NATIONALSTAAT UND REGIONALE INTEGRATION IN DER ZEIT DER GLOBALISIERUNG : Bedingungen, Chancen und Grenzen supranationaler wirtschaftlicher und politischer Institutionenbildung im westeuropaischen und asiatisch-pazifischen Raum = 세계화속의 국민국가와 지역통합

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The decline of the US-Hegemony in the world economy and the end of the Cold War consolidate the tendency towards globalization. The economic and technological developments in the last few decades have caused the increase of interdependence between the nation states. The end of the Cold War means the reduction of the last ideological obstacle in the world economy. It is a well known story that the drastic formation of bipolarity, characterized by intense competition between the opposing blocs of capitalists and communists, immediately after the Second World War was the most important factor in establishing international order under the initiative of capitalist hegemony of the US. This formation was based on the U.S. bloc level interest that was to sustain the security of the capitalist bloc in the political and the economical context.
After the Cold War there are two tendencies which pervade contemporary commentary on the nature of the world political economy. First, there is globalization, which presents a picture of a world in which economic agents are increasingly indifferent to political boundaries, while competing in global markets. Second, there is a view of the world economy which is increasingly defined by high levels of intraregional interdependence which compete globally.
Globalization differs from regionalization in suggesting that political geography is gradually being eroded as a global marketplace matures irrespective of national boundaries. There are two main technological drivers behind globalization. First, transport costs have fallen with improved physical communications. Second, advances in computing power and in telecommunications have transformed the ease, speed, quantity, and quality of international information flows.
Regionalization is the situation in which politics predominates over economics and in which Europe, North America and Asia-Pacific. It implies that the balance of forces in the world political economy is shifting away from multilateralism, underpinned by American Hegemony, towards a system based upon competing regional blocs.
The weakening of the national sovereignty, especially economical sovereignty, in globalization and in regionalization brought into question the future of the nation state. The nation state has a double crisis: the crisis of rationality, where the state cannot protect its citizen in ways they have become accustomed to, and the crisis of legitimation, where the nation state cannot rely on the loyalty of its citizen any longer.
It is true that the national sovereignty is being slowly and differentially eroded, but not eliminated. Despite the general trend towards liberalization in trade, major areas remain where national trade policy action is still strong; where there are powerful coalitions of workers; under the banner of strategic trade policy, where favored new industries are promoted through subsides and government procurement. One of the most crucial functions that nation state still perform, is maintaining a sense of fairness in the distribution of opportunities income and wealth.
The increasing density of the global society gives nation states new roles. Communications, and environmental issues are already notable generators of negotiation between states and these may be expected to grow and be joined by many other issues. Even though globalization has reduced the national sovereignty, it still depends on continuous negotiations between sovereign states in a variety of ad hoc agencies.
The European Community (EC) / The European Union (EU) is the most successful model of peaceful regional integration in history. The major factors of the European integration were the economically catastrophic situation after the Second World War, the threat of expansion of the Soviet, the problem of integration in West Germany and the role of Western Europe in world politics. European integration started in 1951 with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), a custom union which is based on supranational institutions, which are muddled by intergovernmental compromise.
The EC was constructed with the broader political aim to establish the foundation of an ever closer union among the European peoples; even to substitute for old rivalries with the merging of their essential interests; to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples divided by bloody conflicts; to lay the foundation for instructions which will give direction to a destiny to be henceforward shared. This was building the political institution as a strategy: to promote economic integration, in the expectation that social integration would accompany it, that the interests and loyalties of the elite would thus be progressively transferred from each nation state to the broader institutionalized community, which would in turn lay the foundation for an eventual political union.
In the circumstances of the early 1950s, considering that world peace and national survival can be safeguarded only by creative efforts commensurate with the dangers that threaten them, with Western Europe still heavily dependent on the US for economic support and military protection, the vision of an organized and vital Europe regaining through union the independence and economic strength which its individual states had lost had a powerful appeal.
