Recently, there has been an increased market interest in the stewardship code due to the active shareholder engagement by institutional investors. This year marks the 7th year since the introduction of the stewardship code in the domestic market, and ...
Recently, there has been an increased market interest in the stewardship code due to the active shareholder engagement by institutional investors. This year marks the 7th year since the introduction of the stewardship code in the domestic market, and it is a critical juncture to assess whether the market's expectations for shareholder-oriented behavior have been realized. An empirical analysis was conducted on the effects of institutional investors' stewardship code participation on listed companies from 2010 to 2022, focusing on major shareholders (with a stake of more than 5%). The performance of investee companies was measured by selecting three criteria: corporate value, investment efficiency, and quality of earnings. Two analytical methods were employed in this study: Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), which combines the sample data and applies OLS, and the Fixed Effects Model.
The analysis results revealed that the participation of institutional investors in stewardship code had a positive impact on improving corporate value. It was found that the corporate value of the investee companies, where institutional investors who adopted stewardship code had invested at least once as major shareholders, was higher compared to non-investee companies. In particular, the corporate value of investee companies was found to have improved after institutional investors participated in the stewardship code. Both hypotheses showed a statistically significant positive relationship in both Pooled OLS and fixed-effects models.
Secondly, the effect of improving investment efficiency was observed in companies that had a history of institutional investors who introduced stewardship code as major shareholders. However, only the fixed-effects model showed a statistically significant positive impact. The impact on the quality of earnings was not found to improve either before or after institutional investors' participation in the stewardship code.
The analysis revealed a significant negative moderating effect of institutional ownership on corporate value. When the institutional ownership percentage becomes excessively high, there is a possibility that institutional investors may fall into the "trap of overconfidence" and neglect the importance of considering diverse opinions.
Finally, the effects of institutional investor participation in the stewardship code were further examined by categorizing institutional investors into national pension funds and financial investment companies. The results showed that the national pension fund exhibited a positive relationship with corporate value, while financial investment companies had a negative impact. Additionally, the national pension fund was found to have a statistically significant negative effect on investment efficiency.
This study makes a theoretical contribution by attempting an empirical analysis on listed companies in a situation where there is a lack of empirical analysis on stewardship codes. The study confirms favorable results, indicating the theoretical significance of the findings. The findings of this study are expected to provide insights into diagnosing and improving the legal and sociological issues associated with the adoption of stewardship code based on diverse results.