The purpose of this study is to clarify the nature of knowledge in terms of liberal education, and to investigate the way of justification for pursuit of knowledge. For the purpose this study first examines the Greek notion of liberal educaion, and th...
The purpose of this study is to clarify the nature of knowledge in terms of liberal education, and to investigate the way of justification for pursuit of knowledge. For the purpose this study first examines the Greek notion of liberal educaion, and thereupon seeks for both the wag to assess the value of knowledge and the way to reinterpret the classical liberal education. In this study I assume that the classical notion of liberal education has a conceptual linkage between 'the acquisition of knowledge', 'the development of mind', and 'the good life'. Thus I have paied much attention to the logical relationship between these three concepts. It means that the achievement of knowledge is necessarily the development of the mind in its most basic sense, and that the development of mind is a logical condition of the good life.
The Greeks thought. that liberal educaion was based on what is true, fulfiled the essential need of the mind, and guaranteed the good life as a whole, But it is criticized that the Greek notion involves a metaphysical assumption of the character of the mind and a realistic viewpoint on the nature of knowledge.
P. H. Hirst has succeeded to the Greek notion of liberal education which is characterized by the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. He also maintains that the pursuit of knowledge leads to the development of mind, but in a different way from the Greek idea about it. According to Hirst, the development of mind implies experience structured under some form of conceptual scheme which means the growth of knowledge whithin the forms of knowledge theory. Hirst resticted knowldege to the things grasped by conceptual scheme. As a result of this restriction, he defines the development of mind in a narrow sense.
Both the Greek and the Hirstian ideas of the liberal education are too strictly and narrowly confined the scope of knowledge. Thus the development of mind was defined in a narrow sense accordingly. what is more, in Hirst's reinterpretation of liberal education, the Greek idea that the development of mind guides the good life has also reappeared to be an intellectualist narrow definition of the mind and its function. It should be understood that the character of mind in Aristotle involves two virtues(the intellectual and the moral). In that case, the good life might be understood in a much more broader sense.
The good life can be interpreted by two kinds of approach in relation to Aristotle's intellectual virtue and moral virtue. One is the rationalist approach that follows intellectual virtue; the other is the utiliterian approach that follows moral virtue. Those who take the rationalist approach to the good life pursue the life through contemplation of truth. They think that the good life should be guided by theoretical knowledge. In contrast, those who take the utiliterian approach to the good life pursue the life through practical activities which are to achieve rational and just purposes. In the classical idea of liberal education, the good life has mainly been understood on the rationalist view. But now the good life should be redefined in terms of both the rationist and the utiliterian approaches.
The result of this study can be epitomised by two points. One is that the concept of classical liberal education should be extended: the other is that the value of knowledge should be assessed in terms of its contribution to the good life.
As regards the first point, the scope of knowledge that liberal education defines should be extended: it should involve not only theoretical knowledge, but also practical knowledge.
The concept of 'the development of mind' at which liberal education aims should be redefined. If we examine the concept of 'the development of mind' in terms of Aristotle's two virtues, we would grasp the concept in a fuller sense.
The good life that liberal education pursues should not be restricted to the rationalist approach. The meaning of the good life should not be remained to be interpreted in the pure contemplation of the true: its meaning should be extended into social and practical participation.
Concerning the second point, the value of knowledge should be assessed in terms of the good life. The nature of knowledge can be understood in a fuller sense, if we examine it in the contexts of historical and social life. Therefore, the way to assess the value of knowledge in terms of the good life considers both the development of mind and the practical situations of life. If we acknowledge that we are able to lead the good life through social practices, the value of knowledge should be assessed to the extent that the knowledge can be used in various forms of practice and achieve the goods which are internal to those forms of practice.
If the concept of liberal education is extended, and if it is redefined in terms of the good life, some problems arising in liberal education could be dissolved. These problems are mainly related to the aristocratic notion of liberal education. They are as follows: Firstly, the type of knowledge that liberal education has pursued is characterized by theoretical knowledge not practical knowledge. Secondly, knowledge is regarded as being pursued for its own sake, without consideration of social utilities. And thirdly, the good life that liberal education has pursued is characterized by the contemplation of the truth.
However if liberal education involves practical knowledge, assesses the value of knowledge in terms of its contribution to the good life, and considers the good life in the contexts of both the intellectual virtue and the moral virtue, those problems could be dissolved in a proper way.