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Nuclear Energy Policy Issues in Japan After the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
Tatsujiro Suzuki 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 2015 ASIAN PERSPECTIVE Vol.39 No.4
The 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident has become a turning point for Japan, creating loss of public trust not only in nuclear safety but in overall energy policy. More than 80 percent of the public wants to phase out nuclear power eventually. On April 11, 2014, the Japanese government adopted a new National Energy Strategy that declares its intention to reduce dependence on nuclear energy while considering it one of the important base-load electricity sources. Regardless of the future of nuclear energy, Japan needs to face five key policy issues: spent fuel management, plutonium stockpile management, radioactive waste disposal, human resources management, and restoration of public trust. I discuss these critical issues and possible policy alternatives that Japan should pursue.
전성훈,Tatsujiro Suzuki 통일연구원 2003 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.12 No.2
Although the ongoing nuclear problem of North Korea is resolved either peacefully through the six-party talks or militarily following the example of Iraq, that does not settle the inherent nuclear problem harbored in Northeast Asia. Besides North Korea’s persistent nuclear weapon development activities, Japan’s stockpiling of excessive plutonium has been a major source of regional and international concerns. Some politicians’ pro-nuke advocacy has exacerbated such concerns. Facing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, South Korea has been under constant suspicion that it might choose to counter the North with its own nuclear weapon program. In short, the nonnuclear commitments of South and North Korea and Japan have been tainted in varying degrees and thus failed to acquire full trust from the international society. A failure of providing their non-nuclear commitments with full legality has added weights to these suspicions. This article proposes the tripartite nuclear-weapon-free zone (TNWFZ) among North and South Korea and Japan as a practical measure to faithfully implement and solidify the non-nuclear commitments made by the three countries. The TNWFZ aims at creating a legally binding and multilaterally formed institutional mechanism where the three parties reconfirm their non-nuclear will, build mutual confidence, and create environments conducive to regional peace, stability and prosperity. It can further its contributions in this respect by gradually extending geographical areas and enlarging memberships of the nuclear-weapon-free zone. The TNWFZ can be an objective of the ongoing six-party talks as well. If the most urgent problem of North Korea’s nuclear development comes into settlement, the six parties could make use of the negotiating momentum to reach out to creating a broader nuclear-free region in Northeast Asia. The first step, as argued in this paper, would be a creation of the TNWFZ.
Hiromichi Umebayashi,Tatsujiro Suzuki 한국학술연구원 2016 Korea Observer Vol.47 No.4
The 71st session of the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) marked historic progress in the global multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. A UNGA resolution entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations,” which was adopted at the First Committee of the UNGA (which “deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the international security regime”) in October 2016 and is due to be adopted at the plenary session in December 2016, decides that the U.N. shall convene in 2017 a “conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination.”