The EU is a highly interdependent system not only in economic terms, but also in terms of its political structure. It is characterized by the shift of powers to different levels of policy making, depending on issues at stake, the interpenetration of political processes, and the contingencies for political action beyond national boundaries. European integration is a polity creating process in which authority and policy making influences are shared across multiple levels of government - subnational, national, and supranational. While national governments are formidable participants in EU policy making, control has slipped away from them to the supranational institutions. States have lost some of their former authoritative control over individuals in their respective territories. Individual state sovereignty is diluted in the EU by collective decision making among national governments and by the autonomous role of the EP, Commission, and Court reembulse.
The member states have accepted the supremacy of EC-law, and have voluntarily relinquished their rights to autonomous decision making and jurisdiction. Supranational law is executed by lower courts and EC regulations are implemented on the subnational level without the explicit consent or even the right of the central government of the state to interfere. A characterization of European integration at any particular point in time is the outcome of a tension between supranational and intergovernmental pressures. States no longer serve as the exclusive nexus between domestic politics and international relations. At the beginning, supranational bodies like the EU are motivated by and initiated through the interests of self-preservation of states. To the degree that the loss of state sovereignty is reimbursed through gains in stability, wealth and authority of the respective states there might emerge a broad political consensus to exchange additional rights or degrees of sovereignty against prospective political gains.
The most obvious feature of the EU is that it is not just an international regime embodied in a regional organization, but a political system with an institutional core which serves the joint exercise of pooled sovereignty. The European Parliament (EP) and the Commission, as well as the European Court of Justice, are beyond the direct control of member states, and endowed by the treaties with special rights to give the EU interests a voice in EU policy making. On many occasions the Commission has effectively used its right of initiative to give the integration process new momentum, and the EP has already used its new rights of cooperation and codecision to build advocacy coalitions between the EP, the Commission and a council majority. The Court has proved to be a motor of integration, ruling many times in favor of an expansive interpretation of the Authority of EU as well as maintaining the non-interference policy with the common market.
Undoubtedly, the EU exercises power. It adopts normative acts and requests their observance. The EU is based on the rule of law and on the separation of powers. In a formal sense it is also based on self-determination since it came into existence by way of a treaty which has been approved by the parliaments of the member states. Its operation, however, still lacks the traditional parliamentary foundation. The comparison between the requirements of democratic principle and the present institutional system of the EU, in particular with the role of the EP, often is described as democratic deficit.
The council of ministers, representing the executive branch in the member states, continues to enjoy primacy in the EU legislative process. This means, in the starkest terms, that in the field of application of community law and policy, there are still major public policy areas where the governments of the member states may in the EU domain legislate without meaningful control or even consent of the EP.
In recent years, one of the most significant development in the Asia-Pacific region has been the rapid growth of regional cooperation. This is in contrast to Asia's historical records on cooperation. For many years, the pace of regional cooperation was very slow compared with other regions of the world. The only exception is probably the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, the contribution of ASEAN has been primarily political rather than economical.
The challenges arising from the integration of Europe and North America have forced Asian states to strengthen their own cooperative arrangements. During the past two decades, Asian states have benefited substantially from the trend of relatively open trade. In the late 2980s, EC decided to move to form a single European market for goods, services, capital and labor. In 1994 North American Tree Trade Area (NAFTA) was signed. These new regional arrangements exert considerable influence on the world economy. Being an outsider to these two most important regional arrangements, Asian states are increasingly concerned about the adverse impact of the growth of regionalism, since the emergence of an inward looking regionalism could severely hurt the export growth and economic performance of Asia.
The evolution of the Asia-Pacific ideas has been a long process. Its introduction to the policy agenda of the states of the Asia-Pacific region, and between the state decision making communities of the region, has been via the evolution of a broad based regional policy network. This network has some of the characteristics of an epidemic community, but the notion of seeing it in the more developed sense as a functioning formal or institutionalized policy community should be resisted. This policy network has been important in the evolution of a regional cooperation. It exhibits shared normative and principled beliefs. These beliefs form the value based rational for community actions. While formal identification of the community is resisted, these institutional ties and networks promote solidarity and the means for members of the regional community to compare information and find moral support for their views.
