RISS 학술연구정보서비스

검색
다국어 입력

http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.

변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.

예시)
  • 中文 을 입력하시려면 zhongwen을 입력하시고 space를누르시면됩니다.
  • 北京 을 입력하시려면 beijing을 입력하시고 space를 누르시면 됩니다.
닫기
    인기검색어 순위 펼치기

    RISS 인기검색어

      검색결과 좁혀 보기

      선택해제
      • 좁혀본 항목 보기순서

        • 원문유무
        • 음성지원유무
        • 원문제공처
          펼치기
        • 등재정보
          펼치기
        • 학술지명
          펼치기
        • 주제분류
          펼치기
        • 발행연도
          펼치기
        • 작성언어
        • 저자
          펼치기

      오늘 본 자료

      • 오늘 본 자료가 없습니다.
      더보기
      • 무료
      • 기관 내 무료
      • 유료
      • KCI등재

        「IMF 시대」대미 외교의 방향

        김성한 한국전략문제연구소 1998 전략연구 Vol.5 No.3

        Ⅰ Korea's economic crisis has begun to force potentially important changes in the peace-building process on the Korean peninsula. The inauguration of President Kim Dae-jung under the financial crisis has led to a more conciliatory South Korean policy toward North Korea, thereby broadening public support in South Korea for the 'engagement' policy to North Korea while dampening desires for near-term Korean reunification. Recent developments on the Korean peninsula will require closer policy coordination between the United States and Korea on a broad range of issues including the KEDO process. Tactical coordination on such issues as food aid. progress in the pace of North-South relations, how to apply or relieve political and economic sanctions on North Korea, and how to respond to sudden economic and political changes in North Korea is exceedingly difficult, but critical. In order to make the Korea-U.S. policy coordination more effective, first of all, the Korean government needs to convince the U.S. government that the U.S. remain South Korea's ally rather than playing the role of a mediator between the two Koreas. The Clinton Administration could attempt to mediate between the two Koreas in the four-party peace process. Thus, Korea needs to. emphasize to the U.S. for instance, that the past data on North Korea's nuclear program be preserved and that the issue of North Korean missiles be dealt with not only in terms of their export problem but also of their development and deployment on the peninsula. Second. Korea and the U.S. should make all efforts to make their alliance enter a consolidation stage in which they frequently consult each other on bilateral as well as regional issues and seek agenda-building on the basis of shared democratic values between the two countries. In order to make it possible. Korea needs to well manage. through the political leadership. its relationship with China and the increasing cynicism of the conservative middle class to the U.S. Finally. on the basis of the mutual security alliance between Korea and the U.S.. a collective security system for the Northeast Asian region needs to be created. While bilateral security arrangements will remain the backbone of Northeast Asian security for a considerable period of time. the emerging new order raises the need for such a multilateral setting as the NEASED that was proposed by the Korean government in 1994. Korea should try to make it feasible and also actively participate in the multilateral activities at the track-II level. Ⅱ One important area where the interests coincide between the U.S. and Korea is one in which Korea. for the purpose of survival. and the U.S.. in order to protect its leadership, need an equilibrium within the region where Korea is located. An hegemonic order in Northeast Asia would threaten the U.S. leadership position as well as the political independence of Korea. However. the convergence of interests does not always guarantee policy coordination, since Korea and the U.S. can have different policy priorities. The resolution for the priority divergence between Korea and the U.S. can be achieved through redefinition of the alliance that is to be focused on regional priorities. In other words, both countries need to put their first priority on the strategic interests in Northeast Asia including the Korean peninsula. This is the way by which the global interest of the U.S. and the peninsular interest of Korea can be converged at the regional level. Thus, both countries should emphasize that the Korea-U.S. alliance. that was created to deter North Korea's military threat, will ultimately contribute to stability in Northeast Asia. and that the alliance will continue even after the threat from North Korea disappears. In addition. Korea and the C.S. should start preparing for crisis management in the case of North Korea's sudden collapse. Ⅲ Korea and the U.S. will have to begin consulting each other concerning the necessary steps to transform the alliance into the regional one. A key issue that is to be put on the table will be the role and force structure of the U.S. forces in unified Korea. Korea and the U.S. will have three options. They have to decide whether they will actually terminate the alliance by completely withdrawing American troops from Korea or preserve a reconfigurated alliance only with U.S. naval and air presence. or redefine their relationship toward an alliance for stability and interdependence with a token presence of ground forces together with the current level of naval and air forces. The first option of a complete withdrawal of American troops runs the risk of precipitating a power vacuum which is most likely to be filled either by China or Japan. and to trigger Sino-Japanese rivalry and arms race. Should Korea be left alone in the wilderness without an ally, there will arise mounting pressure for developing nuclear weapons in Korea. which could lead to a ''balance of terror." The second option of a reconfigurated alliance with naval and air presence can provide deterrence and reassurance to Korea to a certain degree. However. an alliance without U.S. ground forces cannot guarantee automatic American involvement in the emergency situation that could happen in Korea. In this case. the very credibility of American security commitment will be severely questioned politically. The last option of the alliance with a token U.S. ground force and naval/air forces can be a basis for deterring the rise of hegemonism in Northeast Asia and for preventing Korea from seeking a nuclear option. A small size (3000-5000) of U.S. ground forces in the southern part of Korea. far from the Chinese border. can play an effective hedge against the destabilizing forces and the uncertainty they will bring in Korea. However. this option requires a precondition, which is the Korean people's conviction that the U.S. has contributed to Korea's unification. Otherwise. the revitalizing task of the Korea-U.S. alliance will face insurmountable obstacles.

