Teng's army-building policy of modernization was steering the PLA in the direction of revolutionary changes. The main task of Teng's military reform and modernization plan was a series of exercise in reduction-in-strength and restructuring of the PLA. He expected to effect the reduction of one million troops in short years. Another Teng's major reform was to reduce the eleven military regions to seven. Teng expected that his plans for reduction in strength brought about results in saving equipment procurement and operating costs, and such savings would indeed contribute to the PLA's research and development as China hoped to narrow the technological gap with superpowers. In short, the most important objective in the streamlining and structural reforms exercise was to transform the PLA into a comparatively smaller, better-educated and more revolutionary modern military force. China's modernization programme, highlighted by reforms and streamling has led to significant improvement in China's military capabilities. In fact, China succeeded in developing its strategic weapons, so she possessed intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Teng reorganized the field armies into combined arms group armies and increased the fighting capabilities of the navy and the air force. So Teng was able to improve China's conventional and nuclear forces by implementing his military modernization policy. As China modifies its force structure and make progress in defense modernization, strategic changes have been brought about. These strategic changes lead to improved military capabilities which will better prepare China for limited wars. In consequence, China's strategic target is changed from preparing for the gloval war to coping with the limited war and secure the minimum nuclear deterrence capabilities. The progress achieved so far in military modernization has been attributed to Teng. He provided stable leadership in the PLA since the twelfth party congress in 1982. He forced many senior cadress retiring from the Politburo and the Central Committee. As a result, the influence of the old guard and the leftist was diminished. However in order to realize military modernization in China, Teng had to seperate the military force from the politics. Since a successful military modernization programs could not be achieved without reforming the PLA's political role. But he refused any attempt to reform the established party army relations. So the perfect realization of military regularization and modernization in China would be difficult for the time being.

毛澤東의 初期指導權 確立過程 : 遵義會議를 中心으로

金益度 釜山大學校 師範大學 1992 교사교육연구 Vol.25 No.-

Mao Tse-tung played the majore role in making the national revolution a gigantic success. He gained world-wide eminence after the establishment of the PRC in 1949 SoMao was one of the historic figures of the twentieen century. But he did not emerged as a great Chinese leader in a day. His authority and leadership were accumulated through prolonged inner party struggle with his opponents. After Mif purged Li Li San at the fourth plenum in January 1931, the returned student faction captured firm control of the party. Mao was to carry on a bitter struggle with these men that lasted four years. The struggle between Mao and the returned students continued to have the same two basic themes : agrarian policy : and military tactics. In the directive of September 1931, they fiercely criticized against Maos policies to capture control of the Soviet areas. The conflict was all the more acute because the central committee decided to move from Shanghai to the Central Soviet areas in Kiangsi. The arrival of Chou En-lai and his comrades in Kiangsi was followed almost immediately by measures to curb Mao's authority in both party and government. The situation was even more unfavourable to Mao Tse-tung within the party hierarchy. The first Party Congress of the Soviet Area in November 1931 contented itself with denouncing his policies in every domain. The following August, at the Ningtu Conference of the party, Mao was not merely criticized but began to lose his authority over the Red Army, which was passed to Chou En-lai. Mao's loss of control over the army was doubly grave because it occured in the midst of the struggles to save the Kiangsi Soviet Area in the face of Chiang Kai-sheK's campaigns of encirclement and annihilation. Beginning in September 1931, Chin Pang-hsien and Chon En-lai began to denounce Mao's military tactics as "guerrillalism", quite out of date. To them, conflict between the communists and the Kuomintang appeared as a war between two states. They therefore insisted on replacing the old slogans by new ones such as "Attack all fronts". Though Mao was progressively deprived of such anthority as he possessed in the Party ant the army, he retained his position as chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic. The so-called "forward and offensive line" gained momentum in early 1933 adopting by the Twelfth Commintern Plenum in September 1932. But this inflexible strategy imposed by the majority of the Centrall Commitee ultimately led to a catastrophic defeat which put an end to the very existence of the Kiangsi Republic. Although the Red Army was successful in breaking through the KMT blockade, the initial phase of the march was disastrous in terms of personnel and equipment losses. During the first week in January 1935, the Politburo held the famed Tsuni conference. At the conference, Mao bitterly attacked the policies adopted then, which from his viewpoint played a major role in the collapse of the Kiangsi Soviet. Under the strident criticism of Peng Teh-hua, Mao Tse-tung, and Liu shao-chi, the conference agenda was broadened into an accusation session which covered the entire range of party polices since the Fourth Plenum of January 1931. Liu shao-chi broadend the criticism by impugning the correctness, not only of the Party's military polices, but also of its political line since the fourth Plenum. In the heated criticism-self criticism, Chin Pang-hsien, Chou En-lai, and Li Teh came under heavy attack from party leaders. After prolonged discussion, Chou En-lai accepted criticism of his mistakes. Mao managed to exploit general dissatisfaction within the party for his own gain. Chang Wen-tien suggested a compromise, which was accepted by the leadership. In the interests of party unity, Chang suggested that the conference, in its final resolution, state agreement with the party's political line since the Fourth Plenum, but register sharp disapprove of the military policies during the fifth encirclement campaign and westward flight. The resolution condemning Chin, Chou, and Li Teh resulted in a majore reorganization of the top party leadership and a setback for the "returned student" group. Chin Pang-hsien, who had been responsible as secretory-general for imposing this line, was forced out of his post, and replaced by another "returned student", Chang Wen-Tien. So it would be an overstatement to say that Mao was able to gain the key leadership position in the CCP at Tsun - i conference. But it was sure that the conference provided Mao the basis for just such a future development.