The increase of intraregional trade among Asian states has become an important driving force for economic cooperation in the region. North America and Western Europe used to be the principal markets for Asian exports in the 1960s and 1970s. Since the beginning of the 1980s, however, there has been a profound shift in the geographic pattern of Asian trade. Asia has become its own most important and rapidly expanding market. The flows of intraregional investment in Asia have also complemented the growth of intraregional trade and reinforced the interdependence of Asian economies.
ASEAN was the first established cooperative venture in Asia. The Bangkok Declaration of 1967, which organized ASEAN, emphasizes economic, technical and social cooperation. During its early years, ASEAN achieved slow progress in the area of economic cooperation. It was more preoccupied with political and security issues. Since the 1980s, however, ASEAN has revived the importance of economic cooperation. It has proposed several economic cooperation schemes and has undertaken a series of initiatives. In 1992, ASEAN states agreed to form the ASEAN Free Trade Area (APTA).
In response to the growing interdependence among Asia-Pacific states, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) was formed in 1989. The most distinguished achievement of APEC was the 7994 summit talk in Bogor, Indonesia, where it was decided that, by the year 2010, the developed member states of APEC will remove all trade barriers and that, by the year 2020, the whole APEC region will enjoy free trade.
APEC has had a rapid ascent to international prominence, which was spurred by the fear of discriminatory arrangement in Europe and North America and growing conflict between the US and Japan.
Central to the discourse on regional cooperation in Asia-Pacific is a belief in market led integration and open regionalism. This unconditional, most favored nation status among Asian states is in sharp contrast with the discriminatory and instutionalist integration found in the EU. Compared to other regions, Asian regional cooperation embodies certain unique features. First, even though the pace of regional cooperation in Asia has increased in recent years, it is still its early stage of development. The second feature is its strong willingness to adhere to the principle of open regionalism. Open regionalism is a process of regional cooperation whose outcome is not only the actual reduction of internal barriers, but also the actual reduction of external barriers to states that are not part of the regional arrangements. The third feature is that in addition to large scale regional integration such as ASEAN and APEC, there are also various forms of subregional arrangements in Asia that address a much broader cooperation problem than free trade. This includes infrastructure linkage, foreign investment deregulation and promotion, and human resource development.
There are obstacles to regional policy coordination in Asia-Pacific: First, the absence of an alternative source of leadership to that found in more traditional hegemonic understandings and the adverse effects on policy coordination of continued US-Japan economic conflicts. Second, a contest over the definition of region and the fragile tactical consensus over the role of APEC as a vehicle for dialogue.
Among the members of APEC there are different understanding of range of contested questions - concerning the meaning of concepts such as identity, region, community, institutionalization, widening versus deepening and the speed of progression towards free trade. At this stage, APEC is neither an institution nor a regime, despite having some institutional characteristics.
The importance of intergovernmentalism is that it utilizes the state as a gate keeper against supranational legislation. In this sense, given the desire of many East Asian states to enhance sovereignty, it may even have more explanatory and prescriptive utility in the Asia-Pacific region than in the European context.
While the context of managing regional economic policy coordination in an era of globalization is the same for both European and Asian actors, the geographical, historical, political and cultural contexts are sufficiently different.
The differences between the levels of intent and capability in regional integration between the EU and Asia-Pacific are stark. The EU is the most developed and most cohesive example of regional cooperation to date. In Europe people can talk about integration, but in Asia-Pacific people may talk about cooperation. The EU is a common market, but APEC is not. Moreover, APEC has signaled that it has no intention of becoming one. The EU is the most institutionalized regional organization in the world. APEC has only recently set up a small secretariat in Singapore and, again, this process was resisted in some quarters. On top of that, APEC, unlike the EU, has taken no specific steps to create formalized processes to enhance economic policy coordination. There has been no agreement to relinquish or, in Eurospeak, pool aspects of the sovereignty of individual state economic policy making procedures.
The recent history of EU embodies three major characteristics of cooperation absent in the Asia-Pacific region: First, the institutional removal of domestic regulations to achieve a common market guaranteeing the free movement of capital, goods, services and labor among member states. Second, the development of supranational organs as vehicles for decision making on measures necessary to ensure the functioning of that market. Third, a commitment to develop policies to reduce regional imbalances and enhance socio-economic integration within the members of the community. To the extent that these processes have required a pooling of sovereignty, they are qualitatively different from Asia-Pacific economic cooperation.