      • KCI등재

        한미동맹체제와 주한미군 : 역할 변화의 모색

        김성한 한국전략문제연구소 1999 전략연구 Vol.6 No.1

        Ⅰ. In 1995, the U.S. Department of Defense published the United States Security Strategy for the East Asian Region, which spelled out the security details for the Clinton Administration's strategy of 'engagement' and 'enlargement' in the East Asian region. The U.S. security strategy for East Asia, enumerated in the EASR, aims at maintaining the leadership role of the U.S. in the region through the four specific measures: 1) revitalizing the alliance with Japan: 2) engaging China: 3) consolidating the alliance with South Korea: and 4) combining bilateralism with multilateralism. The primary means for this strategy is the forward-deployed U.S. forces of about 100,000 in the region. Under the strategic framework, it. is important whether the interests of the U.S. and of Korea converge with each other. One important area where the interests coincide is one in which Korea, for the purpose of survival and the U.S. in order to protect its leadership, need an equilibrium within the region where Korea is located. An hegemonic order in Northeast Asia would threaten the U.S. leadership position as well as the political independence of Korea. Since the equilibrium most conducive to Korea's political autonomy is based on continued U.S. participation in the East Asian security system, Korea will continue to prefer to manage the regional equilibrium in alliance with the U.S. However, the convergence of interests does not always guarantee policy coordination, since Korea and the U.S. can have different policy priorities. This is shown in their North Korea policy. The first priority of the Clinton Administration's North Korea policy lies at the global level where the U.S. deals with North Korea to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to other regions. The second priority is based on the regional level in that the U.S. policy to North Korea is interconnected with its policy of' checking' China. At the level of the Korean peninsula, which is the last priority, the U.S. must reduce the tension between the two Koreas in order to prevent the outbreak of a war on the peninsula and must also seek the ways by which the sudden collapse of North Korea can be successfully managed. On the other hand, Korea's priorities in its North Korea policy are in the reverse order. The Korean government is more concerned with how to harmonize and speed up the progress of improving the relationship of Washington-Pyongyang with that of Seoul-Pyongyang. The problem has been that North Korea has yet to start restoring trust with South Korea, though it has been vigorous in carrying out negotiations with Washington. If the U.S.-North Korea negotiations proceed abreast with the improvement of relations between Seoul and Pyongyang, Korea - U.S. relations will remain smooth, but otherwise, their relations will face various complexities. In this respect, the importance of cooperation between Korea and the U.S. is emphasized. The resolution for the priority divergence between Korea and the U.S. can be achieved through redefinition of the alliance that is to be focused on regional priorities. In other words, both countries need to put their first priority on the strategic interests in Northeast Asia including the Korean peninsula. This is the way by which the global interest of the U.S. and the peninsular interest of Korea can be converged at the regional level. Thus, both countries should emphasize that the Korea-U.S. alliance, that was created to deter North Korea's military threat, will ultimately contribute to stability in Northeast Asia, and that the alliance will continue even after the threat from North Korea disappears. In addition, Korea and the U.S. should start preparing for crisis management in the case of North Korea's collapse. As a measure of redefining the Korea-U.S. alliance, both countries need to announce the "Joint Security Declaration" as soon as Korea's new administration is inaugurated in February 1998. The Declaration will contain the following ideas: 1) The Korea-U.S. alliance is still valid in tills post-Cold War period; 2) Korea and the U.S. will continue to cooperate to induce North Korea to, conduct a gradual reform; 3) The alliance will develop into the 'regional' alliance that will take the role of promoting regional peace and stability in Northeast Asia after Korea's unification. However, both countries should not miss pointing out that Northeast Asian security structure should advance toward multilateralism, since this kind of a joint action could provoke China. After the joint declaration is made, Korea and the U.S. will have to begin consulting each other concerning the necessary steps to transform the alliance into the regional one. A key issue that is to be put on the table will be the role and force structure of the U.S. forces in unified Korea. Ⅱ. Korea and the U.S. will have three options. They have to decide whether they will actually terminate the alliance by completely withdrawing American troops from Korea or preserve a reconfigurated alliance only with U.S. naval and air presence, or redefine their relationship toward an alliance for stability and interdependence with a token presence of ground forces together with the current level of naval and air forces. The first option of a complete withdrawal of American troops runs the risk of precipitating a power vacuum which is most likely to be filled either by China or Japan, and to trigger Sino-Japanese rivalry and arms race. Should Korea be left alone in the wilderness without an ally, there will arise mounting pressure for developing nuclear weapons in Korea, which could lead to a "balance of terror." The second option of a reconfigurated alliance with naval and air presence can provide deterrence and reassurance to Korea to a certain degree. However, an alliance without U.S. ground forces cannot guarantee automatic American involvement in the emergency situation that could happen in Korea. In this case, the very credibility of American security commitment will be severely questioned politically. The last option of the alliance with a token U.S. ground force and naval/air forces can be a basis for deterring the rise of hegemonism in Northeast Asia and for preventing Korea from seeking a nuclear option. A small size (3000-5000) of U.S. ground forces in the southern part of Korea, far from the Chinese border, can play an effective hedge against the destabilizing forces and the uncertainty they will bring in Korea. However, this option requires a precondition, which is the Korean people's conviction that the D.S. has contributed to Korea's unification. Otherwise, the revitalizing task of the Korea-U.S. alliance will face insurmountable obstacles.

