China`s Security Relations into the 21st Century

( Lawrence E Grinter ) 한국국방연구원 1998 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.10 No.2

Is China moving toward hegemonic ambitions in Asia and the world, or is it a benign state naturally expanding its interests as its power grows? The question prompts major debates among China specialists around the world. This paper joins the debate by examining China`s most critical security relationships to see what they reveal about the PRC`s ambitions. This paper begins with the widely accepted assumption that national economic development will continue to be China`s most important objective into the early twenty-first century. Economic modernization conditions, colors, and prompts most other PRC policies. Accordingly, as the PRC enters the twenty-first century bordering fourteen other countries (five of them nuclear armed or believed to be nuclear capable), China`s leadership wants a stable and tranquil external environment with which to work and one not dominated by any single power nor set of security alliances. The paper examines in turn PRC security relations with Russia, Japan, Europe, the two Koreas, Southeast Asia, South Asia, the US, and Taiwan. The burgeoning Sino-Russian arms connection, the PRC`s periodic tensions with Japan and India, the mixed conflict and cooperation with the US, and Beijing`s strategy toward Taipei are all treated. The study concludes that in each case (including Taiwan) Chinese policy reflects a general conservativeness and caution. Thus the American foreign policy approach toward China of "engagement" makes sense. Nationalism, however, is now a powerful force in Chinese policies in the post-Deng era. Accordingly, there is no guarantee that China will permanently continue its cautious approach towards international security.

Southeast Asian Security into the 21st Century: Emerging Patterns and Challenges

( Lawrence E Grinter ) 한국국방연구원 1996 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.8 No.2

Indochina`s Slow Opening to the Future

( Lawrence E Grinter ) 한국국방연구원 1997 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.9 No.2

The Cold War ended in Southeast Asia with Communist Vietnam`s entry into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in July 1995. The final remaining communist guerrilla movements, the imploding Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and the dwindling New People`s Army in the Philippines, are mere echoes of their original strengths. Thus, the post-Cold War transformation of all of Southeast Asia is well underway, and much of it reflects market economics and the emergence of middle classes that favor more liberal political arrangements. However, the Indochina states-Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia-are far behind the overall trend. Hammered by American bombing campaigns twenty-five years ago, and further damaged by highly repressive and economically autarkic communist "liberation" regimes that followed, the Indochina states are attempting to climb out of the rubble. But their openings to the future are slow and prone toward reversals. Cambodia, now up to ten million people, is still recovering from Pol Pot`s Khmer Rouge genocide and subsequent ten years of Vietnamese military occupation. The land-mine problem in Cambodia, perhaps ten million remaining devices, is the heaviest concentration in the world. About 1 out of every 250 Cambodians is an amputee. The United Nations presence in Cambodia laid the seeds of more mature politics, but stability disintegrated amidst last year`s fighting between Hun Sen`s and Prince Ranariddh`s forces, The Khmer rouge, attempting to survive, nevertheless imploded; at least that threat to Cambodia`s stability is receding. In spite of the political chaos, Cambodia`s economy is in better shape than it was a decade ago. Infrastructure is being rebuilt, new foreign investment has occurred. But surrounded by Thailand and Vietnam, and with ASEAN membership delayed, Cambodia cannot control its strategic future. Laos, with some five million people and the highest per-capita income among the Indochina states, was less traumatized by the Indochina wars than Cambodia and Vietnam. The secretive militarydominated government in Vientiane has undertaken considerable experimentation with market economies while, nevertheless, repressing moves toward political liberalization. Even this communist leadership recognizes that Laos`s future depends on unlocking the potential of the country`s natural resources-hardwoods, gold, gems, and hydroelectric capacities. ASEAN membership, granted in July 1997, may help. Vietnam is the heavyweight among the Indochina states with 75 million people and a GDP fifteen times that of Cambodia. With over one million Vietnamese citizens consigned to prison camps after "liberation" in 1975, and another three-quarters of a million attempting to escape, the Vietnamese Communist Party assured that no economic development would occur until the late 1980s when it allowed experimentation with guided capitalism. But Vietnam remains a repressive one-party authoritarian state; the Ministry of Interior hounds even peaceful expressions of political and religious differences. Finally in late 1997 there were moves to replace the old revolutionary leadership with younger, more modern cadres. Thus we see the leaderships of the three Indochina states, all communists or ex-communists, slowly allowing their countries to open to the global liberation of markets and middle classes which already dominate the rest of Southeast Asia.

The Economic Rehabilitation of North Korea: Prospects after Kim Jong-il

Lawrence E. Grinter 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2010 Pacific Focus Vol.25 No.3

Despite having signed or agreed to four formal weapon denuclearization agreements, the Kim Jong-il family regime in Pyongyang shows no fundamental willingness to give up its nuclear weapons. Therefore this article looks past the denuclearization issue, and examines the potential for a future rehabilitation of North Korea’s economy in a post -Kim era. Four economic sectors or challenges are analyzed within the context of badly needed North Korean macro economic reform: Energy utilization and the potential for a new natural gas arrangement with Russia; personal income growth tied to major labor reorientations focused on manufacturing for export; expanding capitalist projects like the Kaesong Industrial Complex; and expanding DPRK foreign trade with South Korea, China, Russia and other countries. This paper’s thesis is that once the Kim family legacy of autarchy, corruption, and militarism can be buried, and if a reformist North Korean regime comes forward and institutionalizes state - directed capitalism( as occurred in China and Vietnam), North Korea already has the clear potential to economically develop, shed it tragic legacy, and be welcomed by the international community.

Chinese Nuclear Doctrine, Weapons and Policies

Lawrence E. Grinter 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2013 Pacific Focus Vol.28 No.1

As the governments of the United States and Russia reduce their nuclear weapons inventories through negotiated arms control agreements, the Chinese government remains outside this strategic weapons trend while also continuing to modernize the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s nuclear weapons arsenal. Chinese policy, therefore, presents a number of dilemmas for global arms control. For example, given the PRC’s lack of transparency,could Beijing be secretly building new missiles and warheads inside China’s many miles of tunnels, and going for a first-strike capability or, in keeping with the PRC’s announced doctrine of “minimal deterrence,” is Beijing simply hardening and modernizing the weapons capabilities they already have? This paper explores the public information and the debates about China’s nuclear weapons as well as PRC nuclear proliferation behavior and agreements. The paper concludes with suggestions for encouraging more PRC nuclear transparency with the goal of producing a more stable situation.

The Six-Party Talks and the Future Denuclearization and Rehabilitation of North Korea

Lawrence E. Grinter 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2008 Pacific Focus Vol.23 No.3

The Korean Six-Party Talks focused on North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs reveal contending interests and motives among the participating six governments. Each government has been challenged and several have had to make compromises while nevertheless protecting what it views as its core interests. The Talks are making incremental progress on the “action for action” denuclearization arrangements resulting from the September 2005, and February and October 2007 multilateral agreements. The Talks are also creating the basis for strategic changes in Northeast Asia involving the future rehabilitation of North Korea and, beyond that, possibly a new cooperative security system in the region. The article moves on to analyze three possible strategic outcomes of the Talks: (1) Complete weapons denuclearization of North Korea, a Korean Peace Treaty, the rehabilitation of North Korea, and a new security regime in the region; (2) Partial denuclearization of North Korea amidst ROK engagement with the DPRK as ROK/US deterrence continues; (3) Breakdown of the Talks and DPRK resumption of nuclear weapons production. The paper concludes with recommended policies to encourage outcome.

Northeast Asian Security

Lawrence E. Grinter 한국국제정치학회 KJIS 2011 The Korean Journal of International Studies Vol.9 No.2