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공인철,Bitton, Gabriel 嶺南大學校 環境問題硏究所 1995 環境硏究 Vol.14 No.2
고형시료의 독성 측정시 다량의 추출용매에 희석된 추출물을 이용하지 않고, 적은 양의 용매(1㎖)를 고형시료에 직접 이용하는 급성독성 실험법이 개발되었다. 독성은 유기오염물에 덜 민감하고 중금속에 민감한 효소(β-galactosidase)의 활동도로써 측정했다. β-galactosidas를 생산하는 변이성 E.coli strain을 포함한 1㎖의 용액과 고형시료 0.5 혹은 1.0g의 양이 사용되었다. 고형시료의 기질 색깔 흡수에 대한 변화와 시료에 원래 존재해 있는 효소의 활동은 control에 의해 감안되었고 사용된 용매중 0.1M sodium nitrate가 Milli-Q water보다는 약간 높은 민감도를 나타내었다. 여러종류의 고형시료를 사용한 결과 거주지나 상업지역보다는 공업지역에서 채취한 시료가 높은 독성치를 나타냈다. 독성측정의 결과를 고찰해 볼 때 오염된 동과 아연에 대해서는 독성치가 금속량에 비례하였다. 제안된 이 방법을 이용하여 고형환경의 오염을 이용하게 screening 할 수 있다고 판단되며, 또한 고형시료 오염원의 주(主)원인(중금속 혹은 유기오염물)을 판별하는데는 유효한 방법이 되리라 사료한다. A direct toxicity assay for soils, sediments and sludges which is specific for heavy metal toxicity was developed. In the assay, extraction of metals from the solids sample is not required. Use of 0.1 M sodium nitrate as eluent was found to yield somewhat higher sensitivy to heavy metal in solid phase smaples than Milli-Q water. Application of the assay to a diverse array of soils, sludges and sediments illustrated that samples from industrial sites were generally more toxic than those from residential or commercial sites. Heavy metal toxicity was correlated with the copper and zinc content of solid samples, but toxicity varied considerably at the lower range of metal contents. Proposed solid phase assay should be useful as a screening test for heavy metal toxicity in solids environments.
( Miriam Marcowitz-Bitton ) 고려대학교 법학연구원 2018 The Asian Business Lawyer Vol.22 No.-
The patent system aims to encourage innovation while keeping its own administrative costs to a minimum. Considering the centrality of innovation to 21<sup>st</sup> century economic activity, patent law is widely viewed as a crucial element of our legal system. And yet by any standard our patent system is broken. At present it encourages the filing of a plethora of low-quality patents that have no true innovative value, is plagued by opportunistic patent trolls, and produces endless amounts of costly litigation. This article demonstrates how these phenomena are due to central design flaws in the current system. First, although the patent system is designed to encourage investment in innovation, it lacks a mechanism for directly examining an inventor’s level of investment. This major flaw systematically ignores the single most important factor the patent system seeks to promote. Second, the current system offers one-sizefits- all protection, granting the same 20-year monopoly to any and all inventions. This inflexible legal standard is outdated and inappropriate, given the wide variety of inventions it addresses and the immense differences between them. The core of this article proposes structural reform designed to remedy these fundamental flaws. First, we suggest that the patent system must explicitly consider the investment made in each specific invention when deciding what level of legal protection each invention merits. Second, we advocate departure from the current onesize- fits-all model in favor of a more tailored approach, offering different periods of protection for different inventions. These two elements would produce a system in which inventions are granted protection for a duration that depends on the level of investment each invention requires. We call this model a “recoupment patent” and highlight its advantages over the current system. Under the new model, filing for patent protection will require documentation of investment in the invention, which will serve as the basis for determining duration of protection. Protection will expire once the investment is recouped and a fixed percentage of profit is earned. Filing and renewal fees will also be calculated based on documented investment. Additionally, investment will serve as a basis for calculating royalties (or damages in subsequent litigation). In either case, the patentee bears the burden of demonstrating the level of investment in the invention. This regime is more accurately tailored to incentivize innovation while avoiding the excessive protection that results from the current one-size-fits-all system. This new regime also incorporates mechanisms to prevent inventors from misstating their investment. Throughout the paper, we address the challenges created by our proposal and highlight its advantages over the existing system and over other reform proposals. We also discuss extensions and possible refinements to the basic conception outlined above.