      • KCI등재

        [특별보고서] 북한의 미래 - 전문가 설문조사 보고서

        김성한 고려대학교 일민국제관계연구원 2014 국제관계연구 Vol.19 No.2

        The Ilmin International Relations Institute (Director: Kim Sung-han, Professor at Korea University) conducted an expert survey on the "Future of North Korea" from April 14 to May 8, 2014. A total of 135 experts including scholars and former government officials from 7 countries/regions (South Korea 35, US 25, China 12, Japan 17, Russia 13, Europe 13, Others 6) specializing in North Korea and security studies participated in this survey. By analyzing their responses, IIRI has come to obtain various strategic implications. 고려대학교 일민국제관계연구원(원장: 김성한 고려대 교수)에서는 2014년 4월 14일부터 5월 8일까지 한국을 포함한 전 세계 북한 및 안보전문가(학자 및 전직 관료) 135명(국내 49명, 미국 25명, 중국 12명, 일본 17명, 러시아 13명, 유럽 13명, 기타 6명)을 대상으로 "북한의 미래"에 관한 설문조사를 실시하였습니다. 설문조사 결과를 통해, 북한의 미래에 대한 의미 있는 결과와 한국과 국제사회의 대북정책에 있어 전략적 시사점을 도출하였으며, 이를 기반으로 국/영문 보고서를 출간하였습니다.

      • KCI등재
      • [특파원 칼럼] 연이은 북한의 미사일 실패는 실패가 아닐 수 있다

        김성한 월간군사저널 2017 월간군사 Vol.2017 No.6

        '스콜라' 이용 시 소속기관이 구독 중이 아닌 경우, 오후 4시부터 익일 오전 9시까지 원문보기가 가능합니다.

      • [인터뷰] 북한의 아킬레스 건은 외부의 정보유입이다

        김성한 월간군사저널 2017 월간군사 Vol.2017 No.4

        '스콜라' 이용 시 소속기관이 구독 중이 아닌 경우, 오후 4시부터 익일 오전 9시까지 원문보기가 가능합니다.

      • [특파원 칼럼] 북한의 대륙간 탄도탄 성공과 심화되는 대남 공작

        김성한 월간군사저널 2017 월간군사 Vol.2017 No.8

        '스콜라' 이용 시 소속기관이 구독 중이 아닌 경우, 오후 4시부터 익일 오전 9시까지 원문보기가 가능합니다.

      연관 검색어 추천

      이 검색어로 많이 본 자료

      활용도 높은 자료

      해외이동버튼