RISS 학술연구정보서비스

검색

인기 검색어

    다국어 입력

    http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.

    변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.

    예시)
    • 中文 을 입력하시려면 zhongwen을 입력하시고 space를누르시면됩니다.
    • 北京 을 입력하시려면 beijing을 입력하시고 space를 누르시면 됩니다.
    닫기

    제주4·3의 전개과정과 미군정의 대응전략에 관한 연구 : 5·10 선거를 중심으로 = (The) Study on the Process of Cheju 43 Uprisingand the Counter Strategy of USAMGIK : Focusing on holding of elections on 10 May

    한글로보기

    https://www.riss.kr/link?id=T9572592

    • 저자
    • 발행사항

      제주 : 제주대학교 대학원, 2003

    • 학위논문사항

      학위논문(석사) -- 제주대학교 대학원 , 정치외교학과 , 2003

    • 발행연도

      2003

    • 작성언어

      한국어

    • 주제어
    • KDC

      911.99 판사항(4)

    • 발행국(도시)

      제주특별자치도

    • 형태사항

      iv, 160 p. : 삽도 ; 26 cm.

    • 일반주기명

      참고문헌: p. 126-130

    • 소장기관
      • 제주대학교 중앙도서관 소장기관정보
    • 0

      상세조회
    • 0

      다운로드
    서지정보 열기
    • 내보내기
    • 내책장담기
    • 공유하기
    • 오류접수

    부가정보

    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    This thesis tries to find the level of involvement of United States Army MilitaryGovernment in Korea(USAMGIK) and the government of U.S. during the process ofsuppression of Cheju 43 Uprising.
    The successful holding of 510 election was an essential accomplishments forUSAMGIK during the occupation period.
    USAMGIK was designated the cause of Cheju 43 Uprising as the instigation ofCommunists from North Korea and Soviet Union. And U.S. press criticized ChejuUprising as the guerrilla warfare which was instigated by Soviet Union against theseparated election for the founding of South Korea.
    At that time, U.S. policy toward Asia was extremely shown in the special message tothe U.S. Congress recommending continuation of economic assistance to Korea in June 7,1949.
    President Truman said in this message that the Korean Republic, by demonstrating thesuccess an tenacity of democracy in resisting communism, will stand as a beacon to thepeople of northern Asia in resisting the control of the communist forces which haveover-run them. It meant U.S. recognized Korea as a bulwark of anti-communism in Asia.
    Moreover, U.S. and USAMGIK which designated Korea as a battle ground of ideologyin Asia regarded Chejudo island where the election for the founding of South Korea wasonly defeated as 'ideological battle ground' of the frontline in Korean peninsula .
    As Cheju 43 Uprising was occurred under the slogan of objection of the separatedelection, Military Governor of USAMGIK, Maj. Gen. Dean decided co-operation of theKorean Constabulary and Korean Coast Guard in Chejudo island. And He dispatchedConstabulary and liaison plane L-5. The control of operations was under the Chief CivilAffairs Officer(CCAO) in Chejudo, Lt. Col. John S. Mansfield.
    CG, USAFIK, Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge gave Lt. Col. Mansfield instructions for thesuppression of Cheju 43 Uprising.
    After the failure of the election in Chejudo, FEC dispatched the destroyer USS Craignear off Chejudo island. Even they concerned the use of fighters if the situation was more deteriorated.
    Col. Rothwell H. Brown was named as the chief commander in Chejudo. During histime in Chejudo, About 5,000 Cheju islanders were randomly arrested by theconstabulary.
    His assignment in Chejudo was the intention of USAMGIK for the stern suppression ofCheju 43 Uprising and revival of U.S. prestige by the holding of by-election.
    Despite of the stern operations by USAMGIK, the 623 by-election was postponedindefinitely because of guerrilla's activities.
    Gen. Dean instructed all the government departments to give Chejudo high priority intheir considerations. And He assured CCAO of 59th Military Government, Major, EdgarA. Noel that every effort will be made to secure for Chejudo its share of availablemeans. After Chief of KMAG, Brigadier Gen. William L. Roberts was informed by hisjunior advisor about Chejudo situation, he ordered his junior to go down Chejudo rightnow. So, Chejudo 43 Uprising was very serious problem to the officials of USAMGIK.
    G-2, USAFIK knew the 9th Regiment, Korean Army adopted the program of massslaughter among civilians. U.S. Army advisor who stayed in Chejudo at that time knewthat CO of 9th Regiment, KA regarded inland areas in Chejudo as enemy area before thestart of the scorched-earth operation.
    But They didn't resist 9th Regiment activities. Even the Chief of KMAG, Robertsappraised CO of 9th Regiment was done his job very well. It means U.S and USAMGIKwas backed the massacre of Chejudo islanders at least.
    Cheju 4·3 Uprising was ended when Cheju Police Headquarters announced the lift ofban to climb up to Mt. Halla in September 1954.
    In conclusion, we can consider that U.S. and USAMGIK regarded South Korea asbulwark of anti-communism in Asia. So the failure of 510 election in Chejudo for thefounding of South Korean was shock to U.S. and USAMGIK.
    In spite that they knew the mass slaughter by the 9th Regiment and genocide by rightistgroups in Chejudo, they did not resist such illegal and cruel activities. All what they didin this situation was to appraise activities of 9th Regiment. What does this mean?
    It means that their purpose was to eliminate the communists forces in Chejudo andmake South Korea as the frontline against Soviet Union.
    But, in the process of the suppression on guerrillas in Chejudo, more that 30,000Chejudo islanders including children and old people were killed.
    번역하기

