S-D1 : AUXIN TRANSPORT CARRIERS : THEIR MODULATION AND PHYSIOLOGICAL RELEVANCE

강빈구 한국생화학분자생물학회 (구 한국생화학회) 1987 추계학술대회집 Vol.- No.-

식물생리학자 다윈

강빈구 한국과학사학회 1982 한국과학사학회지 Vol.4 No.1

중력에 의한 오옥신의 횡적이동에 대한 에칠렌의 작용에 관한 연구 : Ⅰ. 세포내 전분체와 골지체의 이동 Ⅰ. Intracellular displacements of amyloplasts and Golgi bodies

강빈구,정상진,민경화,박인범 한국식물학회 1976 Journal of Plant Biology Vol.19 No.2

에칠렌은 황화(etiolated)완두콩의 종아의 절간조직에서 굴지성 자극에 의한 오옥신의 횡적 이동(lateral transport)의 방향을 역전시키고 그 결과로 줄기의 양성 굴지성 반응을 초래한다. 이와 같은 에칠렌의 작용은 중력 감수체(statolith)라고 알려진 전분체의 세포내 이동과는 별 관계를 찾아 볼 수가 없다. 그러나 전분체와 마찬가지로 중력의 작용으로 세포의 밑부분으로 이동하는 골지체는 에칠렌의 영향을 받으면 그 이동 방향이 역전되어 세포의 윗부분으로 몰리게 된다. 이와 같은 실험결과는 골지체의 이동이 굴지성 자극의 감수, 또는 이로 인한 오옥신의 재분포와 차별적인 세포신장에 대해 어떤 인과 관계에 놓여 있다는 것을 제시해 주고 있는 것이다. Ethylene was found to reverse the direction of gravity-induced lateral auxin transport and to cause an accumulation of auxin in the physically upper sides of horizontally placed pea shoots. The pea shoot displayed a slightly positive(downward) geotropic curvature in the presence of applied ethylene. Golgi bodies were found to be distributed preferentially in the bottom halves of cells as against the top halves following geotropic stimulation, and this pattern of intracellular distribution of dictyosomes was also reversed by ethylene treatment. Intracellular displacement of amyloplasts as a result of geotropic induction was not reversed by the action of ethylene. In view of a positive correlation between the direction of auxin movement and the displacement pattern of dictyosomes, it is suggested that the Golgi bodies are involved in the perception of gravity and/or subsequent redistribution of auxin or differential elongation in geotropism.

