경영·유육가공·초지·사료 ; 6 . Sodium - ascorbate 첨가 수준과 염적 조건이 NO2- 잔존량과 발색성에 미치는 영향

김두진,문윤희 한국동물자원과학회 ( 구 한국축산학회 ) 1983 제40회 학술발표회 논문초록 Vol.- No.-

馬韓社會의 構造와 性格

金杜珍 원광대학교 마한백제문화연구소 1990 馬韓, 百濟文化 Vol.12 No.-

나의 역사 연구

김두진 한국사학사학회 2022 韓國史學史學報 Vol.- No.46

名義貸與者의 責任에 대한 硏究

金斗鎭 연세법학회 2000 연세법학 Vol.7 No.2

무더운 현실의 무게와 그 자리 : 90년대 소설의 새로운 경향

김두진 충남대학교 교지편집위원회 1993 寶雲 - 충남대학교 Vol.- No.24

마치 주기적인 행사처럼 한국의 문단은 10년을 격차로 지각변동을 일으켜왔다. 90년대에도 예외없이 찾아온 이 순환적 지각변동은 우리 문학사의 결핍된 예언 능력을 꼬집듯이 참으로 엄청난 형태의 변화를 몰고 왔다. 예언능력이 없다는 것은 현실을 바라보지 못하고 그 변화발전 추이에 무능하다는 것을 잘 알려주는 아픈 사실임에 틀림없다.

Diners’ Intended Payment at Restaurants:The Dynamics between Institutions and Chef-Related Factors

김두진,유태영 (사)한국조리학회 2024 한국조리학회지 Vol.30 No.6

This study ventures into the gastronomic landscape of Seoul, South Korea, to unravel how institutional arrangements and chef-centric innovations shape diners’ spending decisions. Analyzing survey data from 247 adults, we probe their perceptions of specific cuisines and their consequent payment intentions. The findings reveal a nuanced scenario where institutional arrangements not only mediate diners’ culinary perceptions but are also subtly recalibrated by chef-driven factors. In detail, institutional arrangements, such as culinary schools and evaluative mechanisms, mediate the relationship between diners’ perceptions of cuisine and their intended payment at restaurants. Furthermore, chef-related factors, such as inventive menu designs, moderate the mediating effect of institutional arrangements on the relationship between diners’ perceptions of cuisine and their intended payment at restaurants. Concerning the relative impacts between chef-related factors and institutional arrangements, when chef-related factors are high (low), the mediating effects of institutional constraints on the relationship between diners’ perceptions of cuisine and their intended payment at restaurants will decrease (increase) than when chef-related factors are low (high). This interplay between institutional norms and individual creativity thus emerges as a key determinant in the economic success of restaurants.

백제의 미륵신앙과 (彌勒信仰) 계율 ( 백제연구총서 제4집 1994년 )

