北韓의 '攻擊優位 神話'와 先軍政治 : 脫冷戰期 軍備態勢와 軍事戰略에 관한 理論的 硏究

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The key question that led to this study is, why has North Korea maintained, strengthened, and demonstrated an offensive military posture and strategy for two decades in the post-Cold War era that were never beneficial to its own security and economic recovery. To find a fundamental answer to this question, this study borrowed concepts and logics from one of the latest theories in the international politics, the offense-defense balance theory, and raised three different questions which are expected to be instrumental in search of a conclusion.
The first question is what practical changes have been made in the contents and characteristics of North Korea's military posture and strategy in the post-Cold War era. This study found that, for the past two decades, North Korea has established a permanent wartime preparation system by integrating a wartime and a peace time military command control into a single unified system. At the same time, North Korea has not only maintained and increased massive conventional forces and weapons, but also bolstered its forward deployment for preemptive strikes and special warfare capability required for rear infiltrations, steadily building up the offensive. Overcoming various difficulties, North Korea particularly focused on rapidly reinforcing its WMD capability. Its nuclear program is currently on the verge of weaponization after conducting two nuclear tests, while the missile program has reached the level of setting up threatful multiple-range systems. Based on such offensive military posture, North Korea also continued to build up the offensive of its military strategy.
The second question is whether such military posture and strategy of North Korea are likely to be successful when it comes to a real war situation. In order to find an answer to this question, this study evaluated the offense-defense balance between South and North Koreas. It turned out that there was little chance for the North's military posture and strategy to succeed in an actual war, because the strategic condition, or the offense-defense balance, on the Korean Peninsula in the post-Cold War era is assessed to be in the state of strong defense dominance. The pattern of war that had depended heavily on physical superiority in the past changed to a war dominated by the state-of-the-art military capacity, allowing the South Korean military to be equipped with a strong early warning system and a defensive military posture on the basis of its robust economic power and quality military forces. In particular, the decline of socialism replaced by the South Korean people's growing confidence on liberal democracy has left less room for North Korea's so-called "Juche tactics" to maneuver. Unlike the Cold War era, neighboring countries tend to place their highest strategic interests on maintaining the status quo. The fact that North Korea still maintains and strengthens its offensive military posture and strategy nevertheless suggests that the perception and judgement of the North Korean leadership is affected by a wrong belief and a bias that a military offensive will either be beneficial or bring about a victory in war, in other words, the "myth of the offensive".
The last question is how the formation and causes of the "myth of the offensive" can be explained. This study has attempted to search various explanations by employing three different approaches.
Firstly, the realist explanations, which set the focus of analysis to the international system, account for North Korea's military offensive as its rational choice. However, a close look into the outcomes of the North's military offensive over the past two decades reveals how detrimental it was to the regime that it entailed huge costs. The effectiveness of the offensive deterrent was unclear, and it rather triggered a stronger military response by South Korea, the US and Japan as well as a creation of an international encircling net. The diplomatic coercion was also far from profitable. Although North Korea was able to gain "small benefits" such as bilateral dialogue with the US and food aid, its increased power to pose military threats paradoxically resulted in more preconditions to improve relations with the US, leaving North Korea with a fairly long distance to go to reach the goal of normalizing US-North Korea ties. Disadvantages accumulated and its national image tainted following the economic sanctions imposed on North Korea, which aggravated conditions for its economic recovery. Here lies the limit of realist explanations.
Secondly, the cognitive explanations account for North Korea's maintaining and strengthening of military offensive in the post-Cold War era as a choice based on a unique belief of its decision-makers. The socialistic revolutionary war perspective and the direct and indirect experiences of war by North Korea are said to have shaped a strategic belief of the decision-makers, which in turn influenced the regime's decision. However, such explanations were not persuasive enough to identify the fundamental causes. The socialistic revolutionary war perspective does not necessarily end up with an offensive strategic choice. It can also be said that North Korea's formative experience, which had been manipulated and transformed, was used as a means to justify and rationalize the strategy that had already been chosen for other reasons.
