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Partial Credibility, Information Selection and the Signalling Channel of Sterilized Interventions
( Silke Fabian Reeves ) 세종대학교 경제통합연구소 (구 세종대학교 국제경제연구소) 1998 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.13 No.1
The signalling channel suggests that central banks use sterilized interventions in the foreign exchange market to convey information about future monetary policy to the market. To date, this theory is not sufficiently supported by theoretical work that establishes the link between intervention signals and exchange rates. This paper develops a two country model of sterilized interventions. I argue that reputational effects cannot eliminate the credibility problem between central banks and the private sector and that agents will only partially use available information to form exchange rate expectations. Both partial credibility and non-rational expectations reduce the effectiveness of interventions. (JEL Classifications: E52, F31, F41)
Partial Credibility, Information Selection and the Signalling Channel of Sterilized Interventions
Reeves, Silke Fabian 세종대학교 국제경제연구소 1998 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.13 No.1
The signalling channel suggests that central banks use sterilized interventions in the foreign exchange market to convey information about future monetary policy to the market. To date, this theory is not sufficiently supported by theoretical work that establishes the link between intervention signals and exchange rates. This paper develops a two country model of sterilized interventions. I argue that raputational effects cannot eliminate the credibility problem between central banks and the private sector and that agents will only partially use available information to form exchange rate expectations. Both partial credibility and non-rational expectations reduce the effectiveness of intervention.(JEL Classification: E52, F31, F41)