Today Korean society shows the trend toward a religious pluralism which consists of Protestant, Catholic, Buddhism etc. Thus, multiple religious problems have been raised more and more along with societal change in Korea. Following the principle of 's...
Today Korean society shows the trend toward a religious pluralism which consists of Protestant, Catholic, Buddhism etc. Thus, multiple religious problems have been raised more and more along with societal change in Korea. Following the principle of 'state neutrality', our courts have taken a negative position in solving such religious problems, simply applying principal norms to religious cases. Especially the courts have not tried actively to participate into problems concerning the doctrine of separation of state and church or prohibition of established church under the Article 20 Section 2 of our Constitution.
The protection of religious freedom could be fulfilled through the cases concerning religious beliefs and actions. Nevertheless, there have been few religious cases in Korean constitutional history. And in determining the cases our supreme court has applied only statutes, but not constitutional principles. Therefore, it is important to review American history of religious development and the Supreme Court's attitude toward religion clauses, implementing the principles of protecting the freedom of religion.
It is impossible to define the concept of 'religion' in a word in the USA because it is based upon a religious pluralism. As Choper recognized in his article, 'Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment', no satisfactory definition is likely to be conceived. The scope of religious pluralism in the U.S. alone has resulted in such a multiplicity and diversity of ideas about what is a religion or a religious belief. No simple formula seems able to accommodate them all. The difficulty of definition derives also from the fact that no set of factors has been found that religion cannot be satisfactorily distinguished from philosophy or ideology.
The Supreme Court has therefore indicated that the category of religion must be open ended. Indicating that none of the attempts to formulate a constitutional definition of religion has been satisfactory, Professor Greenwalt concluded that the attempt to settle upon any one definition is misconceived. Because the religion is such a complex subject that no single definition is likely to be satisfactory, we must proceed the common law method of case by case analogical reasoning. It has been the Supreme Court's attitude that the court gradually create a body of case law that can produce a true definition.
In the early period of American colony, most Americans probably imagined that religion inherently had something to do with the concept of a creator God. But some religions, for example Buddhism, have no such concept of God. And a number of famous Christian theologians have attempted to "demythologize" their religion by removing all the supernatural elements. Thus, the concept of religion has been changed to imply all the faiths of "ultimate concern" along with the passage of time.
Some scholars have suggested that the term "religion" ought to be defined differently for different purposes. Professor Tribe did not even attempt an overall definition in his famous constitutional book, only suggesting that non-theistic creeds should be protected by the free exercise clause, but should be free of the restrictions of the establishment clause. The object of the religion clause is the same, but scholars maintain that there are two definitions according to whether applied to the establishment clause or the free exercise clause. Indeed, the Supreme Court has supported Tribe's reasoning of two definitions of the religion clause. The Court has in fact adopted a dual definition of religion, an expansive interpretation for the free exercise clause and a more confined interpretation for the establishment clause.
In the United States v. Seeger, the most generous definition of religion was in a statutory, rather than a constitutional setting. The Supreme Court interpreted a provision of the Universal Military Training and Service Act that exempted from military service, "those persons who by reason of their religious training and belief are conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." Religious belief was defined as "an individual's belief in relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human being. Although this case was resolved as a matter of statutory interpretation, the decision had a significant constitutional importance. Seeger's functional approach in defining the concept of religion has been applied since then to resolve religious problems.
In oder, however, the Supreme Court had retreated from the Seeger's position by emphasizing that the free exercise clause's extraordinary exemption was available for only a religious belief or practice. Without specifying the criteria for a definition, the Court expressed a relatively cautious approach. "A way of life may not be interpreted as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education, if it is based on purely secular considerations; to have the protection of the religion clause the claims must be based on religious belief. Although a determination of what is a religious belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a more delicate question, the very concept of ordered liberty in which society as a whole has important interests to limit individual's freedom of religion.
Most of all, in the Reynold case, the distinction between belief and action was first mentioned. Religious clause embraces two concepts - freedom to believe and freedom to act. People are free to believe but they may not be allowed to act upon those beliefs in all instances. This became evident in civil liberty cases in the twentieth century and indicated that religious rights, like others, are not absolute, but must be balanced against other competing social rights.
The Supreme Court in the Lemon case has developed a three-part test for assessing violation of the establishment clause. In order to pass constitutionality of statutes concerning the establishment clause, government action first, must have a secular, rather than a religious purpose; second, may not have the principal effect of advancing or inhibiting religion; and third, may not involve excessive entanglement between government and religion. Also, the law must not create an excessive degree of political division along religious lines.
Originally, the protection of free exercise of religion and the prohibition against establishment of religion were intended to apply only to Congress, not to the states. The American people had learned by bitter experience of Civil War and subsequent violent civil rights struggles that several states cannot always be relied on to protect all the rights of all their citizens. What was at issue was the incorporation of the religion clauses into the Fourteenth Amendment, making them applicable to the states as well. Those citizens who are disadvantaged by the states to grant them the basic rights may appeal to the Federal Constitution to protect the rights by virtue of their federal citizenship. In the Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the First Amendment were wholly applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Today Korea is faced similar situations compared with those of the U.S.A. where a religious pluralism flourishes. But in Korea there are few cases concerning the freedom of religion and at most those cases have been dealt with only by applying statutes technically in favor of the protection of state security or social order. The freedom of religion is more important than any other spiritual freedoms; Therefore it should be secured strictly and inclusively. In solving religious conflicts which are raised under the religious pluralism, there should be some general rules or guidelines based upon rationality. American's experiences, specially efforts of the Supreme Court which developed some guidelines for the solution of religious conflicts will suggest us some lessons. At any rate, there are some differences comparing the conditions between Korea and the U.S.A. What we have to learn from the U.S.A. experiences is not the contents of precedents themselves, but the attitude of the Supreme Court to do its best to fulfill the freedom of religion.