Auxin Receptor 와 그 생리적 연관성

강빈구 생화학분자생물학회 1986 생화학분자생물학회 소식 Vol.6 No.4

생물학 교육의 현황과 발전 과제

강빈구,Gang, Bin-Gu 한국대학교육협의회 1996 大學敎育 Vol.83 No.-

非公式組織에 대한 人間關係論的 檢討

姜濱口 서울大學交 商科大學 韓國經濟 硏究所 1964 經濟論集 Vol.3 No.4

Ⅰ. Introduction At the beginning of the 19th century, the entrepreneurs were forced by the pressure of liberal capitalism to engage in large-scale competition for markets and in a merciless fight for the accumulation of capital. But at the same time this pressure had fundamentally changed aspects of labour and life of industrial workers, bringing along innumerable labour problems. During the first industrial revolution, the attitude of the employers towards their workers was characterized by ruthless and usurious exploitation. But by the end of the century they become aware that labour is not inexhaustible, that it is expensive. Moreover, workers get organized in order to defend their value at the labour market and the most elementary guaranties of working conditions. Social legislation became a necessity and has been developed ever since, and the formation of labour groups in enterprises was institutionalized. Gradually managers and administrators begin to take care of organization, coordination and techniques of production, while the classical entrepreneur had only worked for his profit. The changed situation is marked by a growing autonomy of the problems of the enterprise that may actually be considered as an independant social system. The whole field of organization has become of great importance with the rapid development of mechanization and automation (second industrial revolution). In the science of management the problems of organization take a relatively large part as no enterprise would be able to survive without it. The structure of organization has a double character; the first being functional and technical, the second being social. This social structure has been gradually developing into an informal and spontaneous organization. The function of informal organization shall be dealt with and integrated into the system of management in its concern with human relations. It is evident that these can be examined only as far as questions of management are related to them. Ⅱ. Rationalization and Human Relations Approach In a certain sense the techniques of management have become measures for solving problems of labour, the source of the surplus value of capital. The history of management consists of a continuous confrontation of capital and labour, and the development of capitalism can be traced back clearly. R.W. Taylor, for instance, who has played a great part in the history of scientific management (as its founder) wanted to rationalize and institutionalize the method of work by propagating his "science". This "science" relied exclusively on the ideal functioning of capital, but was not at all concerned with psychologic, human and sociologic problems of the workers. Therefore American labour groups were vigorously opposed to this movement of scientific has been worked out and has become the central problem of labour management. This step marked the beginning of the modern management science. It is particularly noteworthy that the human relations approach was based on the discovery that informal organization was existing and functioning and had sprung up spontaneously formal organization background. Ⅲ. The Necessity to Recognize Informal Organization Even if status and role are determined very scientifically by formal organiits members gets stronger in direct contact and preferably outside of official forms; 3) informal relations may serve as a protection from or a defense against the requirements of organization. The development of the capitalist production system at a high level requires doubtlessly a growing indifference towards thoughts, feelings and humanities of workers. But it has been stated that man not only works as homo economicus, but also acts as a social being. It is by this fact that Taylorism has lost its impact. The human relations approach has descerned the positive and the negative elements of informal organization. With this knowledge the establishment of a more rational management system is no longer possible without taking in account the mutual interdependence of formal and informal organization in order to achieve a maximum, benefit of capital. Ⅳ. Informal Organization and the Logic of Situation The two kinds of organizations are inseparably interrelated and determined together the social organization, but they obey to logics completely different from each other. Therefore they cannot be examined in the same way, i.e., the logic of sentiments cannot be replaced by the logic of cost or the logic of efficiency. Nevertheless, there is no denying the fact that both, formal and informal organization, function for the same common aim. In order to answer this demand the logics of organization must be made into one, and that ins where the logic of situation theory or of situation understanding takes its origin. The aim of this logic of situations is the interior comprehension of human activities in management. The theory of human relations gets a new significance in this context as the individual and the social situation are considered at the same time so that the total situation might be more clearly understood. The logic of situations is, by the way, another social technique for management.

後進國經濟政策의 몇가지 根本問題에 關하여

姜濱口 서울大學校 商科大學 韓國經濟硏究所 1964 經濟論集 Vol.3 No.2

Ⅰ. Introduction. In this thesis, some ideas for the possible economic progress in the under-developed countries are proposed. An under-developed country is generally defined as a country with low national income not capable of deciding its course toward development. Though remitted from cultural backwardness, their economical structure is westernized. Approach to the problems of the under-developed countries is to be divided by comparison with the historical study, econometric study, and study on the economic policy. This thesis is based upon the latter. Ⅱ. Political View of Economy. It is dangerous to use history as guidence for development. Nothing common is found between matters of process of the advanced countries' economical growth and the present problems of the under-developed countries. The major difference is the fact that Europe of the 19th century was the precursor of the world and penetrated first into the world market while the under-developed countries of today are under the unbalanced internal economic situation and unfavorable conditions among the world markets, which are not organized in democracy. Ⅲ. On the Agricultural Problems. The agricultural structure of the under-developed countries is characterized by the limited mobility of funds which are formed of incomes from agricultural production, and the low proportion of agricultral investment. Ⅳ. On the Commercial Problems. One of the basic characteristics of under-developed economics is the strong tendency to commercialization. Entrepreneurs' income does not depend upon the formation of productive capital, but upon the exchange of merchandise. The split into innumerable small capitals makes participation of the innumberable agents on each commercial operation. The appearable realization of intermediate gains decreases the productive willingness and the commercial capital accumulation does not serve on economical construction. Ⅴ. On the Industrial Problems. Not only the accumulation of capital is important, but judicious utilization of this accumulated capital in accordance with the established programme is rather more important. It is necessary also to devise the methods permitting for the increase of the labor factor and the economization of natural resources and capital of the production factors. Ⅵ. On Financing Economic Growth. 1. First Aspect. The monopoly is formed, in under-developed economy, by legislative measure such as loose rhythm of economic growth, rarefaction of capital, insufficiency of demands; a group formed by a number of entrepreneurs, as that of pressure. Therefore, the monopoly is not the result of strict concurrence. It is far from advanced economics that the enterpreneurs' profit does not provoke the additional production factors and the decrease of prices. The familiar enterprises contribute negatively toward an important part of economics in underdeveloped countries. Such enterprises are financed mostly by auto-financement. The banks mostly utilize the commercial method and aim at researching customers' solvability and high rate of interest, inclination toward short-term loans which favor speculation and monopoly situation of import-export. The infra-structure is impossible to build by the minor size of private spontaneous saving which could be considered as a by-product of consumption. This matter shows the necessity of appeal for enforced saving. 2. Second Aspect. The transmission of capital from personal possession to that of the state through impositions of taxes makes efficient utilization of it possible, especially, heavy taxes on luxuries, for example, with the aim of controlling the consumation of imported merchandize besides other necessaries. Ⅶ. Conclusion. The inferiority of under-developed countries can not be covered by opportunism of economic policy, but recovery could be achieved through the political policy. Unless an international equality is assured, it is natural that a consciousness of community would be formed among the majority of under-developed countries. The different forms of nationalism aroused by the reason that the political independence depends upon economic force and assures the development power considerably under the terms of non-blindedness.

