http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.
변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.
- 中文 을 입력하시려면 zhongwen을 입력하시고 space를누르시면됩니다.
- 北京 을 입력하시려면 beijing을 입력하시고 space를 누르시면 됩니다.
RISS 인기검색어
- 검색키워드
- 저자 : Vivekananda Mukherjee (검색결과 2 건)
- 무료
- 기관 내 무료
- 유료
-
INCIDENCE OF CORRUPTION ON FORMAL AND INFORMAL SECTORS: IS THERE ANY SYMMETRY?
Vivekananda Mukherjee,APARAJITA ROY 중앙대학교 경제연구소 2019 Journal of Economic Development Vol.44 No.3
Do the formal and informal sectors of production react symmetrically to higher frequency of corruption? The theoretical model developed in the paper qualifies the answer and explains certain empirical observations. In the informal sector while an increased frequency of corruption increases the entry cost, in the formal sector the effect remains uncertain. While abundance of firms definitely falls in the formal sector, in the informal sector it may either rise or fall in the economies with high share of formal sector employment and unambiguously falls in the economies with low share of formal sector employment. Finally, while the firm size distribution shifts towards relatively larger firms in the formal sector, in the informal sector the effect on firm size distribution remains uncertain in the economies with high share of formal sector employment and it shifts towards smaller size firms in the economies with low share of formal sector employment.
-
WILLFUL DEFAULT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRY BANKING SYSTEM: A THEORETICAL EXERCISE
Samaresh Bardhan,Vivekananda Mukherjee 중앙대학교 경제연구소 2013 Journal of Economic Development Vol.38 No.4
We construct a sequential game to highlight the incidence of ‘willful default’ in a developing country banking system where the borrowing unit underreports its true financial position and defaults willfully. Specifically, the paper deals with the implications of willful default for profitability and ultimate loan decision-making process of the banks. It shows that if limited liability condition holds and the conditions of willful default are satisfied, the bank will extend maximum possible amount of loan. However, it also follows that higher the loan capacity of the bank, the higher is the incidence of willful default. These would imply important policy lessons for the regulator. In fact, the regulator faces a trade-off between higher incidence of willful default and higher profitability of the bank. What we observe in reality depends on the objective of the regulator.
연관 검색어 추천
이 검색어로 많이 본 자료
활용도 높은 자료