The European experience at least demonstrates that fully sovereign states are perfectly able to construct supranational institutions and that they might gain new political strength and economic power through a calculated loss or delegation of sovereignty.
The low degree of institutionalization in Asia-Pacific reflects very different economic and political circumstances when compared to Europe or America, and implies important limits to the degree of potential integration in the Asia-Pacific region. A more negative factor which hampers active regional diplomacy in the region is the absence of a security community, in contrast with North America and Europe. In addition, the mistrust by the smaller states in the region of the intentions of the big states (the US, Japan and China), and particularly of an active regional economic policy by Japan, makes it very difficult to achieve the degree of liberalization that we witness in the EU or even NAFTA. Unlike in the EU, the fear of hegemony in Asia-Pacific has not produced institutionalized integration. However, as the EU institutions show, institutionalization tends to make certain level of integration irreversible. Institutionalization establishes bureaucratic specialists, that have a vested interest in further integration and the expertise to fully exploit the need for, and the chance of, further regulation and legislation. Furthermore, institutionalization will lead to the establishment of courts, which although they lack the power of sanction, are by now well endowed with an authority to sentence. Successful integration can result in institutions which, although being devoid of power, begin to control their own resources, accumulate knowledge and exert authority. The supranational institutions can, to an ever greater degree, influence the political perceptions of the various state governments. They might manipulate their choices and will operate as third parties. Supranational integration is not only successful, but it is by now probably irreversible and it can impress itself on the public mind as a success.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Inhaltsverzeichnis
• Tabellenverzeichnis = vii
• Abbildungsverzeichnis = vii
• Abkurzungsverzeichnis = viii
• 0. Einleitung = 1
• Ausgangsuberlegungen der Arbeit = 1
• Untersuchungszeitraum = 8
• Geographische Anmerkungen = 10
• Anmerkung zur Terminologie = 10
• Fragestellungen and Aufbau der Arbeit = 11
• 1. Theoretischer Hintergrund = 14
• 1.1 Definitionischer Rahmen = 14
• 1.1.1 Begriff der regionalen Integration = 14
• 1.1.2 Die wirtschaftliche Regionalisierung = 14
• 1.1.3 Die politische Regionalisierung = 16
• 1.1.4 Beziehungen zwischen wirtschaftlicher and politischer Regionalisierung = 17
• 1.1.5 Regionalisierung and nationale Souveranitat = 19
• 1.2 Theorien der regionalen Integration = 19
• 1.2.1 Die wirtschaftliche Integrationstheorie = 20
• 1.2.2 Der Foderalismus = 21
• 1.2.3 Der Funktionalismus = 22
• 1.2.4 Der Neofunktionalismus = 24
• 1.2.5 Der Intergouvernementalismus = 25
• 1.2.6 Die institutionalistischen Ansatze = 27
• 1.3 Die Entwicklung von Regionalisierungstendenzen in der Welt = 28
• 1.3.1 Regionalisierungstendenzen nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges = 28
• 1.3.2 Beziehungen zwischen regionalen- und Weltorganisationen = 30
• 1.4 Beziehung zwischen der Globalisierung und der Regionalisierung = 31
• 1.4.1 Globalisierung als Rahmenbedingung der Regionalisierung = 31
• 1.4.2 Regionalisierung als Anpassung an Globalisierang = 34
• 2 Der Wandel des Nationalstaates im Globalisierungs- und RegionalisierungsprozeB = 37
