근대 일본 병참체제의 성립과 운영 : 청일전쟁 시기 한반도를 중심으로

魏晨光 고려대학교 대학원 2023 국내박사

Starting from the fundamental inquiry into whether the tradition of underestimating logistics is inherent in the Japanese army, this dissertation thoroughly investigates the introduction and conceptualization of military logistics by the modern Japanese army. It examines the institutionalization of logistics through the enactment of laws, the management of logistics during the first Sino-Japanese War, and the subsequent reorganization of logistics following the conclusion of the conflict. Diverging from previous studies that predominantly explored specific aspects such as transportation, communications, or sanitation within military logistics, this research provides a comprehensive analysis of the system's functioning, highlighting its integral role as a singular, comprehensive, and intricate supply system located at the rear. The modern concept of military logistics was first introduced by Kelmens Wilhelm Jacob Meckel, an esteemed instructor who was invited to the army war college in 1885. At that time, the Japanese army operated under the Chindai(鎮台) system, primarily focused on defending the mainland. However, even the elite generals, comprising the top 10% of the army, struggled to grasp the intricacies of logistics for field armies deployed overseas. Meckel commenced his instruction by elucidating basic terminology, encompassing the transportation of divisions within logistics, the integration of combat arms, and the overarching concept of maintaining a continuous supply chain from the rear to the front lines. Meckel's educational approach aimed to instill a solid understanding of the foundational principles behind establishing a supply line and executing logistics operations and commands. To facilitate this, a series of field education programs called 'the trip for staff practice'(参謀練習旅行) were conducted, where Meckel provided problem-solving scenarios and engaged in discussions with third-grade students at the Army war college and agents of the imperial Japanese army general staff office(参謀本部). Over the course of three years, these field education sessions were held seven times. Through this immersive learning experience, the elite generals gained proficiency in the essential concepts of logistics operations, command structures, and the establishment of supply lines. These newfound understandings served as the bedrock for the subsequent institutionalization of military logistics through the implementation of ordinances. After Meckel's departure from Japan, the Japanese army underwent a transformation into the modern divisional system. In preparation for the impending warfare with the Qing, the army established ordinances and manuals specifically tailored to the logistics system. Between 1887 and June 6th, 1894, as the dispatch to Joseon loomed, the Japanese army diligently organized institutions and developed comprehensive ordinances for logistics. Through an examination of various statute books, it becomes evident that the logistics system encompassed a vast structure, comprising multiple specialized fields such as transportation, communications, sanitation, and accountancy. The organization and mobilization department(兵站総監部) operated under the imperial general headquarters(大本営), while the logistics unit(兵站部) was affiliated with the independent field division at the center. Within the organization and mobilization department, there existed sub-organizations including the quartermaster general (兵站監), the transportation and communications general(運輸通信長官), the field army director general(野戦監督長官), and the field sanitation general(野戦衛生長官). Nevertheless, the logistics organization functioned within distinct spatial domains categorized as dot, line, and area, such as the "main logistics field"(兵站主地), "logistics field"(兵站地), "supply line"(兵站線路), and "logistics management area"(兵站管理区域). The Japanese army, despite lacking prior experience in overseas warfare, successfully established a robust and efficient logistics system characterized by a well-regulated commanding structure, defined tasks, and control areas. This achievement was made possible through the direct adoption of German logistics systems, which had already demonstrated their effectiveness in various military campaigns. However, it is worth noting that Meckel's education, which primarily relied on German standards, did not encompass the intricacies of maritime supply lines and logistics management in foreign