김두진 충남대학교 백제연구소 1994 백제연구총서 Vol.4 No.-

컨소시엄 방식에 의한 경매입찰의 경쟁법적 문제점

김두진 한국경제법학회 2011 경제법연구 Vol.10 No.1

컨소시엄은 “공동의 목적을 성취하기 위하여 공동활동에 참여하거나 자신들의 자원을 공동이용하려는 복수의 개인, 회사, 조직 또는 정부의 단체 또는 이들 주체들의 결합”을 의미한다. 현실적 또는 잠재적 경쟁사업자간 컨소시엄은 합작투자의 일종이다. 합작투자는 경쟁자간협력이라고도 불리는 것으로서, 복수의 기업들이, 다른 경우라면 개별적으로 생산하였거나 시장에서 획득하였거나 그것 없이 해나갔을 일정한 투입물을 생산하는 데에 협력하기로 합의한 일정한 형태의 조직을 말한다. 합작투자 내지 경쟁자간협력에는 완전통합 합작투자, 연구․개발 합작투자, 생산 합작투자, 공동마케팅 및 판매 협정, 공동구매협력 및 네트워크 합작투자 등 여섯 가지 주된 타입이 존재하며 경우에 따라 친경쟁적 효과와 반경쟁적 효과가 병존할 수 있다. 본 논문은 경쟁사업자간 컨소시엄 구성에 의한 입찰 사업관행의 경쟁법상 함의를 분석하고 그 경쟁제한성을 적절히 평가하기 위한 분석의 기본틀을 제시하여 공정거래법 집행의 실효성과 효율성을 제고하려는 데에 목적이 있다. 요점은 어떤 범위에서 경쟁사업자간 컨소시엄 구성에 의한 경매입찰이 경쟁법상 허용되고, 허용되지 않는지 그 경계선을 가늠해 보고 그 적절한 판단기준을 발견하려는 것이다. 사업자간 컨소시엄 구성에 의한 경매입찰 사업관행은 합작투자 또는 경쟁자간협력의 일종으로서 그 자체로서는 적법한 것도 위법한 것도 아니다. 컨소시엄 구성에 의한 입찰은 경쟁법상으로는 카르텔, 즉 입찰담합에 해당하는지 여부가 제기될 수 있는 중심적 문제이고, 그 외에 제한적인 상황에서 경쟁제한적 기업결합에 해당하는지 여부, 그리고 시장지배적 지위의 남용여부가 검토될 수 있다. 컨소시엄 구성에 의한 입찰이 어떤 경우에 입찰담합 또는 적법한 공동입찰인가 판단하기 위해서는 컨소시엄을 구성하는 사업자들이 단독으로도 입찰할 수 있는 경쟁역량을 가지고 있는지 여부, 당해 컨소시엄이 당해 입찰에서 시장지배력을 보유하는지 여부, 당해 컨소시엄과 경쟁하는 다른 경쟁자들의 존부와 그 경쟁역량의 정도, 거대한 공사의 일련의 입찰이라면 다른 공구의 공사의 입찰과의 상호관련성 및 역사, 컨소시엄을 구성할 수 밖에 없는 지적재산권이나 도급능력 등의 정당한 사유의 존부, 보다 덜 제한적인 경쟁제한방법이 존재하는 지 여부, 전체적인 경쟁제한 효과와 효율성 증대효과간의 형량 등이 단계적으로 원고와 피고간에 증명될 필요가 있을 것이다. According to the wikipedia, a consortium is an association of two or more individuals, companies, organizations or governments with the objective of participating in a common activity or pooling their resources for achieving a common goal. In the context of the competition law, a consortium is a kind of "joint venture" which is a form of organization with procompetitive effect in that two or more firms agree to cooperate in producing some input that they would otherwise have produced individually, outsourced, or perhaps done without. Additionally, "competitor collaboration" is a nickname of joint venture. There are six primary types of joint venture: fully-integrated joint ventures, R&D joint ventures, production joint ventures, joint marketing and selling arrangements, joint purchasing agreements, network joint ventures. In the world of competition law, Bid-rigging is a hard core cartel, per se illegal, while joint venture is presumed legal. However it becomes more complicated provided both concepts are combined. This article examines by which approach and with which criteria the competition authority may adequately assess bidding via consortium from the dimensions of cartel, dominance or merger regulation. Of course, the weighs must be placed on the matter of cartel. Chapter Ⅱ of this article examines the legal standards applicable to joint ventures generally. Those standards are the prohibition of cartels as an unreasonable restraint of trade, the merger regulation in a limited situation and the prohibition of abuse of dominant position. In so doing, how to apply those standards to joint ventures is also discussed. Chapter Ⅲ describes the exemptions through special acts from the antitrust liability in U.S.A. for R&D joint ventures and production joint ventures, standards development organizations and export trading joint ventures. And it also explains EU's block exemptions from the antitrust liability for R&D agreements and specialization agreements. Chapter Ⅳ addresses the estimation of bidding via consortium in the eye of the Korea Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. It urges that greater emphasis has to be put on economic criteria such as the market power of the parties and other factors relating to the market structure in assessing the impact on markets likely to be caused by bidding via consortium. Lastly, Chapter Ⅴ suggests the legal standards applicable to deciding whether a bidding via consortium in private or public procurement is collusive or not. This article recommends the "abbreviated rule of reason" approach devised in the NCAA v. Board of Regents Case by the U.S. Supreme Court.

하도급법 위반행위의 위법성 판단기준 및 집행수단

김두진 한국경영법률학회 2015 經營法律 Vol.25 No.4

Subcontracting transactions can lead to cost saving, risk sharing, quality upgrading and competitiveness improving. However it is necessary for government to intervene the subcontracting relationship because principal contractors could abuse their positions in trade with subcontractors unfairly. The Fair Transactions in Subcontracting Act (hereinafter the “Subcontracting Act”) provides duties and obligations of the principal contractors to protect subcontractors. Part II of this Article looks into the illegality of offenses of the Subcontracting Act, especially fixing unreasonable subcontract consideration (Article 4) and adjustment of subcontract consideration due to change in Design, etc. (Article 16). And then I shift my focus into the enforcement means of the Subcontracting Act. In Part Ⅲ, I discuss the documentary fact-finding investigations on subcontract transactions introduced in 2010 to avoid principal contractor’s retaliation for subcontractor’s reporting to the Fair Trade Commission that the principal contractor has violated the Subcontracting Act. After looking into the orders for corrective measures or imposing surcharge as remedies, I explain the 3 year’s time limit for making remedies in the recently-amended Subcontracting Act. And I consider the adequateness of awarding punitive damages for the subcontractors of important offenses of the Subcontracting Act. Article 35(2) of the Korea Fair Transactions in Subcontracting Act has introduced treble damages for the victims of abuses of the acquired technical data by a principal contractor since 2011 revision. This is the first legislation of punitive damages in modern Korean law. I insist that the beneficiaries of punitive damages should be confined to the victims of intentional offenses of the Subcontracting Act. Finally, Part Ⅳ concludes by summarizing my suggestions that follow from my analysis.

The political Rationale of the EU Constitutional Treaty:Hegemonic Consideration for the Core Member States

김두진 서울대학교 국제학연구소 2005 Journal of International and Area Studies Vol.12 No.2

The constitutional draft of the EU represents remarkable progress compared with the current Treaty of Nice. From a political perspective, the proposed ‘Constitutional Treaty’ has the attributes more of an international treaty than a constitution, and reflects rather incomplete constitutionalism. The EU constitution is regarded as a carefully contrived compromise between the supranational federalist and intergovernmentalist positions. The proposed EU Constitution has grown out of constitutional politics strategically constructed by the core Member States, whose national governments have driven the process of EU constitution-making. We argue here that it is the major Member State-led constitutional politics underlying hegemonic intergovernmental governance that will continue to prevail, and that the concept of EU constitutional federalism seems, at present, to be a rather far off goal