登小平의 指導權 確立 過程

金益度 釜山大學校 師範大學 1997 교사교육연구 Vol.34 No.-

Deng Xiaoping's rise to power was one of the most important historical turning points in modern China. China has since made a remarkable development with his initiation of the Four Moderniazations. As a result, China is now widely regarded as a candidate of economic superpowers in the 21th century. His achievement, however, was far from a purely economic one, made possible through his successive political struggle. At first, Deng had to purge the Gang of Four in his effort to put an end to the Maoist system which had been sustained for twenty years. The new regime under Deng managed to reorganize the leadership by eliminating, step by step, the legacy of the Cultural Revolution. At last he was successful in this task enough to pacify the so-called "line struggle" over the strategy of building socialism in China. As of now, it is highly unlikely that a grave ideological split might occur inside the Chinese leadership. Deng's most critical efforts along this road was legitimizing his drive for de-Maoization in ideology and party policies. His initial strategy in this task was to reinterpret the Thought of Mao Zedong. In 1978, an article entitled, "Practice is the sole criterion against which to judge a theory", appeared on an publication of the Central Party School which then was headed by Hu Yaobang, one of the leading supporters of Deng. The article emphasized the necessity to clear the truth and false of the "forbidden areas" set up by the Gang of Four. In this way Deng could undertake a partial denial of Maoism. Deng's approach to shatter ideological fetters had important ramifications for the political leadership as it clashed directly with the stance taken by Hua Guofeng. But it should be pointed out that his denial of Maoism, a brave approach for sure, had its own limit. It was because uncontrolled expansion of the movement could bring about a revolutionary crisis in the existing belief system of China and the very legitimacy of the CCP. Through this fine-tuned political and ideological maneuver, Deng consolidated his political leadership and could embark on a fullfledged pace of modernization by the end of 1978. Thus, the launch of Deng Xiaoping system could be described as a turning point of profound historical significance in China.

공산주의 비판방법 체계화방안.

김익도 한국국민윤리학회 1986 倫理硏究 Vol.23 No.2

毛澤東治下의 中國의 黨·政關係

金益度 釜山大學校 師範大學 1995 교사교육연구 Vol.31 No.-

In the analysis of the patterns lying in the development process of party·government relations in C.C.P, we can perceive several noticeable major changes as follows: 1. In contrast to the Soviet Russia, China's communist leaders came to power by prolonged military operations against both Kuomintang and Japanese army. The party·government relations in the C.C.P had been in progress for decades before they came to power. So the party·government relations in China took shape during the Yenan period. The party became the central force in the Chinese politics. The party took solid, monolithic control over administrative apparatus, military force, and the other organizations. 2. After seizuring the power, the main task for the communist leadership was to refashion the party for restructuring the Chinese society into socialist system. As a result the C.C.P opted to adopt the Soviet system as a model. Mao felt that it was absolutely necessary to copy everything from the Soviet Russia, especially in the field of central planning economic system. This policy was imposed by the need for an answer to handle the pressing and difficult tasks of creating an administrative system and building a socialist economy. The party·government relations was greatly changed in the pursuit of Soviet Russia's model. Consequently, the roles and functions of the party·government became separated and specialized. As a result. the party's solid grasp over the government appartus was loosened. 3. Khurushchev's de-Stalinization in 1956 influenced the C.C.P in a negative manner. After Anti-rightist movement, Mao searched an independent Chinese way of building socialist system. To achieve China's full potentials for economic and social development by themselves, Mao attempted the most extreme domenstic experiment, the Great Leap Forward policy. Once again, the patterns of the party·garvenment relations after Soviet model went through a great change. Because the G.L.F was carried out under the slogan of the "the party in command." The party became the nucleus of leadership of the state and it absorbed most of the executive and administrative functions previously performed by the government. In the area of party·government relations, the C.C.P has shifted from the indirect control to the direct control. 4. The G.L.F had turned out to be a colossal failure while the adjustments carried out under Liu Shao-Chl's leadership proved to be successful. The policy reversal, the loss of Mao's authority in the policy process, and the ideological erosion were an omnious threat to Mao. In respect to this situation, Mao could not help launching the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution to regain the control of the state and party leadership. Aiming to overthrow the party establishment, he set out to destroy completely the party apparatus which Liu and Teng dominated. Red Guards Movement rapidly developed by Mao's exhortations that "Rebellion is Justified". The intensity and violence of the Red Guard Movement disrupted China's party·government relations and brought China to the brink of international war. So Mao called for the army to involve in politics to recover the order. During the G P C R periods, China faced the unprecedent turmoil throughtout the country, but Mao's leadership was much more strengthened and all power was concentrated to him. The cult of Mao Tse-tung was frenziedly pushed to an extreme. In early 1970s, the G P C R was replaced by an institutionilizing polity. From that time on, Mao Kept firm control of the party and his power was culminated. But he disrupted China's political order and marked an indelible scar on the Chinese politics during his later years.