territories. Consequently, the logistics system implemented by the Japanese military can be considered a "pay-later" approach, as it had not undergone the trial and error process typical of real-world scenarios. In order to comprehensively examine the logistics system developed by the Japanese army without prior overseas warfare experience, this dissertation focuses specifically on the Korean peninsula. The study traces the supply lines originating from the port cities of Incheon, Busan, and Wonsan, where the Japanese army conducted its landings. Through this analysis, the supply lines are classified into two categories: "passing" supply lines('通過型' 兵站線) and "operations support" supply lines('作戰支援型' 兵站線) on land, as well as "maritime supply lines"(海路兵站線) and "watercourse supply lines"(水路兵站線) on water. It was not uncommon for overland supply lines to be supplemented by maritime or watercourse routes. The transportation capacity of support lines varied in order, with marine transport, watercourse transport, carts, draught horses, and manual laborers. Consequently, the logistics unit(兵站部) of the Japanese army favored maritime or watercourse supply lines due to their larger transport capacity. However, the maritime supply lines, which boasted the highest transportation capacity, were burdened by a significant challenge—securing control of the sea. Without absolute dominance over the seas, these maritime supply lines could not be utilized without the protection of battleships. What ultimately determined the successful functioning of the logistics system during the first Sino-Japanese war was not solely effective command structures, but rather the indispensable reliance on a labor-intensive workforce comprising workers and shaft horses. Mechanized power played no role in the operations, leaving the Japanese army with no choice but to heavily depend on human and animal labor. However, the 9th Mixed Brigade(混成第九旅団), positioned at the forefront, encountered significant challenges in procuring an adequate number of workers and shaft horses along the newly established Incheon-Yongsan supply line. Consequently, the breakdown of labor columns became prevalent due to frequent desertions. These difficulties were further exacerbated by the imperial general headquarters' steadfast adherence to the policy of "local procurement". Recognizing the challenges posed by frequent desertions of workers, shaft horses, and cows, the leadership of the Japanese army gradually shifted their focus towards the implementation of a light railway system as a viable solution for mass transportation. This strategic shift aimed to alleviate the logistical paralysis caused by the reliance on traditional labor-intensive methods. Evidence supporting this change in mindset can be observed in the Japanese army's attempts to employ a light railway during the planned Zhili Operation(直隸作戦), which encompassed the region from Shanhaiguan to Beijing. Although the logistics plan involving the light railway could not be realized due to the signing of a peace treaty, it laid the groundwork for the establishment of a railway battalion. Notwithstanding ongoing peace negotiations, the Japanese army demonstrated unwavering determination to conquer Beijing by organizing temporary railway troops and enacting relevant ordinances. Through an examination of the concerns raised by logistics officers and the subsequent reorganization of logistics ordinances, we can ascertain that the army's senior members, faced with the challenges of operating long-distance supply lines and severe manpower shortages, considered the length of supply lines and the recruitment of logistics personnel as critical factors in logistics operations. This viewpoint is supported by the repeated emphasis on the need to increase logistics personnel evident in various written opinions. Furthermore, efforts were made to establish a pool of human resources for recruiting commanders of the quartermaster unit(兵站監部) during peacetime. Additionally, revisions to the ordinances were undertaken with the aim of reducing the distance between logistics commands(兵站司令部) and expanding logistics columns. The inclusion of an increased number of logistics personnel in the revised ordinances can be attributed to the existing consensus among the army's leadership on this matter. However, not all logistics challenges were completely resolved, and certain tasks remained unresolved. One such example is the changing perception regarding the concept of "local procurement".