「리베르만」論爭과 實際

姜濱口 서울大學校商科大學 韓國經濟硏究所 1966 經濟論集 Vol.5 No.1

Ⅰ. Introduction The idea has been accepted for a long time that profit is what keeps going capitalist enterprises and economy. Under capitalism, therefore, the pursuit of maximum profit seems to be its aim without preestablishing any kind of coordination with or program for the whole of society. This kind of reasoning remains true, even if one favours the theory of the purpose of enterprise that has been developed in recent years, the most outstanding scholar in this field being P.F.Drucker, who refuses maximization of profit as the purpose of enterprise by replacing it by "adequate profit" as the first responsibility towards society. In the same way the emerging of managerial society does not oppose the above reasoning either, because the parts played by the capitalist so far will only be taken over by the managers of industrial enterprises. For these reasons it is astonishing that the notion of profit, characteristic of capitalist society, is being introduced into the socialist economy of USSR. The association of the terms of "profit" and "communism" has, at first glance, a shocking effect. The introduction of profit has come about after a series of discussions, the contents of which have been called Libermanism. Liberman, professor at the University of Kharkov, becomes the exponent of new theories in 1962 and after the personal changes at the Kremlin, the discussions of Libermanism are led with more fervour while experiments with a number of his new ideas are being carried through. We have, therefore, reasons to ask: Are the USSR going to let themselves inspire by capitalism and are they trying to adopt profit as a motor for social production? Does this mean a confession of failure concerning economic planning practised until now? Reality is less spectacular: there is no economic revolution in the USSR. The experiments carried out now are rather meant to improve planning than to undermine its foundations. If profit is being introduced into this system its function is very different from that in capitalism. Ⅱ. Evaluation of P.F.Drucker's Theory of Profit P.F.Drucker thinks that his theory about profit and profitability may be applied regardless of any difference in economic or social systems. Thus, according to him, "profit figures are the only thing the management has to go by when it makes his decisions-in a collectivist and planned as well as in a free-enterprise economy. They are inevitably the first yardstick and gauge of performance." And "profitability operates as much under collectivism as under individualism, under government control and government ownership as in a free-enterprise system." The validity of this indiscriminating application is dubious. Profit under socialism, admitted and considered necessary already by Lenin, is clearly subordinated to the principle of planned national economy. The fact that all enterprises in the USSR are nationalized makes profit outside planned economy impossible. And therefore the fulfilment of the plan is "the first yardstick and gauge of performance." Consequently, profit, being "a necessity of survival" to the enterprise for Drucker, need not be so under socialism. The enterprise or its survival does not depend on the profit it makes but rather on the decision of a state which may even close down a profitable enterprise if it is thought necessary. Moreover, there may be enterprises operating with a deficit foreseen in the plan. Under the planned economy therefore, profit is not "the first social responsibility as well as its first duty toward itself and its workers." Drucker further defines profit as "the risk premium that covers the costs of staying in business-replacement, obsolescence, market risk and uncertainty." and that "profit insures the supply of future capital for innovation and expansion." But if an enterprise estimated as important within the plan should not have made the profit estimated in the plan itself, the state will take over the risk premium and supply of future capital. Moreover, there cannot exist any market risk under socialism because there is no free or capitalist market. Finally, we may state that Soviet enterprises, even if they range within the scale of self-financing, are not and will probably never be absolutely autonomous. They all depend on the national plan. In this case, Drucker's theories can only be applied to industrial enterprises in capitalist countries. The fundamental difference stems from the fact that capitalist enterprises work in a system of free market and liberal economy, while socialist enterprises are working principally for the realization of the plan. Ⅲ. Liberman's Theories and the Controversy Concerning Libermanism In order to overcome difficulties in USSR economy and management, Liberman suggested the following points of a reform: The national economic council and the regional economic councils (Sovnarkhozes) must radically improve the means of supply of material as well as of technical needs of enterprises, the present hierarchy bringing about an attitude of irresponsibility. Individual enterprises must be authorized to fix their plans independently. Plans enforced from above that only consider the output, force enterprises to dissimulate their reserves and keep them from operating according to their full capacity. Instead of having the Gosplan