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      • KCI등재

        스위스 산재보험제도 민영화 개혁의 성과 평가와 정책과제

        이정우 ( Jung-woo Lee ),김희년 ( Heenyon Kim ) 한국질서경제학회 2017 질서경제저널 Vol.20 No.2

        The Industrial Injury Insurance System (IIIS) was introduced to South Korea in 1964. In the short time since it was implemented, it has been seen as a significant part of the dramatic advancement in South Korean social policies. However, we cannot ignore that the IIIS still contains many functional flaws that calls for immediate attention. The most urgent of which, is its imperfect application leading to limited coverage and protection. In search of a solution to the problems as such aforementioned, the partial monopolization policy of the IIIS in Switzerland was examined. The Partial monopolization can give SUVA (a public insurer of the IIIS) an exclusive jurisdiction of the industry that it manages, protected by law. It also gives SUVA the capability to lead private insurances to enter the IIIS Market through negotiation and compromise. The resulting public and private multiple insurer systems of the Swiss IIIS would lead to an expanded applicability to all laborers, and be composed of industrial accident insurance and Non-industrial accident insurance. Thereby, allowing the Swiss IIIS to cast off its functional illiberality as a rigid industrial accident compensation insurance system. As a General Accident Compensation Insurance System, all laborers would receive comprehensive protection from accidents, both in the work and private environments. The merits and faults of the partial monopolization policy can only be judged through examining its developmental process in history. The partial monopolization policy that was introduced with the 1984 Swiss reformation of its IIIS is seen as an epoch-making contribution to the system’s magnification of applicability in terms of membership and level of allowance. However, partial monopolization of SUVA also separates the whole market by restrict- ing interaction and competition between public and private domain. The separated market would have vulnerability to change in industrial structure and surrounding environment. Furthermore, it would lead to functional collision and conflict in understanding between the public and private domain due to the lack of consistency and communication. Partial monopolization is also criticized for lacking all the benefits of privatization or that of a competitive market. This impedes the development in a fair and balanced IIIS. Therefore, it is necessary that future reform plans of the IIIS begin from exploring the problems at a more fundamental level. Two directions have been considered while seeking a solution. The first is a reformation of the IIIS through implementing a comprehensive privatization plan. This would enlarge the competitive function of the market while maintaining its distinct General Accident Compensation Insurance System. The second is a comprehensive publicization plan that would enforce its public responsibility as a social insurance. Although the two plans are opposite in nature, neither of them are an immaculate solution. In order to mend the problem of the partial monopolization policy, further analysis is needed for a realistic reformation. South Korea is experiencing similar problems to Switzerland of 1984, before its reform of the IIIS. After close examination of the current circumstances, evidence calls for a need to reevaluate the foundational the problems to provide a new solution, rather than seeking a compromising plan of partial monopolization.

      • KCI등재

        사학연금 가입자들을 위한 점진적 퇴직제도의 도입방안에 관한 연구

        이정우 ( Jung-woo Lee ),김희년 ( Heenyon Kim ) 한국질서경제학회 2018 질서경제저널 Vol.21 No.1

        As the average lifespan increases, most developed countries are reforming their pension systems for the elderly in a large scale. The reform of the Teachers’ Pension system of 2015 is just one example in Korea. Increased life expectancy in Korea caused an imbalance between the expected labor and leisure years in old age. This led to elderly care becoming a significant social burden. One solution is to extend the period of life-time labor. For this to be viable however, a new system must be introduced that would support those who would have difficulty adapting to the new lengthened life-time labor period due to health conditions, family matters, etc. The new system to combat the aforementioned social problem would have to guarantee a person’s right to select from a variety of options that include one that fits his/her capabilities and needs. Proposed is a solution that focuses on the necessity to adjust the life-time labor expectancy to receive pension while examining the current Teacher’s Pension system. As the retirement system is gradually introduced, it would have the capacity to absorb shock resulting from potential problems such as the no-income period, problem of career emptiness in pension enrollment, and so forth. In order to guarantee the individual right of free choice either times or forms of retirement during gradual retirement selection period, the changing rate of applying for insurance must be strictly and accurately reflected. The elderly themselves would be supported in gradually shortening their labor hours, and decrease their income which would be compensated by a separated system such as a bridged pension or time-valued accumulated account. Furthermore, by considering the shortening of labor hours and the intensity of labor, the gradual retirement system could work in coherence with the Wage Peak System.

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