    This thesis tries to find the level of involvement of United States Army MilitaryGovernment in Korea(USAMGIK) and the government of U.S. during the process ofsuppression of Cheju 43 Uprising. The successful holding of 510 election was an essential ac...

    This thesis tries to find the level of involvement of United States Army MilitaryGovernment in Korea(USAMGIK) and the government of U.S. during the process ofsuppression of Cheju 43 Uprising.
    The successful holding of 510 election was an essential accomplishments forUSAMGIK during the occupation period.
    USAMGIK was designated the cause of Cheju 43 Uprising as the instigation ofCommunists from North Korea and Soviet Union. And U.S. press criticized ChejuUprising as the guerrilla warfare which was instigated by Soviet Union against theseparated election for the founding of South Korea.
    At that time, U.S. policy toward Asia was extremely shown in the special message tothe U.S. Congress recommending continuation of economic assistance to Korea in June 7,1949.
    President Truman said in this message that the Korean Republic, by demonstrating thesuccess an tenacity of democracy in resisting communism, will stand as a beacon to thepeople of northern Asia in resisting the control of the communist forces which haveover-run them. It meant U.S. recognized Korea as a bulwark of anti-communism in Asia.
    Moreover, U.S. and USAMGIK which designated Korea as a battle ground of ideologyin Asia regarded Chejudo island where the election for the founding of South Korea wasonly defeated as 'ideological battle ground' of the frontline in Korean peninsula .
    As Cheju 43 Uprising was occurred under the slogan of objection of the separatedelection, Military Governor of USAMGIK, Maj. Gen. Dean decided co-operation of theKorean Constabulary and Korean Coast Guard in Chejudo island. And He dispatchedConstabulary and liaison plane L-5. The control of operations was under the Chief CivilAffairs Officer(CCAO) in Chejudo, Lt. Col. John S. Mansfield.
    CG, USAFIK, Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge gave Lt. Col. Mansfield instructions for thesuppression of Cheju 43 Uprising.
    After the failure of the election in Chejudo, FEC dispatched the destroyer USS Craignear off Chejudo island. Even they concerned the use of fighters if the situation was more deteriorated.
    Col. Rothwell H. Brown was named as the chief commander in Chejudo. During histime in Chejudo, About 5,000 Cheju islanders were randomly arrested by theconstabulary.
    His assignment in Chejudo was the intention of USAMGIK for the stern suppression ofCheju 43 Uprising and revival of U.S. prestige by the holding of by-election.
    Despite of the stern operations by USAMGIK, the 623 by-election was postponedindefinitely because of guerrilla's activities.
    Gen. Dean instructed all the government departments to give Chejudo high priority intheir considerations. And He assured CCAO of 59th Military Government, Major, EdgarA. Noel that every effort will be made to secure for Chejudo its share of availablemeans. After Chief of KMAG, Brigadier Gen. William L. Roberts was informed by hisjunior advisor about Chejudo situation, he ordered his junior to go down Chejudo rightnow. So, Chejudo 43 Uprising was very serious problem to the officials of USAMGIK.
    G-2, USAFIK knew the 9th Regiment, Korean Army adopted the program of massslaughter among civilians. U.S. Army advisor who stayed in Chejudo at that time knewthat CO of 9th Regiment, KA regarded inland areas in Chejudo as enemy area before thestart of the scorched-earth operation.
    But They didn't resist 9th Regiment activities. Even the Chief of KMAG, Robertsappraised CO of 9th Regiment was done his job very well. It means U.S and USAMGIKwas backed the massacre of Chejudo islanders at least.
    Cheju 4·3 Uprising was ended when Cheju Police Headquarters announced the lift ofban to climb up to Mt. Halla in September 1954.
    In conclusion, we can consider that U.S. and USAMGIK regarded South Korea asbulwark of anti-communism in Asia. So the failure of 510 election in Chejudo for thefounding of South Korean was shock to U.S. and USAMGIK.
    In spite that they knew the mass slaughter by the 9th Regiment and genocide by rightistgroups in Chejudo, they did not resist such illegal and cruel activities. All what they didin this situation was to appraise activities of 9th Regiment. What does this mean?
    It means that their purpose was to eliminate the communists forces in Chejudo andmake South Korea as the frontline against Soviet Union.
    But, in the process of the suppression on guerrillas in Chejudo, more that 30,000Chejudo islanders including children and old people were killed.

