俄館播遷 前後의 韓露關係 = A study on the realtion between Korea and Russia 1895-1898

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This is a study on the Russo-Korean relations about the time of Korean King Kojong's stay at Russian Legation(俄館播遷期:Feb.11,1896-Feb.20,1897) in Seoul. This study covers the political and diplomatic events related to Korea for 3 years from the Triple Intervention(三國幹渉) to Rosen-Nishi Convention(Rosen-西協定). Its focuses are to pursue the development of Russo-Korean relations and grasp the mutual recognition of the two countries during that time. Public or private records of Korea, England, America, partly of Russia, Japan and China are used for this study. The major points of each chapter are as follows:

Chapter II

(1) Russia had hoped for the stability of Manchuria and also the integrity of Korean Independence for the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway under construction since 1891. Russia led the Triple Intervention to expel Japan from Liaodung Peninsular with the close of the Sino-Japnese war. At the same time Russian minister Karl Waeber in Seoul induced Korean Queen Min(閔妃:明成皇后,1851-1895) to lead the anti-Japanese policy of Korean Royal Court. It was against Count Inouye Kaoru(井上馨,1836-1915), who had attempted to establish a Japanese protectorate over Korea since his arrival in Seoul as Japanese minister to Korea. Waeber was supported by such a western diplomat as Horace N.Allen(安連) who contrived for the acquirement of interests in Korea. It proves that Queen Min's brave 'pro-Russia and anti-Japanese' policy(引俄拒日策) was mainly motivated by Waeber in the line of Russian policy.

(2) Russian foundation in Korea, however, was not so solid. With the secession of German, the powerful influence of Triple Intervention had rapidly lessened. Moreover, Japan assured a military and economic superior position to Russia in Korea. In this situation Japanese retaliation resulted in Queen Min's Assassination(明成皇后弒害事件,Oct.8,1895). It was planned by ex-Japanese Minister Count Inouye with the support of Ito's cabinet, not by ex-general Miura Goro(三浦梧樓,1846-1926)who has been described as the main conspirator by many Japanese and western historians until now. However Miura was only a scapegoat for Count Inouye. Count Inouye recommanded Miura for the Japanese minister to Korea as his successor. He stayed at Japanese legation in Seoul with Miura for 17days even after Miura arrived in Seoul. Count Inouye left Korea for Japan just 17 days before the Assassination. Count Inouye was one of the most powerful 3 members with Ito Hirobumi(伊藤博文,1841-1909) and Yamagata Aritomo(山縣有朋,1838-1922) in Japanese Government. Through Queen Min's Assassination, Count Inouye intented to cut off Russian influence over Korea and revert to the the status quo ante of Korea as before the Triple intervention. As a few Japanese scholars have asserted, Queen Min's Assassination was never contradictory to the Japanese policy to Korea. Therefore it is reasonable for us to believe that Count Inouye was the major ringleader, that the Japanese minister Miura played the role of Queen Min's murderer in Seoul, and that the Japanese cabinet was behind the conspiracy.

Chapter III

(1) King Kojong's Flight to Russian Legation(俄館播遷,Feb.11,1896) derived from queen Min's Assassination by the Japanese. It has been said that pro-Russian ministers of Korea, such as Lee Pom Chin(李範晋) led it and Waeber supported them. However it was mainly led by Waeber and the new Russian minister Alexis de Speyer with the support of the Russian Government. Following examples should be considered to understand the background of it. Russian Government dispatched Speyer as new Russian minister to Korea and instructed Waeber not to leave Seoul for Mexico, and commanded the Russian admiral in Chemulpo to dispatch about 100 marines to Seoul Feb.10,1896,just the day before King Kojong's Flight. In fact Russia hoped for the integrity of Korean Independence for the stability of Manchuria. That was the reason why she helped King Kojong to flee to the Russian legation.

(2) After King Kojong's Flight to Russian Legation, Russia hoped to maintain the status quo in Korea, while the Japanese government had the standpoint that Japan must not retreat from the Korean peninsula anymore. Under this background, Waeber-Komura Memorandum (Waeber-小村覺書,May 14,1896) was signed by the ministers of Russia and Japan in Seoul. It was the compromise between the two countries for admitting the status quo of King Kojong's stay at Russian legation and protecting the possible collisions in Korea between their soldiers.

