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Municipal Fiscal Performance: Mayors’ Gender and Organizational Human Resources
Claudia N. Avellaneda,Ricardo A. Bello-Gomez,Ricardo Correa Gomes 서울대학교행정대학원 2022 The Korean Journal of Policy Studies Vol.37 No.3
Local governments strive to improve fiscal performance to effectively implement policy agendas and reduce dependence on central governments. Explaining fiscal performance has relied on intergovernmental relations and politically driven strategies and has given less attention to organizational human capital attributes. Mayors and municipal personnel with different attributes interact differently, thus affecting their contributions to fiscal performance. This study assesses the fiscal performance effects of mayors’ gender and municipal personnel attributes and their interactions. We assess fiscal performance as fiscal capacity, autonomy, and solvency. Using 2003-2015 data from 822 Brazilian municipalities, we find results contingent on the assessed fiscal performance dimension. Female mayors are positively associated with fiscal capacity and autonomy but not with solvency. Personnel availability and salary are positively correlated with fiscal capacity and autonomy but negatively correlated with solvency. Under a female mayor, the fiscal performance contribution of available personnel increases, while average salary’s fiscal performance contribution declines.
Julio C. Zambrano-Gutiérrez,Claudia N. Avellaneda 서울대학교행정대학원 2022 Journal of Policy Studies Vol.37 No.1
Existing studies see foreign donors as (a) brokers between sustainable development goals (SDGs) and aid-recipient countries’ needs, or (b) intruders into aid-recipient countries’ internal affairs. The intruder view has triggered regulations of NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) in aid-recipient countries. However, little is known, empirically, about how foreign donors respond to regulatory burden. We suggest regulatory burden adds uncertainty and turbulence to the operating context, negatively affecting government effectiveness in securing aid. This negative effect is moderated by the number of foreign donors operating in a jurisdiction. Propositions are tested in a data set derived from the 221 Ecuadorian municipalities during 2007-2018. Findings suggest regulations of NGOs have decreased municipalities’ ability to secure international cooperation. This negative effect is larger in municipalities with a higher presence of donor supply. These results encourage policy makers to consider counterproductive costs of overregulating foreign NGOs and other civil society organizations when designing regulatory tools.