So the key to finding an answer to the third question lies in the domestic politics of North Korea. In an attempt to making domestic politics explanations, this study takes into consideration North Korea's unique monolithic system centered on its supreme leader and applies three-tier power theory in which the political power is stabilized in the order of coercion (first tier), institution (second tier) and ideology (third tier), thereby focusing on the correlation between the process of Kim Jong-il's stabilization of power and the expansion of the offensive.
It was from 1989 to 1994 that North Korea laid the foundation for a military-centered system. As Kim Jong-il keenly felt the importance of military as a stronghold to defend the regime from internal and external crisis following the end of the Cold War, he believed that capturing the mind of the military by giving material shape to the image of "General" would work to the interests of his establishing a stable power base. Protecting the military's vested interests and reinforcing the offensive were thought to be the way to go, so Kim Jong-il granted all sorts of privileges to promote the sense of honor and pride among the military, and went as far as declaring a quasi-state of war and withdrawing from the NPT. In doing so, Kim Jong-il tried to set an image of a powerful supreme military (field) commander by exercising tough and offensive military order.
From 1995 to 1998, facing political and economic crisis caused by the death of Kim Il-sung and the natural disaster that followed, North Korea sought to overcome the crisis situation by rallying the military behind the supreme commander standing in the frontline. The huge famine turned into an imaginary "quasi-state of war" triggered by the imperialistic hostile scheme, while all the authorities were concentrated to the Supreme Commander and his Command Headquarters, giving justification to Kim Jong-il's exercise of power. At a time when the military's role was critical, costs to sustain the military capability including a tremendous defense expenditure were considered inevitable. The times of domestic and international stability that came with the signing of the Agreed Framework was thought as a period for North Korea to make "covert preparations" for "a war likely to break out in the future", such as pursuing an uranium enrichment program (UEP) and conducting high-explosive tests for nuclear development as well as manufacturing long-range missiles.
Since 1998, Kim Jong-il has consolidated the military-centered system by institutionalizing the existing system centered on the Supreme Commander to a system led by the National Defense Commission. The National Defense Commission, that had been upgraded to the state's supreme organization as well as policy consultation and decision-making body, consisted of military commanders and key party members in charge of munitions. Deeply involved in not only military affairs but major domestic and foreign affairs as well, the Commission played a pivotal role in running the regime. This means that a system is in place where key national policies are interpreted and decided from a military point of view. On the surface, North Koreans appeared to be responsive to the progress made in the inter-Korean relationship, but beneath the surface, they were continuously pursuing UEP and developing a variety of missiles. When the US and the international community called for transparency in their nuclear and missile programs, they rather reacted in an offensive manner with long-range missile launches and nuclear tests. They even boldly carried out armed provocations of different scale in the west sea. The economic management improvement measures implemented in 2002 totally failed to consider any means of demilitarization which are critical to the success of an economic reform.
This said, North Korea's maintaining and strengthening of the military offensive in the post-Cold War era is basically attributable to Kim Jong-il's intention to operate and institutionalize a military-centered system. It was natural in a military-centered system that a narrow and short-termed military perspective prevailed over long-term benefits brought about by a stable foreign relations and economic reform. Therefore, this has led North Korea to maintain and reinforce the offensive, instead of reducing the weight placed on the military sector and relieving the offensiveness. The military offensive incurred disadvantages on the one hand, but on the other hand, it provided a favorable condition for the regime to consolidate internal solidarity and justify the military-centered system by keeping the state of crisis on a daily basis. This shows that maintaining and strengthening of the military offensive was not only a product of the military-centered system, but also an effective tool to establish such system.