fix very strict plans annually, its powers would be reduced to only drawing up general outlines being forwarded through the sovnarkhozes. They would contain mainly control numbers and stretch over a period of two or three years. In order to make planning more attractive, enterprises should have the possibility to get into direct contact with suppliers and consumers within the limits set by the control indices. The managers would have large influence and, after having consulted with their own committees of production, would have the right: To determine the structure and the personnel of the enterprise within the general frame of members and salary budget assigned to them by the Gosplan; To refix salaries more or less raised above the standard type salary; To refix prices in order to enhance the functioning of any section of the enterprise; To extend loans for housing projects and other social services. These propositions are directed towards a large decentralization. Their main importance would be to make the managers, up to now blind executives of a strict plan, real heads of enterprises. These propositions of Liberman have been attacked by two sides; by those reproaching him of going to far and by those thinking his suggestions of reform insufficient. The conservative theorists hold the opinion that the index of profit proposed by Liberman is not applicable in all enterprises of different sections and they favour a less strict system of leaving a certain margin for each case where the plan has to be adopted. For them a general spirit of reconciliation in economic administration would be sufficient to dissolve a too rigid tutelage. The result, according to them, would both benefit the fulfilment of the plan and safeguard the rights of the enterprises. Other more progressive theorists, e.g., Nemchinov, a menber of Academy, criticize that Liberman has not brought up any new idea concerning the formation of prices, nor the fiscal system of the enterprises. Moreover the index of profit does not show anything but the relation between profit and productive capital. It shows a result but does not go into the details of production. The relationship of subordination of the enterprise under the planning authority must therefore be changed and the enforced plan has to be substituted by a plan based on a mutual contract. The volume of production and the provided quality would no longer be considered as a task but as an obligation originating in the freely negotiated contract between the planning offices and the enterprises. Secondly, prices should be remunerative, according to quality, novelty of a product, etc. In the third place, an enterprise must be able to obtain, without too long delay, all equipment and material necessary for its production. Last, not least, the mentality of the managers has to be trans formed; they must learn to care personally for economic administration of their productive capital. Ⅳ. Experiences with Libermanism and the Contents of Economic Reforms in the USSR The procedure of putting theoretical suggestions into experimental application has more and more often been practiced in USSR in many fields. These experiments have not only been carried through in the case of Libermanism, but also, e.g., applying to forms of organization for operation in enterprise, new methods of financing, techniques of accounting, methods of establishing plans for enterprises, reforms of the premium system, new systems for encouraging innovations, etc. But the experiment that roused rumours in capitalist countries, speaking of a "return to the free market," "sovereignty of the consumer," "abandoning of planning," was the one that dealt with direct contracts between supplying enterprises and their customer enterprises. This method has been applied for the first time in two enterprises, "Bolshevichka" and "Maiak", which are both manufacturers of ready-made clothes. The plan was made up for them after contracts had been signed with the customer. This means that both enterprises make first contracts with retail firms that have, on their side, to respect the demands of their customers. The contracts define the quantity, the quality, the prices etc. of the product. The plan is approved afterwards by the central planning offices. Moreover, both enterprises are free to choose whatever method of execution they want and are thus freed from the habitual normalization in the field of use of raw material, labour, etc. Finally, the result of their activities is evaluated according to the ealization of their production plan (as before) and to the level of their benefit (new system). After six months of experimenting in both enterprises, positive results have been announced. Consequently, the government seems to follow the same way now, extending the application of reforms to a greater number of other enterprises. It decided also in favour of a progressive reform towards greater subtlety in economic organisms and lans. The philosophy of this reform program consists in assuring harmony between national planning and balanced management of individual enterprises. Ⅴ. Evaluation of the Soviet Economic Reform and Its Problems Even if we can speak of great revisions in Soviet economy we must however delimit it. All measures towards reform are neither concerned directly with the principle of planned centralization nor, of course, with