    더보기

    목차 (Table of Contents)

    • 목차
    • Abstract = ⅲ
    • 제1장 서 론 = 1
    • 제1절 문제의 제기 = 1
    • 제2절 기존연구의 검토 = 5
    • 목차
    • Abstract = ⅲ
    • 제1장 서 론 = 1
    • 제1절 문제의 제기 = 1
    • 제2절 기존연구의 검토 = 5
    • 제3절 연구의 범위와 자료 = 7
    • 제2장 해방직후 제주도의 정치.사회경제적 상황 = 11
    • 제1절 정치적 상황 = 11
    • 제2절 사회경제적 상황 = 20
    • 제3장 미국의 대한정책과 단정안의 유엔 결의 = 29
    • 제1절 미국의 대한정책 = 29
    • 제2절 미국의 단정수립 계획과 단정안의 유엔 상정 = 31
    • 제3절 유엔조선임시위원단의 구성과 선거참관 결정 = 37
    • 제4장 5.10선거와 제주도 = 41
    • 제1절 미군정의 선거준비 과정 = 41
    • 제2절 유엔조선임시위원단의 선거감시 활동 = 44
    • 제3절 제주도의 5.10선거 실시 양상과 결과 = 48
    • 제5장 미군정의 국면별 대응전략 = 64
    • 제1절 미군정의 초기 실책과 5.10선거: 1947.3-1948.5 = 64
    • 제2절 5.10선거의 실패와 미군정의 공세, 그리고 정부수립: 1948.5-1948.10 = 79
    • 제3절 초토화작전과 재선거를 위한 정지작업: 1948.10-1949.5 = 99
    • 제4절 마지막 토벌과 미국의 인식: 1949.5-1954.9 = 117
    • 제6장 결 론 = 123
    • 참고문헌 =126
    • 연 표 = 131
    • 제주도 주둔 미군 장교 일람 = 160
    더보기

    분석정보

    View

    상세정보조회

    0

    Usage

    원문다운로드

    0

    대출신청

    0

    복사신청

    0

    EDDS신청

    0

    동일 주제 내 활용도 TOP

    더보기

    주제

    연도별 연구동향

    연도별 활용동향

    연관논문

    연구자 네트워크맵

    공동연구자 (7)

    유사연구자 (20) 활용도상위20명

    이 자료와 함께 이용한 RISS 자료

    나만을 위한 추천자료

    해외이동버튼