러일전쟁 후 만주철도에 대한 청일러의 대응 : 滿洲에 관한 日淸條約의 성립을 중심으로

魏晨光 고려대학교 대학원 2018 국내석사

Abstract The Response of the Qing Dynasty, Japan and Russia to the Railways in Manchuria after the Russo-Japanese War - Focusing on the Conclusion of Treaty and Additional Agreement between Japan and China Relating to Manchuria - Name: Wei Chenguang Department: Department of History, Korea University Thesis Advisor: Cho Myung Chul This thesis reviews the negotiations among the Qing Dynasty, Japan and Russia on the Manchuria Railway after the Russo-Japanese War, focusing on the handling of the complicated Manchuria issue between the Qing Dynasty and Japan. Owned no railway in Manchuria before the Russo-Japanese War, Japan managed to occupy part of the South Manchuria Railway—the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway—during the war. However, Japanese high officials divided over the management of Manchuria as well as the Manchuria Railway after considering factors like geographic position, profitability, strategic role and so on: some expressed positive opinions while others held negative attitude. Since Japan faced serious financial problems even after it concluded the Treaty of Portsmouth with Russia, the voice of importing American capital and conducting Japanese—American joint management of the South Manchuria Railway was prevailing. In such a situation, Japanese Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro advocated the “Management Plan of the South Manchuria Railway”, arguing that Japan should control Manchuria independently and endeavor to maximize Japan’s national interests in Manchuria. Komura attempted to let Japan control the whole South Manchuria Railway (Harbin—Port Arthur). On the ground that the Japanese army failed to occupy Harbin, Russia rejected Komura’s demand but proposed to define Changchun, locating in the south of Harbin, as the dividing point. In fact, despite the fact that Japanese army did not proceed northward to Changchun, Komura still managed to win the ownership of Changchun-Port Arthur Railway and the construction permit of the Changchun-Jilin Railway for Japan thanks to his sophisticated diplomatic skills. Komura considered the South Manchuria Railway the most important trophy of the Treaty of Portsmouth. Therefore, on his way back to Japan from the United States, Komura came up with the “Management Plan of the South Manchuria Railway”, which would enable Japan to gain actual management rights of the South Manchuria Railway. As soon as Komura returned to Japan, he overthrew the Katsura-Harriman Memorandum signed by and between Japanese Prime Minister Katsura Tarō and American Ambassador E. H. Harriman, which was an important step to achieve his “Management Plan of the South Manchuria Railway”. In order to legally own the Changchun-Port Arthur section of the South Manchuria Railway ceded by Russia and the temporary military railways constructed in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War, Japan had to gain the approval of the Qing Dynasty. In order to achieve this goal, Komura together with his entourage went straight to Beijing after the Portsmouth Peace Conference, and opened negotiations with the Qing Dynasty government. However, the concessions demanded by Japan were more than what had been ceded by Russia. Thus Japan was confronted with the uncompromising attitude of the Qing Dynasty, which had not been expected by Japan. As a result, the negotiations in Beijing between Japan and the Qing Dynasty lasted for a long time—more than one month. The conflicts between Japan and the Qing Dynasty related to railways in Manchuria occurred again in the future, even after the Qing Dynasty collapsed, the disputes between Japan and the Qing Dynasty over the railways in Manchuria still remained. The origin of such disputes could be found in the negotiations conducted in Beijing between Japan and the Qing Dynasty. 국문초록 러일전쟁 후 만주철도에 대한 청일러의 대응 - 滿洲에 관한 日淸條約의 성립을 중심으로 - 고려대학교 대학원 사학과 일본근현대사 전공 위신광 본고에서는 러일전쟁 이후 만주철도를 둘러싼 일본과 러시아, 청나라 간의 교섭 과정을 살펴보았는데 특히 청일 간의 복잡한 만주사후처리과정을 분석하는 데에 중점을 두었다. 러일전쟁 이전 만주 지역에서 철도를 전혀 갖고 있지 못했던 일본은 전쟁 중에 동청철도(东清铁道) 남만주지선의 일부를 장악했다. 그러나 지리적 위치, 수익성, 전략적 요소 등 다양한 측면에서 일본 관료층은 만주철도를 포함한 만주경영에 대해 부정적 태도와 긍정적 태도로 대립하고 있었다. 특히 전후 일본은 러시아와 포츠머스조약을 체결했음에도 불구하고 심각한 재정문제로 인해 미국의 자본을 도입하여 남만주철도를 공동 경영할 것이 유력했다. 이러한 상황 속에서 고무라 주타로(小村夀太郎) 외상은 일본이 만주를 독점적으로 장악해야 한다는 “만주구상안”을 추진하여 만주에서 일본의 국익을 극대화하고자 노력했다. 고무라 외상은 동청철도의 남만주지선 (하얼빈(哈尔滨)∼여순(旅顺) 구간) 전체를 장악하고자 했으나 러시아 측은 일본 육군이 하얼빈까지 점령하지 못했다는 이유로 일본의 요구를 거절하고 하얼빈 남쪽의 장춘을 경계로 정하자는 타협안을 제시했다. 실제로 일본 육군은 장춘(长春)까지도 북상하지 못했지만 고무라는 노련한 외교 수완을 발휘하여 장춘∼여순 구간의 철도 소유권과 장춘∼길림(吉林) 구간의 부설권을 얻어내는 데 성공했다. 남만주철도를 포츠머스조약의 가장 중요한 전리품으로 여겼던 고무라는 미국에서 일본으로 귀국하는 도중에 남만주철도 실제적 경영권을 장악할 수 있는 “만한구상안”을 준비했다. 고무라가 귀국하자마자 가쓰라 타로(桂太郎) 수상과 해리먼(Harriman, Edward Henry)이 맺은 만주철도에 관한 미일 공동경영의 예비안을 파기한 것도 자신의 “남만주철도 경영구상”을 실현하려는 행보였다. 일본은 러시아가 양여한 장춘∼여순 구간의 남만주철도와 러일전쟁시기 만주에 부설한 임시 군용철도들을 합법적으로 소유하기 위해 청나라의 승인을 얻어야 했다. 이를 위해 포츠머스강화회담을 끝낸 고무라는 수행원들을 이끌고 북경에 와서 청나라와 담판을 벌였다. 하지만 일본은 러시아로부터 양여 받은 이권보다 더 많은 것들을 요구했다. 그러나 예상치 못한 청나라의 강경한 저항에 부딪쳐 청일 북경 회담은 한 달이 넘는 장기간의 회의과정을 거쳐야 했다. 훗날 만주의 철도를 둘러싸고 청일 간에 갈등이 재발하고 청나라가 멸망한 후에도 만주철도 문제로 인해 중일 간에 끊임없이 사단이 일어났는데 이러한 분쟁의 근원은 바로 청일북경회담에서 찾아야 한다.