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Financial Policy Coordination in a Keynesian Framework
Correa, Romar 세종대학교 국제경제연구소 1997 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.12 No.1
We propose a simple framework within which to examine the problem of policy coordination between two central banks. The context is the various components of a broad measure of the money supply. Consider two central banks, one 'monetarist' and the other 'Keynesian'. In each economy there is 'involuntary unemployment' of loans. It is shown that the monetary authorities can strategically vary short-term interest rates in order to relax the constraint in the loan market so that none of the players is worse off. Both the banks play a zero-sum game with regard to foreign exchange reserves. Here too, the central banks can, via their influence on prices, increase the profits of firms providing thereby a credible signal to banks(JEL Classification: E12, E61, F42)
A Structural Case for International Cooperation
Correa, Amelia,Correa, Romar 세종대학교 국제경제연구소 2003 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.18 No.2
We recommend a Bretton Woods system along structural lines. A key component of the case is the substitution of the money transmission mechanism by the credit transmission mechantsm. We suggest that the real exchange rate be the variable of cooperation between countries that are free to set interest rates to pursue domestic policy objectives.
A Structural Case for International Cooperation
( Amelia Correa ),( Romar Correa ) 세종대학교 경제통합연구소 (구 세종대학교 국제경제연구소) 2003 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.18 No.2
We recommend a Bretton Woods system along structural lines. A key component of the case is the substitution of the money transmission mechanism by the credit transmission mechanism. We suggest that the real exchange rate be the variable of cooperation between countries that are free to set interest rates to pursue domestic policy objectives.