Effect of ethylene on storage life of non-climacteric fruit and vegetables

국문 초록 (Abstract)

과실 및 채소는 수확후 활발한 대사활동을 계속하기 때문에 쉽게 악변된다. Climacteric 과실은 미성숙 단계에서 수확되어 시장에 출하되기 전에 에틸렌처리로 숙성도를 조절하여 이러한 특성을여 바나나, 감귤류 및 사과 등은저장 대기 환경에서 에틸렌을 제거시켜 저장수명을 연장하는 연굼�보고되어 왔다. 그러나 화훼류나 Non-Climacteric 과실 및 채소에 있어 에틸렌은품질을 저하슷傷鄂�요소로 알려져 있으나 이에 대한 정량적인 연구 즉품질저하를 야기시키는 에틸렌의 최소 에 대한 보고는 거의 없는 실정이다. 본 연구는 Non-Climacteric 과실 및 채소중 딸기, 상치, 배천�(greenbean) 에 대해 저농도의 에틸렌이 품질에 미치는 영향에 대한 다음과 같은광범위한 조뽀璿臼눼� 조사항목은 상온 및 저온에서 에틸렌 농도0. 005-10㎕/liter의 범위에서 품질변화, 시을玲逾풔�단위 포장에서의에틸렌의 양 측정 및 KMnO₄를 첨가하여 저장수명 연장에 대한 것이다. 경으로부터 에틸렌 농도를 10㎕/liter 에서 0. 005㎕/liter로 감소시켰을 때상온 및 저온에서각 걘ㅌ弩�저장수명이 유의적으로 연장되었다. 이에 대한요인을 시료별로 보면 딸기는 20℃에서 곰팀갼店�0℃에서 tissuecollapse . 지연, 상치는 20℃ 및 0℃에서 browning 지연, 배추는 20℃에�bscission 과 Browning 과 지연 및 green beans은 20℃에서 degreessing 과 5℃및 0℃에서 냉해민감도가 저하되었다. 시중에서 판매되는 과실 및 채소의단위포장별 에틸렌 농도는 상치, 배추, beans은 0. 1㎕/liter 이상이 었고딸기는 punnet 당 0. 03-0. 36㎕/liter 였다. 딸기 punnet에 KMnO가시키고,상치 및 배추는 polyethylenefilem과 KMnO₄를 함께 단위포장하였을 때 에틸렌함량의 윳醯�저장수명이 유의적으로 연장을 보여 주었다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The global nuclear nonproliferation regime (the NPT regime), based on the NPT, the
IAEA, the UN, and the NSG, tends to rely on the supply-side strategic options such as export controls, diversion controls, and punitive sanctions. However, in spite of its remarkable achievements, the NPT regime reveals its limitations in halting nuclear proliferation. In this situation, the demand-side strategy, based on the strategic bargaining for reducing the aspirations of a proliferator for nuclear weapons, emerges as an alternative to nuclear nonproliferation, The North Korean case of nuclear proliferation (from mid 199 1 to December 1995) is an exemplary one which showed the potential of the demand-side strategy. As the NPT regime failed to fully dissuade North Korea from going nuclear, the U.S. and South Korea stroke several bargaining deals with North Korea in order to denuclearize the Korean
Peninsula. North Korea tried to protect or promote its national interests by using its nuclear proliferation option as bargaining leverage. Meanwhile, the U.S. and South Korea adopted diverse strategic options which could affect the incentives and disincentives of North Korea for nuclear weapons.
North Korea, South Korea, and the U.S. as bargaining parties faced a variety of
uncertainties which they had to cope with in order to enhance the procedural or
substantive rationality of their strategic choices. In the strategic bargaining to resolve the North Korean nuclear dispute, the patterns of uncertainty management (uncertainty ignoring, uncertainty reduction, uncertainty accommodation, and uncertainty overlooking) influenced the strategic choices of North Korea, South Korea, and the U. S.(conceding strategy, demanding strategy, and compromising strategy). Moreover, the patterns of uncertainty management also affected the bargaining outputs (conflict, cooperation, and capitulation) by influencing the combination of strategic choices of bargaining parties. Uncertainty as a critical variable had a significant impact on the dynamicity of the strategic nuclear bargaining.
This research has significance in three dimensions. In theoretical terms, this research contributes to developing the managerial approach to uncertainty which is newly emerging because of the limitations of the analytic approach to uncertainty. In practical terms, this research helps the understanding of the nuclear incentives, bargaining strategies, and bargaining tactics of North Korea as a nuclear proliferator. In policy terms, this research shows the weaknesses of the supply-side options of the NPT regime, especially the IAEA nuclear inspections and the UN sanctions. Meanwhile, this research reveals the limitations and potential of the demand-side strategic options which can be selected within or beyond the NPT regime.
Index Words: Analytic approach, Conflict, Cooperation, Diversion controls,
Export controls, IAEA, Managerial approach, NPT, NPT regime, North Korea, Nuclear Incentives, Nuclear nonproliferation, Nuclear proliferation, Punitive sanctions, Strategic choice, Supply-side strategy, UN, UN Sanctions, Uncertainty, Uncertainty management,