In the meantime, the military-first politics and ideology, that had been officially proclaimed in late 1990s, were a powerful ideological mechanism to justify the military-centered system. Furthermore, the military-first politics and ideology reinterpreted the post-Cold War era as a history of victory, and were a political method and idea which gave birth to the belief and conviction that a victory could only be achieved in an offensive manner based on strong military forces and offensive means. In this respect, the military-first politics and ideology served not only as a mechanism to rationalize North Korea's military offensive, but also in fact as the "myth of the offensive" that encouraged the offensive with embellished discourse. The permanent state of crisis and priority given to the military perspective were justified by this ideology. An offensive response was considered the only alternative that could ultimately bring about a victory. The uncertain effect of deterrent and "small benefits" gained from negotiations were exaggerated, while self-encirclement resulting from the offensive and enormous security and economic disadvantages were disregarded. North Korea ideologically ruled out a "normal" political option which was about seeking economic development by easing the offensiveness and reducing the gravity of the military sector. What it means to be ideologically ruled out is that the general populace of North Korea, to say nothing of its leadership, failed to recognize the disadvantages caused by their offensiveness and redefined their interests from an offensive military point of view. Both the leadership and the populace became slaves to the "myth of the offensive."
In conclusion, the fundamental reason behind North Korea's maintaining and strengthening of the military offensive in the post-Cold War era was the military-first politics and ideology that virtually served as the "myth of the offensive" which encouraged the offensive and justified the North's operation and institutionalization of the military-centered system.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 연구의 핵심적 문제의식은 북한은 왜 탈냉전기 자신의 안보와 경제에 자해적인 공격적 군비태세와 군사전략을 유지·강화·발현해왔는가이다. 이에 연구자는 국제정치학의 최근 이론중 하나인 공격-방어 균형이론(offense-defense balance theory)의 분산된 논의를 통합, ‘공격우위 신화 검출 및 분석모델’을 구축·적용하여 보다 근원적인 해답을 구하고자 하였다.
지난 20년간 북한은 전·평시 군사지휘체계 일원화, 대규모 재래식 병력·장비의 유지·강화 및 전진배치, 특수전 및 핵·미사일 전력의 급속한 증강 등 공격성을 증대시켜 왔으며, 이에 기반하여 군사전략의 공격성 역시 배가시켜왔다. 그러나 남북한 공격-방어 균형평가를 수행한 결과, 북한의 군비태세와 군사전략은 성공할 가능성이 없었다. 이는 탈냉전기 한반도 전략조건이 강한 방어우위(defense dominance) 상태에 있는 것으로 평가되기 때문이었다. 그럼에도 북한이 군사적 공격성을 유지·강화하고 있다는 것은 북한내에 그것이 유리하다거나 승전을 가져올 수 있다는 잘못된 믿음과 편향, 즉 ‘공격우위의 신화’(the myth of the offensive)가 존재하고 있음을 의미한다.
이같은 ‘공격우위 신화’의 형성과 작동 원인은 국제체제 수준에 초점을 맞춘 현실주의적 설명이나, 정책결정자의 신념체계에 주목하는 인지적 설명으로는 부족함이 있었다. 북한의 군사적 공격성은 이득보다는 엄청난 안보·경제적 비용과 대가를 수반했고, 특유의 신념을 만들어내는 형성적 경험도 조작·변형되어 이미 선택된 전략을 사후 합리화하는 수단으로 활용되었기 때문이었다. 결국 ‘공격우위 신화’의 형성과 작동 원인은 북한의 국내정치에 있었다.
본 연구는 국내정치적 설명을 시도함에 있어 정치체제의 보편성 및 북한의 유일체제적 특수성을 감안, 정치권력은 강제력(무력)→제도→이념 순으로 안정화된다는 3차원적 권력이론을 적용하였다. 그 결과, 북한의 군사적 공격성 유지·강화는 일차적으로 김정일의 군 중시 체제 운영 및 제도화 노력에 원인이 있었다. 탈냉전기 대내외적 위기상황 속에서 김정일은 군을 전면에 내세워 자신의 권력을 안정화시키고자 했으며, 이같은 노력은 최고사령관 중심의 체제 운영방식에서 국방위원회 체제로 점차 제도화되어 갔다. 군 중시 체제에서는 대외관계 안정과 경제개혁이 주는 장기적 이익보다는 협애하고 근시안적인 군사적 관점이 우선적으로 고려되었고, 이는 자연히 군사적 공격성의 유지·강화로 귀결되었다. 군사적 공격성은 불이익도 초래했지만, 위기를 상시화 함으로써 내적 결속을 다지고 김정일의 통치 및 군 중시 체제를 정당화하는데 유리한 조건을 제공하는 것이기도 했다.
