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유왕종 한국이슬람학회 2004 한국이슬람학회논총 Vol.14 No.2
Yemen is a country with deep Muslim traditions, but is often most mentioned for its relatively large Zaydi Shi'i group, even if this represents a minority in the country as a total. Yemen's north is the centre of Zaydism, the second largest group inside Shi'i Islam. Zaydism is known for putting less importance on the position of the Imam, than among the Twelver (Iran), perhaps because the Zaydis have enjoyed far more political and religious freedom than the other. The Zaydis have professed military and violent activities in this century (examples of this is the stubborn fight against the British colonialists in Aden and the occupation of the great mosque in Mecca in 1979). The people of Yemen have practically the experience of passing through a multitude of political ties, ideologies and government systems like no other state on the planet, from Marxism, democracy, Islamism, monarchy and a range of occupations (British, Ottoman to name a few). Their experience with Islamists had been soaked with support at times and total rejection at others, and today, it is at the point of rejection. The Islamists and the Islamic movements are at an end in Yemen. The international community represented by the. United States will pinpoint and eradicate all whom they deem to be a terrorist, basically an Islamically oriented individual, and the government will gladly add to that list some of its own opponents that they deem to be a threat even if not an Islamist. It' s the start of a witch-hunt that nobody knows where it would lead, but one thing is sure, that it is the new cycle of oppressiveness justified by the war on terrorism, an era where the last breed of Islamists, radical or not will be eliminated, and the long history of Islamism in Yemen is close to an end. During the past two decades, a proselytizing, reformist, "Islamist" movement--mainly characterized as "Wahhabi"--has gained increasing popularity throughout Yemen. Wahhabism actively opposes both the main Yemeni schools--Zaydi Shi'ism in the north and Shafi'i-Sunnism in the south and in the Tihamah. It is closely connected with the political party Islah, a coalition of tribal, mercantile and religious interests that pursues a mixed social and political agenda.
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유왕종 한국이슬람학회 2003 한국이슬람학회논총 Vol.13 No.2
The Islamic religious movement in Palestine is not how to confront Zionist barbarities; it is rather to ensure that the second Intifada (appropriately named the al-Aqsa Intifada) does not suffer the same fate as the first Intifada(1987-1993). Then, the sacrifices of the Palestinians were bartered away in Oslo, culminating in the infamous accords signed on the White House lawn in September 1993. The PLO, which had played little part in the first Intifada were imposed upon the Palestinian people to do the Zionists' and the Americans' dirty work. The al-Aqsa Intifada is proof that the Palestinians, Muslims and Christians alike, have utterly rejected the Oslo accords in the only way possible: by staging massive protests with their bare hands. There can be only one state - a Palestinian Islamic State - in the land called Palestine. There is no room for two states there, especially a racist state. Similarly, Muslims are the only ones who have demonstrated that when they rule the land (for more than 1300 years so far), the holy places of all religions are respected. The Christians have never had any complaints against Muslims, despite vandalism by the Crusaders in the holy land in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The Jews have found refuge with Muslims whenever they wanted to escape persecution in Europe. Thus Muslims are the only true inheritors of the divine mission who have respected the religious sentiments and places of all peoples. The rise of Islamic movement among Palestinians may be attributed to a number of factors. The first factor is the loss of Palestine in 1948. The establishment of a Jewish state in its place is perceived by Islamic movements as an encroachment on Muslim land. Israel is considered an alien body in the heart of the Arab and Muslim worlds, and a spearhead of Western hegemony. The second factor is the 1967 defeat of the Arab states by Israel. This defeat and the subsequent Israeli occupation of the remainder of Palestine and other Arab land have forced Palestinians and other Arabs to acknowledge their weakness. The third factor is the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran. This is perhaps the most important factor in the rise of Islamic movement in general, and in Palestine in particular. The revolution restored confidence in Islam as a viable alternative to secularism and provided Muslims in other countries with a model to emulate. The fourth factor is the decline of the PLO(Palestine Liberation Organization) that began in the late 1970s. This decline was a function of several setbacks suffered by the PLO, which prevented the organization from winning the independence for Palestine to which it had committed itself and that had inspired its widespread acceptance. The PLO's consequent evolution from ideological purity to political pragmatism created an ideological vacuum that was soon filled by Islam, the only available alternative. The fifth is the Palestinian popular uprising(the Intifada) of 1987. This, clearly, was the most important factor in the growth of Palestinian Islamic fundamentalism. The Intifada defined the content of Palestinian Islamic fundamentalism as nationalist and political, projecting it as a movement whose primary objectives, as illustrated by the charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement(HAMAS), were resistance to Israeli occupation and liberation of Palestine. The prominent