the fundamental principle of the state as owner of the means of production. Doubtlessly the reform gives a greater margin of initiative to the managers, but the planning offices continue, directly or indirectly, to fix from above the prices of the majority of products, the volume and the product line. They thus control important factors of profit variation. Therefore, with or without Liberman, the enterprise is not entitled to plan independently its rentability. In order to fully understand the dimensions and the limits of these reforms it is necessary to get some insight into the reasons underlying these changes. For several years a low efficiency could be observed in USSR economy. The rhythm of production increase had, in the past, been due to an extensive development of economy (extension of the quantity of production, like increase in productive capacity by construction of new units and enlarging of old ones, increase of labour for industrial production, etc.) However, having exhausted these extensive sources, it seemed to become more and more necessary to stress intensive means of development in order to assure a larger output. Roughly speaking, the system of planned management was judged to be incapable of speeding up this process. It was considered rather as an obstacle towards quick development. In other words, Soviet economy has, in recent years, suffered from serious deficiencies in its production structure. These influenced at the same time the "macrostructure" (the proportion between diverse branches of production) as well as the "microstructure" (the relation between the various categories of production within a certain branch). Therefore many signs of distortion in the relation between the production structure (supply) and real needs (demand) began to make themselves felt more and more. In practice there was a prolific stock of articles not immediately necessary to demands of daily life(an alarming increase of unsold material was the result), while the list of lacking or insufficiently supplied goods became longer and longer. Unrealistic and unilateral plans have been an obstacle for the rationalization of production and distribution. On the other hand, it is not for the central planning office to discover concrete means for better production and even less to assure rational exploitation. Therefore, it was necessary to radically change the correlation and interdependence between the socialist planning system in USSR, the enterprises and the market. In order to adopt these revisions efficiently the solution of the following problems is prerequisite: (a) As the realization of the plan remains the supereme objective of a Soviet enterprise, the central and the control organizations will continue to interfere directly or indirectly with the management. But even if a great flexibility and subtlety is aimed at within this system, it will always remain difficult to assure them practically, especially in a large country like USSR. (b) The enterprises used to collect money for their sales, but the amount did not represent the real value of the merchandise, for prices did not correspond to its value. The formation of prices was based on a subjective decision by the state, so that the relation between prices did not correspond to relations of values. That is why certain enterprises made deficits while others had large profits, without taking into consideration the question of good or bad anagement. If, under these circumstances, the notion of rentability is introduced, all prices have to be revised first. But this is a task of immense complexity. (c) The socialist market is different from the capitalist or free market. In order to assure the productivity and rentability of enterprises they should be able to act according to the situation and the needs of the market. However, in USSR, even the market is a product of the plan deciding the general trend of development of this same market. It is, of course, not always possible to guarantee a healthy mechanism of the market for the central planning offices. Therefore, the market is easily a victim of the subjectivity of the state. (d) Formerly the planning authorities in USSR believed that the means of production could not be productive because they did not render and added value. They would only have to be replaced or reproduced, which would be the same as depreciation. But the present Soviet economists think that the disposition of productive capital should not be free, but that enterprises must pay a certain amount, besides the depreciation, corresponding to the normative efficiency coefficient of investment. They therefore hold it necessary to impose taxes or some kind of interest rates on the capital. These propositions aim at assuring a more rational usage of productive capital. As a matter of fact, the capital given free of charge led to an irresponsible attitude of the managers and to waste of equipment. (e) It is a difficult though necessary task to change the attitude of the managers who were only used to blindly obey orders. In order to stop the enormous factor of stagnation that has crept into hierarchical machine, a spectacular change in spirit and method seems to be more necessary than detailed reforms.

에틸렌과 식물생장

강빈구 연세대학교 교육대학원 1982 연세교육과학 Vol.22 No.-

Auxin 수용체의 생리적 기능

강빈구 ( Bin Goo Kang ) 한국생화학분자생물학회 (구 한국생화학회) 1988 생화학총설집 Vol.2 No.-