• 2.1 Die Entwicklung des Nationalstaates = 37
• 2.1.1 Begriffliche Ansatze = 37
• 2.1.1.1 Definitionen = 37
• 2.1.1.2 Merkmale des Nationalstaates: Territoriale Begrenzung, Souveranitat und Legitimitat = 39
• 2.1.2 Der EntwicklungsprozeB des Nationalstaates = 41
• 2.1.2.1 Die Entstehung des Nationalstaates = 41
• 2.1.2.2 Rahmenbedingungen fur die Entstehung and Entwicklung des Nationalstaates = 43
• 2.1.2.3 Der EntwicklungsprozeB des Nationalstaates = 44
• 2.1.2.4 Der Einf1uB der zwei Weltkriege auf den Nationalstaat = 47
• 2.1.3 Die Aufgaben des Nationalstaates = 49
• 2.1.3.1 Klassische Aufgaben des Nationalstaates = 49
• 2.1.3.2 Die Entwicklung des Wohlfahrtsstaates = 50
• 2.1.3.3 Das Dilemma des Wohlfahrtsstaates im GlobalisierungsprozeB = 53
• 2.2 Der neue Nationalismus im GlobalisierungsprozeB = 55
• 2.2.1 Der klassische Nationalismus = 55
• 2.2.1.1 Begriffliche Ansatze = 55
• 2.2.1.2 Ursachen des Nationalismus = 57
• 2.2.2 Der neue Nationalismus nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges = 59
• 2.2.3 Ein Interpretationsversuch des neuen Nationalismus in Osteuropa im Zusammenhang mit der regionalen Integration = 63
• 2.3 Die Transformation des Nationalstaates = 67
• 2.3.1 Der Nationalstaat zwischen Globalisierung and Regionalisierung = 67
• 2.3.2 Der Wandel des Nationalstaates = 70
• 2.3.3 Verandenxngen der Rolle des Nationalstaates im ProzeB der Globalisierung und Regionalisierung = 76
• 2.3.3.1 Eine neue Bestimmung der Funktionen des Nationalstaates = 76
• 2.3.3.2 Die wirtschaftlichen Funktionen des Nationalstaates = 78
• 2.3.3.3 Die politischen Funktionen des Nationalstaates = 79
• 2.3.3.4 Die sozialen Funktionen des Nationalstaates = 80
• 2.3.3.5 Der Nationalstaat auf der internationalen Ebene = 81
• 3 Nationalstaaten and Supranationalitat in der Europaischen Union = 84
• 3.1 Die europaische Integration unter verschiedenen theoretischen Blickwinkeln = 84
• 3.1.1 Die Europaische Union als Foderalstaat = 86
• 3.1.2 Die Europaische Union als intergouvernementales System = 88
• 3.1.3 Die Europaische Union als neues Machtzentrum = 90
• 3.1.4 Die Europaische Union als fusionierter Foderalstaat = 92
• 3.1.5 Die Europaische Union als Mehrebenensystem = 94
• 3.2 Der ProzeB der europaischen Integration = 96
• 3.2.1 Die Chronologie des Integrationsprozesses = 96
• 3.2.1.1 Die Antriebskrafte und Rahmenbedingungen der euxopaischen Integration = 96
• 3.2.1.2 Die Grundung der "Europaischen Gemeinschaft fur Kohle und Stahl" = 98
• 3.2.1.3 Die Romischen Vertrage - Die Europaische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und die Europaische Atomgemeinschaft = 99
• 3.2.1.4 Die Einheitliche Europaische Akte = 101
• 3.2.1.5 Der Vertrag uber die Europaische Union = 103
• 3.2.1.6 Die Europaische Union nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges = 104
• 3.2.2 Die Europapolitik einiger ausgewahlter Mitgliedstaaten = 108
• 3.2.2.1 Die Europapolitik Frankreichs = 109
• 3.2.2.2 Die Europapolitik GroBbritanniens = 112
• 3.2.2.3 Die Europapolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland = 116
• 3.3 Nationalstaat und Supranationalitat in der Europaischen Union = 121
• 3.3.1 Nationalstaat und Supranationalitat im europaischen IntegrationsprozeB = 121
• 3.3.1.1 Der Begriff der Supranationalitat = 121
• 3.3.1.2 Die Supranationale Zustandigkeit der Europaischen Union = 122
• 3.3.1.3 Supranationalitat als Erganzung der Hundlungsfahigkeit des Nationalstaates = 124
• 3.3.1.4 Supranationalitat in verschiedenen Politikbereichen der Europaischen Union = 125
• 3.3.1.5 Die Verstarkung der Supranationalitat durch Sekundarentscheidungen = 126
