The Rise of Class Cleavage
and Party Realignment in South Korea
Lee, Yong Ma
Department of Political Science
The Graduate School
Seoul National University
The South Korean party system since the 1987 democratization has been a system constructed b...
The Rise of Class Cleavage
and Party Realignment in South Korea
Lee, Yong Ma
Department of Political Science
The Graduate School
Seoul National University
The South Korean party system since the 1987 democratization has been a system constructed by ideologically conservative and politically regionalist parties. This party system met with a crisis shortly after its establishment, characterized by a rapid decrease of turnout and an increase of the non-committed. Even in Youngnam and Honam, Chungchong province, three main strongholds of regionalist parties, regionalist voting tendency of the electorates has been weakened.
Two historical events, the 1997 financial crisis and the inter-Korean summit in 2000, resulted in the total change of social cleavage structure in Korea. First, inter-Korean relations have experienced revolutionary change since the 2000 summit and the Korean people started to realize that two Koreas would be able to co-exist through dialogue and cooperation. As a result, anti-communism or anti-North Korea sentiment in South Korea has been diluted gradually. This gives a possibility that Korean society can recover the normal ideological structure balanced by left and right from the abnormal one that has been leaning to the right since the 1950 war.
Furthermore, the deepened economical polarization since the financial crisis resulted in the major change in the existing socio-economical cleavage structure. The new middle class had been growing, as the industrial structure advanced. But the new middle class has shrunk since the financial crisis for the first time since the South Korean capitalism started developing in 1960s. The financial crisis gave an important momentum to the change of class structure.
The formation of working class in South Korea had just begun since the worker’s struggle in 1987. Many trade unions were organized rapidly, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions was legalized in 1997, and Democratic Labor Party was founded in 2000. But everything has changed since the financial crisis. The diision within the labor has been deepening between regular and non-regular workers, between big companies and small companies, and between export companies and domestic industries, etc. As a result, the working class has been facing a serious organizational crisis.
For the same time, the new middle class has been active politically with the growth of civic movements since the 1990s. The civic movements have played a role of setting up progressive agenda. The party reforms that took place after the retirement of ‘Three Kims’ encouraged the political participation of the middle class rather than that of the lower class. As a result, the new middle class with higher education has been active politically.
The financial crisis and the inter-Korean summit, and the change of political and social environments have made the new middle class more politically engaged and more progressive than the working class.
According to my analysis of six national elections since 2002, the new middle class with higher education and higher income has continuously supported parties with progressive agenda. In contrast, the upper class has supported conservative parties. The old middle class and the lower class have vacillated and have not been ideologically consistent. In short, the new class cleavage between the upper class and the new middle class has emerged in the 2000s.
The different voting behavior of the upper and the new middle class is based on their ideology. The new middle class showed the most progressive inclination, while the upper class showed the most conservative inclination, measured by both subjective ideological orientation and the evaluation of specific policies.
But the ideological inclination differed in the area of policy even among the new middle class. On the political issue of policy concerning the relations between the two Koreas, the new middle class was very progressive, while it was conservative on the issue of economy. This shows that “development ideology” formed during the Park Chung Hee government has continued to be dominant.
The class cleavage came out most clearly substituting the previous regional cleavage in the elections in which the main issue was political. However, The class cleavage was weakened and the regional cleavage was stronger in the elections in which the main issue was economical. The party-electorate alignment between the politically progressive group and the new middle class has not taken a root and swayed according to election issues. This is characteristic of an initial stage of party realignment, which means Korean political party system has entered into a secular realignment.