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RISS 인기검색어
- 검색키워드
- 저자 : ( S. Mansoob Murshed ) (검색결과 3 건)
- 무료
- 기관 내 무료
- 유료
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When Will WTO Membership Signal commitment to Free Trade by A Deveoping Country
S. Mansoob Murshed 세종대학교 경제통합연구소 2004 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.19 No.2
A signalling game involving three parties: a developing country, the WTO and a developed country is outlined. The developing country might be tempted to renege or deviate from free trade. Although the costs of reneging from free trade result in a loss of credibility, the costs come in the future and are discounted. Short-term gains include revenues from import taxes that are important to the public finances of low-income countries. Membership of a rules based organisation such as the WTO can act as a credible commitment device. In these circumstances, however, the South’s commitment to free trade depends upon a clear signal from the North that it too is committed to free trade. Otherwise the South will continue to deviate from optimal and freer trade policies. A signalling game involving three parties: a developing country, the WTO and a developed country is outlined. The developing country might be tempted to renege or deviate from free trade. Although the costs of reneging from free trade result in a loss of credibility, the costs come in the future and are discounted. Short-term gains include revenues from import taxes that are important to the public finances of low-income countries. Membership of a rules based organisation such as the WTO can act as a credible commitment device. In these circumstances, however, the South’s commitment to free trade depends upon a clear signal from the North that it too is committed to free trade. Otherwise the South will continue to deviate from optimal and freer trade policies.
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When Will WTO Membership Signal Commitment to Free Trade by A Developing Country
( S. Mansoob Murshed ) 세종대학교 경제통합연구소 (구 세종대학교 국제경제연구소) 2004 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.19 No.2
A signalling game involving three parties: a developing country, the WTO and a developed country is outlined. The developing country might be tempted to renege or deviate from free trade. Although the costs of reneging from free trade result in a loss of credibility, the costs come in the future and are discounted. Short-term gains include revenues from import taxes that are important to the public finances of low-income countries. Membership of a rules based organisation such as the WTO can act as a credible commitment device. In these circumstances, however, the South`s commitment to free trade depends upon a clear signal from the North that it too is committed to free trade. Otherwise the South will continue to deviate from optimal and freer trade policies.
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Tradable Permits in Greenhouse Gas Emissions: A Macroeconomic Analysis in the North-South Context
S. Mansoob Murshed 서울대학교 경제연구소 1995 Seoul journal of economics Vol.8 No.3
The paper presents an analytical macroeconomic model of North-South interaction covering a scheme of tradable permits in greenhouse gas emission encompassing the two regions. The delineation between the fix-price North and the flex-price South is along traditional structuralist lines. A number of parameter changes are analyzed including transfers to and from the South, as well as changes in emission efficiency in the two regions. Transfers from North to South could induce the participation of the South in global schemes for environmental control, as well as be linked to improvements in the South's emission efficiency.
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