and effective participation of the Islamic movement in the Intifada created significant popular support, and it emerged as a serious rival to the PLO, challenging its political program and contending with it for the leadership of Palestinian society. The sixth factor is Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount in Jerusalem on September 28, 2000. This visit became the pretext for instigating large scale demonstrations, the start of the al-Aqsa infifada. Therein lies the dilemma of the people of Palestine. They are the ones making the sacrifices, as they have done for more than 50 years under a brutal occupation, and others have come to steal the fruits of their labour. As the al-Aqsa Intifada goes on, with its daily mounting death-toll, the Islamic movement in Palestine as well as outside needs to be clear about its position. First and foremost is the question of the future geographical boundaries of the state of Palestine. There can be no compromise on the question that the entire area of Palestine belongs to the Palestinian people. Hamas is considered the most influential of the Palestinian fundamentalist groups. It is known for its extensive following, particularly compared to that of the other two groups, and for its military wing, Kata'ib Izz al-Din al-Qassam (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades). The Islamic Jihad is narrowly based and more action oriented than the other two groups, focusing on violent acts of resistance to Israeli occupation. . . . The Palestinian Muslim fundamentalists have opposed the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, the Oslo Declaration of Principles of September 13, 1993, and subsequent Palestinian-Israeli agreements; they have also refused to participate in the Palestinian Authority, which was (first) established in Gaza and Jericho.
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The Contemporary Moro Conflict in the Southern Philippines
Yoo, Wang-Jong 한국이슬람학회 2002 한국이슬람학회논총 Vol.12 No.-
This study is focuses on the contemporary Moro conflict in the Southern Philippines. To achieve this goal, the study has proposed the grievances and demands of these Moro people, the successive Manila governments been responding to their demands, the alternatives which can be tried to resolve the crisis. Primary findings underscore the ethnic distinctness of the Moro people as a historical factor in the conflict. Corollary to this, is the role played by Islam in Moro people's lives plus their history of resistance against foreign cultures. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front, a hostage crisis perpetrated by the extremist Abu Sayyaf group, and a wave of bombings in Manila's main shopping malls - all these events helped to bring the Southern Philippines issue into focus, injecting gloom in the political outlook in the country. Violence is rife in the southern Philippines where Moro people are fighting for an independent homeland. This ongoing conflict in the Mindanao region has to be studied in the context of the social, cultural and economic issues of the region, as some of the worst-off areas in central and western Mindanao are inhabited by a sizeable Moro population.
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마흐디민병대와 이라크 쉬아파 제도권 진입 과정에 관한 연구
유왕종 ( Wang Jong Yoo ) 한국외국어대학교 중동연구소 2010 중동연구 Vol.28 No.3
The main purpose of this article is to analysis the Mahdi Army and the Entrance of Shia into Iraqi Mainstream Politics. The first and most urgent step is to try to solidify Muqtada al-Sadr`s unilateral measure by reaching a more comprehensive, multilateral cease-fire. U.S. and Iraqi forces should seek to circumscribe their operations more narrowly so as to focus on military targets and principally respond to attacks. The U.S. and its Iraqi allies should tolerate Sadrist activities of a purely non-military nature, while strictly prohibiting Sadrist-manned patrols or checkpoints, and immediately arresting the participants. The U.S. and its Iraqi allies should immediately freeze all sahwa recruitment, a phenomenon that further threatens the country``s cohesion by adding to the number of armed militias; instead, the focus should be on developing professional and nonpartisan national forces. Given Sadrist opposition to any open interaction with coalition members, non-coalition third parties such as the UN, Arab countries, Turkey or France should take the lead in engaging the movement and encouraging its transition toward strictly political action. As long as they are unarmed and show appropriate restraint, Sadrists should be allowed to visit religious sites; local security forces should enforce a strict ban on unlicensed non-religious demonstrations and other provocative behaviour connected to such visits. Iraq``s political system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process, is increasingly characterized by peaceful competition rather than violence, but sectarianism and ethnic and factional infighting continue to simmer. As 2009 began, there was renewed maneuvering by opponents of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki who view him as authoritarian and were perceived as conspiring to try to replace him, had his party fared poorly in the January 31, 2009 provincial elections. However, the elections appeared to strengthen toliki and other Iraqis who believe that power should remain centrolized in Baghled, and toliki is considered well positioned to compete in the parliamentary elections that will select the next four-year government. The provincial elections, held in all provinces except Kirkuk and the Kurdish-controlled provinces, were relatively peaceful and there was a more diverse array of party slates than those that characterized the January 2005 provincial elections.
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