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North Korea`s Nuclear Option: Observations and Reflections on the Recent NPT Crisis
( James Bayer ),( Robert E Bedeski ) 한국국방연구원 1993 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.5 No.2
In March 1993 the North Korean government announced its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Pyongyang`s motives have been the subject of much speculation, but could be explained by one of four possible interpretations. The "conspiracy thesis" argues that the North Koreans decided to withdraw from the NPT when International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections threatened to expose their clandestine program of nuclear weapons development. The "frustration" theory says that the decision was in direct retaliation for international community`s failure to give the economic and political rewards promised North Korea when it agreed to give up its nuclear weapons option and accept IAEA inspec- tions of its nuclear facilities. The "Israeli approach" is predicated on the assumption that North`s withdrawal from the NPT is intended to prevent the international community from discovering that Pyongyang was not developing nuclear weapons, or alternatively, that they had encountered technical setbacks in their nuclear research and development program. Finally is the "embarrassment" interpretation, speculating that Pyongyang inadvertently provided the IAEA with incorrect data on its plutonium holdings and now wishes to avoid the dishonor and humili- ation of being publicly found out. If Pyongyang is absolutely intent on building nuclear weapons, the issue is unlikely to be resolved satisfactorily irrespective of what the international community offers in return. If, as seems more likely, the North Koreans are using the nuclear weapons issue in a last ditch attempt to achieve nonnuclear objectives, the issue will likely be resolved to everyone`s mutual satisfaction but only after long and difficult negotiations. The objective of the international community during these objectives ``must be: to ensure that North Korea remains a member of the NPT, to convince North Korea to open suspect nuclear waste sites to IAEA inspections, and to have North Korea satisfactorily explain the apparent inconsistencies between its declared plutonium holdings to the IAEA and the IAEA findings on the matter. In return the international community will have to satisfy legitimate concerns and expectations raised in Pyongyang. There is much to be gained and little to be lost from such a conciliatory approach at this time.