(3) Robanov-Yamagata Protocol (Lobanov-山縣議定書,Jun.9,1896) was signed just after the coronation of Nicholas II by higher level officials of Russia and Japan in Moscow. It was a mutual restriction about the control of Korean military and finance. Also it was actually a suppress over Korean domestic administration. However, as stipulated in article II, the part of military affairs and public finance was ambiguous, which lefted room for controvercial explanation. In the long run, Russia and Japan had no intention of trying to observe it with sincerity. Therefore it was a temporary compromise that there was some possibility of cheating each other.

(4) The coronation of Nicholas II provided the Koreans with the opportunity for secret negotiations with the Russian government. In the early stage of Russo-Japanese entente, with Waeber's help, the Korean Government was planning to dispatch Min Young Whan(閔泳煥)as Special Envoy Extrordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to attend the coronation of Czar Nicholas II in Moscow, May 26,1896. The Korean Envoy Min demanded military and financial aids to Russia including the security of the King Kojong's personal life. However Russian Government had no other intention than maintaining the status quo of King Kojong's stay in Russian Legation. Russia could not accept the demand of the Korean Envoy owing to the estimated Japanese and English resistence. The expectation of Korea toward Russia could not be accopmplished satisfactorily. The responce of Russia to the Korean Envoy Min was contradictory to Lobanov-Yamagata Protocol. As for Russian government, it was a kind of inactive' double game.

Chapter IV

(1) The first contingent of Russian Military Instructors arrived in Seoul together with the returning special envoy, Min, on October 21, 1896. It consisted, in addition to Colonial Putiata, of 2 officers and 10 noncommissioned officers with a doctor. After they drilled Korean soldiers for three months, Korean King moved to his palace with Korean soldiers' escort in 20 Feb. 1897. As for Japan, she didn't want to argue against Russia about her dispatch of the military instructors if it aimed at training the Palace Guards necessary to the King's returning to his palace. However Russia thought that she could keep her political superiority over Japan in Korea through grasping the right to cammand Palace Guard by her instructors. That is one of the most important reason why Russia despatched military instructors.

(2) Witte's policy, however, became to be challanged both in Manchuria and Korean Peninsula in the early spring of 1897. Japan exposed Russo-Japanes Agreements just after King Kojong's move to the New Palace. It resulted in promoting Korean officials' disbelief on Russia, particularly on Waeber. Japan distorted purposefully and skillfully the content of article II of Lobanov-Yamagata Protocol and expanded the double game of Russian government. The timely Paying off Japanese loans with Korean funds by McLeavy Brown, the British Director of Korean Customs also let Korean government release the necessity of Russian loan. What is worse, Russia came to be confronted with Li Hung Chang's obstinate attitude not to permit Russia the construction right of southern manchurian railway. In this situation Witte began to take more positive attitude to the direction of Korean peninsular.

(3) Witte dispatched Alexeiev, a high level Russian financial specialist and the second contingent of Russian military instructors under the pretence of Korean envoy's request for Russian aids in the previous year. In the beginning of September in 1897, a newly appointed Russian Minister to Korea, Alexis de Speyer also arrived in Seoul. He forced Korean government to hire Alexiev and military instructors and also to establish Russo-Koreean Bank in Seoul. The Independence Club and the British, Japanese, and American Diplomatic officials resisted against Speyer's high handed request to Korean government. Nevertheless, Speyer almost came to accomplish those objects from late 1897 to early 1898. Hiring Russian military instructors and Alexiev by Korean government meant to give Russia the right of controling Korean army, finance, and customs. It also did no good to England and Japan.

(4) On the other hand, Russian fleet arrived at Port Arthur after a German fleet occupied Kiaochow Port at the end of 1897. Japanese and English fleet demonstrated against Russian fleet in the sea of East Asia. Tension arouse in East Asia. England and Japan thought Russia might try to advance toward both Manchuria and Korean Peninsular. However, Russia took action to withdraw her military instructors and financial specialists from Korea on March 23,1898. In fact, Russia could not complain of the withdrawal from Korean Peninsular which was secondary purpose, because Russia assured the foothold for the penetration to Manchuria that Russia had been eager for its aquisition.

As a result of it Japan could approach one more step closer to the aim of establishing a Japanese protectorate over Korea. The article of Rosen-Nish Convention proves it. Japan was assured of the superior commercial and technical position in Korea. It was a kind of reorganization of power between them in Korea and a great turning point since Triple Intervention in East Asia.