• 3.3.2 Die Akteure im Policymaking-ProzeB in der Europaischen Union = 129
• 3.3.2.1 Der Policymaking-ProzeB der Europaischen Union = 129
• 3.3.2.2 Die Europaische Kommission = 131
• 3.3.2.3 Der Europaische Rat = 135
• 3.3.2.4 Das Europaische Parlament = 139
• 3.3.2.5 Der Europaische Gericlttshof = 141
• 3.3.3 Nationalstaat und Supranationalitat im Policymaking-ProzeB in der Europaischen Union = 144
• 3.3.3.1 Der Gewaltenteilung zwischen supranationalen und intergouvernementalen Institutionen in der Europaischen Union = 144
• 3.3.3.2 Entscheidungsstruktur der Europaischen Union = 148
• 3.3.3.3 Interburokratische Netzwerke in der Entscheidungsstruktur = 153
• 3.3.3.4 Nationalstaat und Supranationalitat im Entscheidungsverfahren = 156
• 3.3.4 Supranationalitat und demokratische Legitimitat der Europaischen Union = 159
• 3.3.4.1 Begriffliche Ansatze = 159
• 3.3.4.2 Supranationalitat und Legitimitatsdefizite der Europaischen Union = 162
• 4. Nationalstaaten und regionale Integration im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum = 169
• 4.1 Der Nationalismus als Rahmenbedingung regionaler Kooperation = 169
• 4.1.1 Die Entwicklung und die Merkmale des Nationalismus in Asien = 169
• 4.1.2 Der Nationalismus in China = 173
• 4.1.3 Der Nationalismus in Japan = 175
• 4.1.4 Der Nationalismus in Korea = 177
• 4.2 Die Regionalpolitik ausgewahlter Nationalstaaten im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum = 178
• 4.2.1 Die Wandlung des asiatisch-pazifischen Raumes nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges = 178
• 4.2.2 Sicherheitspolitische Situation im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum = 181
• 4.2.3 Die Asienpolitik der USA = 184
• 4.2.4 Die Regionalpolitik Chinas = 189
• 4.2.5 Die Regionalpolitik Japans = 194
• 4.2.6 Regionalpolitik Sudkoreas = 198
• 4.3 Die Regionale Kooperation im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum = 201
• 4.3.1 Die wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Struktur des asiatisch-pazifischen Raums = 201
• 4.3.2 Der EntwicklungsprozeB der regionalen Kooperation im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum = 212
• 4.3.3 Erklarungsansatze zur Integration im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum = 219
• 4.3.3.1 Das Flugganse-Modell = 220
• 4.3.3.2 Das Modell der Transformationskette = 221
• 4.3.3.3 Die Netzwerkansatze = 222
• 4.3.3.4 Regimetheoretische Ansatze = 223
• 4.3.4 Die Wirtschaftskrise und regionale Kooperation im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum = 224
• 4.4 Institutionen fur die regionale Kooperation im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum = 226
• 4.4.1 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) = 226
• 4.4.2 APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) = 231
• 4.4.2.1 Die Initiative zur Grundung der APEC = 231
• 4.4.2.2 Institutionelle Merkmale der APEC = 233
• 4.4.2.3 Die Institutionalisierung und die Konferenzen der APEC = 235
• 4.4.2.4 Die Schwierigkeiten des APEC-Prozesses = 238
• 4.4.2.5 Die zukunftigen Aufgaben der APEC = 242
• 4.4.2.6 Die Asien-Krise und die APEC = 244
• 4.5 Vergleich zwischen Europa und asiatisch-pazifischem Raum = 246
• 4.5.1 Motivation regionaler Integration in beiden Regionen = 246
• 4.5.2 Nationalstaat und Nationalismus in beiden Regionen = 248
• 4.5.3 Sicherheitsbedingungen fur die regionale Integration = 249
• 4.5.4 Die wirtschaftlichen Verflechtungen in beiden Regionen = 253
• 4.5.5 Die Rolle der Supranationalitat in der regionalen Integration = 257
• 5. AbschluB = 260
• Summary = 266
• Literaturverzeichnis = 274
• Selbstandigkeitserklarang = 303