고구려-수 전쟁의 배경 연구

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This paper aims to analyze historical background of the Koguryo-Sui War and focuses on Koguryo’s policy on Liaoxi and political situation in the region.
In the period between 5th and mid-6th century, Koguryo exerted powerful influence in the east of Mount Yiwulu and Dalinghe river in the Liaoxi region. Sphere of influence in the Liaoxi, however, did not solely belong to Koguryo as other powerful entities such as Northern Dynasties, Ruanruan, or Turks also intersected in the region. The ethnos of Liaoxi was decided by changes in international relations. Koguryo’s sphere of influence in the Liaoxi therefore was by no means fixed, but subject to ongoing changes. Liaoxi was better conceptualized as a border zone between Koguryo and neighboring states.
Koguryo established and organized la, a type of military base, in Liaoxi. La was located in various places along the western part of Liao river, and its function was to patrol and inspect the Liao river as well as to act as a gateway for its Liaoxi policy. At the same time, the region’s various tribes were granted considerable autonomy.
The multi-polar system in East Asia underwent drastic changes from the late 570s. The change was triggered by the Northern Zhou’s occupation of Northern Ch’i and hence the northern China, signaling the beginning of changes in the balance of power. On the other hand, Koguryo was confronting Gaobaoning, which was in conflicts with Northern Zhou with the support of Turks. This effectively created the triangular confrontation between Koguryo, Northern Zhou, and Turk-Gaobaoning. Under this structural confrontation, Koguryo was competing against Gaobaoning over the influence in the Liaoxi region.
The international relations in East Asia experienced another major shift in 580s. The Northern Zhou was replaced by Sui dynasty and Spara Khagan became a king in Turk heightening its tension with Sui. In response, Gaobaoning attacked the Sui’s northern border with the Turks in the 580s. However, Sui staged a powerful counterattack against Turks, which crumbled Gaobaoning group. Sui then advanced into the Liaoxi. Sui’s initial policy was to appease Liaoxi region through its Regional Command Office. It, however, exerted little direct influence in the region until the mid-580s.
At the same time, with an internal division after its defeat by Sui, Turk effectively lost its influence in the Liaoxi region. In the palace of Turk, Khitan emerged while Koguryo also tried to expand its influence.
Sui’s Liaoxi policy began with the creation of Yingzhou Regional Commander Office in the late 580s. The Commander Office tried to expand its influence by winning political favors of the Liaoxi region. The tribes under Koguryo influence began to agitate, and Koguryo sought to simultaneously contain the agitation and launch attacks on the tribes that have turned to Sui. However, Sui’s absorption of Chen and the consequent emergence as the most powerful state in Northeast Asia forced Koguryo to resort to power-balancing strategy rather than direct confrontation.
In 598, the two states faced a possibility of all-out war. In 598 Koguryo attacked the Sui’s Liaoxi region, to which Sui mobilized a large army to counterattack. Then, Koguryo called Mohe’s army. This move aimed to reduce international and domestic political burden of directly confronting Sui, and this was supported by emerging group of elites in the Liaoxi who pursued active foreign policy to secure Koguryo’s pre-mid 6th century sphere of influence.
Sui’s immediate counterattack against Koguryo’s advance into the Liaoxi ultimately failed because of the logistical problem into the Liaoxi region. Despite the failure, Sui’s Guan-Long Clique was formulating a war-plan since the mid-590s on Koguryo in order to seize the trade in Liaoxi and Northeast Asia. This may explain the immediacy of Sui’s counterattack.
The Koguryo’s attack on Liaoxi in 598 targeted the Yingzhou Regional Commander Office. The Office had been successful in expanding its influence into Northwest area, which consequently raised an alarm to Koguryo. Koguryo’s attack to Liaoxi was a response to this expansion and an effort to maintain the balance of power in the region. The Sui’s counterattack failed and the relationship with Koguryo was restored. The Koguryo’s attack appears to have achieved its objectives.
On the surface, the relationship between Koguryo and Sui was largely friendly between 598 and 607. This restoration of the relationship was due to the Sui-Turk war in 598-603, which forced Sui to avoid confrontation with Kogury. Koguryo also was taking a “wait and see” approach. However, Sui established and maintained Zhen and Shu, beginning to advance eastward again after 603-604. The advance was possible at the expense of Koguryo’s loss of influence in the Liaoxi, heightening the sense of crisis in Koguryo. A tension between the two powers began to intensify again.
It has been argued that Sui’s offensive plan on Koguryo was devised after Koguryo’s secret envoy was exposed at Qiminkehan in 607. However, Sui’s offensive plan to neighboring states began in Emperor Yangti’s accession. Koguryo was no exception. Yangti collected basic information on Koguryo prior to 607 through Peiju and recorded them in “Koguryo Tradition”.
Koguryo maintained trade with neighboring nomadic tribes, supplying nomadic products to agricultural societies and vice versa. The two-way trade is termed as agriculture-nomad trade, and the Liaoxi region formed an important part for Koguryo’s agricultural-nomad trade.
Liaoxi region was a composition zone for Eurasia, and a center of agricultural-nomad trade. Since the 5th century in particular, the significance of Liaoxi extended beyond Koguryo and China into nomadic groups in inner Asia and the Silk road route. Since the 5th century, the Liaoxi began to function as a route that connects agricultural societies in China and nomad societies in inner Asia, while Koguryo’s agriculture-nomad trade gradually expanded.
The agriculture-nomad trade between Kogugyo and the Liaoxi tribes was one means to maintain political influence. Moreover, the same trade between Chinese dynasties and nomad tribes was a part of power-balancing foreign policy in the broader context of multipolar East Asian international order in the 5th-6th century. Accordingly, the Koguryo’s agriculture-nomad trade was a part of its Liaoxi policy, and carried important significance in establishing and maintaining its own hegemony in the Northeast Asia.
Yangti’s northern policy had dual purposes–permanent stability in the agriculture-nomad composition zone and acquiring full control in Silk Road-Oasis trade routes. One important outcome of this policy was expansion of East Asian trade route from western borders to Liaoxi region, and from southern China to the northern plains. Sui’s Liaoxi policy must be understood under the context of this northern policy. The offensive plan on Koguryo aimed to take control of trade not only in Liaoxi but also in Northeast Asia.
Yangti’s norther policy and offensive plan on Koguryo intended to reinforce his own imperial power. He wanted to check the elite group and strengthen his relative position, and one way to achieve this was trade and wars. Although Sui’s offensive plan on Koguryo was brought up by the elites in the mid- to late-590s, the plan now carried Yangti’s political purposes. This appears to explain the reason why Yangti continued to press for attacking Koguryo despite a series of difficulties and questions raised after the repeated defeats in the Koguryo-Sui conflicts.
Koguryo responded to Sui’s offensive aspiration through forming military alliances with neighboring states. The most significant of this effort was Koguryo’s attempt to negotiate with east Turks which had traditionally sided with Sui. The decision of East Turks could potentially influence other tribes of the Liaoxi region. Koguryo’s negotiation with Japan and Baekje took place under the similar contexts. Koguryo was trying to prevent Sui’s attempt to form alliance with them, while checking Shilla’s in order to promote stability in the southern borders.
In response to Sui’s move, Koguryo tried to exploit Sui’s logistical weakness by attacking Zhen and Shu. Sui reciprocated by attacking similar military bases such as la. A series of skirmishes around the border-area of Liaoxi looked like a prelude to a full-scale war between Koguryo and Sui. Koguryo however effectively lost military bases in Liaoxi including Muryeo-la in 611, and the war finally broke out with Sui’s army crossing the Liaohe river.
These were preventive measures against the war with Sui and decision-makers of Koguryo’s foreign policy was dominated by king and novels.
Traditional elites were also participating in the war-preparation against Sui. Koguryo’s territorial expansion effectively ceased after the 6th century and its agricultural production began to stagnate, making the trade more important. Koguryo's elites could not afford to sacrifice Liaoxi region, and this explains their commitment to fight Sui. Overall, the Koguryo-Sui war was initiated by Sui’s offensive, but Koguryo’s political decision was a part of the equation.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 서론 1
• 제Ⅰ장. 고구려의 서방 변경지대와 요서지역 9
• 1. 요서지역의 정세와 서방 변경지대 9
• 2. 요하서안의 邏와 요서지역의 제종족 17
• 제Ⅱ장. 6세기 후반 고구려와 요서지역의 정세변화 27
• 1. 고구려의 대외관계와 요서지역의 정세 27
• 1) 고구려와 돌궐․북주의 관계 27
• 2) 고구려와 고보령 세력의 대립 32
• 2. 요서지역의 정세변화와 고구려의 세력확장 39
• 1) 고보령 세력의 몰락과 수의 요서진출 39
• 2) 돌궐의 쇠퇴와 고구려의 세력확장 46
• 3. 수의 영주총관부 설치와 고구려의 견제 51
• 제Ⅲ장. 598년 고구려 요서공격과 수의 반격시도 61
• 1. 고구려의 요서공격과 주도세력 61
• 2. 수의 반격시도와 주도세력 68
• 3. 고구려 요서공격의 배경과 성과 79
• 제Ⅳ장. 고구려－수 갈등의 심화와 변경지대 분쟁 89
• 1. 양국의 관계회복과 그 이면 89
• 2. 수의 전쟁구상과 『고려풍속』의 저술 99
• 3. 고구려의 대외정책과 변경지대 분쟁 105
• 제Ⅴ장. 고구려－수의 요서정책과 전쟁결정 115
• 1. 고구려의 농목교역과 요서정책 115
• 2. 수의 북방정책과 요서정책 129
• 3. 양국의 정국동향과 전쟁결정 138
• 1) 수의 전쟁결정과 양제의 정치적 목적 138
• 2) 고구려의 정국동향과 전쟁결정 144
• 결론 153
• 참고문헌 159
• Abstract 175