이와 함께 군 중시 체제운영과 제도를 합리화하기 위해 90년대 후반 공식화한 선군정치·사상은 탈냉전 시기를 승리의 역사로 재해석하며, 강력한 군사력을 기반으로 반드시 공격적으로 나가야만 승리를 전취할 수 있다는 믿음과 확신을 추동하는 정치방식이자 이념이었다. 이러한 의미에서 선군정치·사상은 지난 20년간 북한의 군사적 공격성을 합리화하고, 그같은 공격성을 조장하는 언술로 분식(粉飾)된 사실상의 ‘공격우위 신화’였다. 군사적 관점의 우선적 고려는 이에 의해 정당화되었다. 공격적 대응은 위기를 타개하고 승리를 가져올 수 있는 유일한 대안으로 간주되었다. 불분명한 억지효과와 협상에서 얻은 ‘작은 이득’은 과장되었고, 공격성으로 초래된 자기포위와 막대한 안보·경제적 불이익은 무시되었다. 공격성을 완화하여 군사부문의 비중을 줄이고 경제발전을 기하는 지극히 정상적인 정책대안은 이념적으로 배제되었다. 이는 자신들의 공격성으로 인한 불이익을 인식하지 못하고 군사적·공격적 관점에서 스스로의 이해관계를 재정의함을 의미한다. 북한 지도부, 주민들 모두는 이제 ‘공격우위 신화’의 포로가 되어버린 것이다.
결론적으로, 탈냉전기 지속된 북한의 군사적 공격성의 유지·강화·발현은 군 중시 체제 운영과 제도화, 그리고 이를 정당화하기 위해 창출한 ‘공격우위 신화’인 선군정치·사상에 북한 스스로 포획되었기 때문이었다.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 제1장 서 론 1
• 제1절 문제 제기 1
• 제2절 기존 연구검토 8
• 제3절 이론 및 방법론 14
• 1. 안보딜레마와 국제정치이론 14
• 2. 공격-방어 균형이론의 논리와 내용 17
• 3. '공격우위 신화'의 형성과 작동 25
• 4. 연구방법과 분석틀 31
• 5. 연구자료 37
• 제4절 논문의 주장과 구성 40
• 제2장 탈냉전기 북한의 군비태세와 군사전략 42
• 제1절 탈냉전기 북한의 군비태세 변화 42
• 1. 군사지휘체계 : 戰時체제의 일상화와 지휘계선의 축소 42
• 2. 재래식 전력 : 공격성의 유지와 강화 50
• 1) 지상군 : 병력·야포(장사정포)·특수전부대 중심의 증강 51
• 2) 해군 및 공군 : 수중·상륙전력 증대, 공중침투능력 강화 63
• 3) 예비전력 : 동원인원의 확대와 지휘체계의 일원화 67
• 3. 대량살상무기(WMD) 전력 : 핵·미사일 능력 증대와 공격성의 강화 71
• 1) 핵·미사일 전력 : 핵무기 보유 기정사실화와 多射程 미사일체제 구축 72
• 2) 화학 및 생물학 전력 : 통상적인 재래식 전력화 84
• 제2절 탈냉전기 북한의 군사전략 변화 91
• 1. 대남정책의 변화 징후와 군사전략의 공격성 유지 91
• 2. 군사전략 개념의 발전 : 배합·선제기습·속전속결의 3대 전략 98
• 3. 군사전략의 내용 : 단계별 작전 시나리오의 구성 107
• 1) 냉전기 공격작전 시나리오 108
• 2) 탈냉전기 공격작전 시나리오의 재구성 115
• 제3절 대량살상무기(WMD) 활용전략 123
• 1. WMD 활용효과와 군사전략의 성격 123
• 2. 화생무기 및 핵무기 활용전략 125
• 제3장 남북한 공격-방어 균형과 ‘공격우위 신화’의 존재 132
• 제1절 공격-방어 균형 평가를 위한 몇 가지 전제 133
• 제2절 남북한 공격-방어 균형의 측정 138
• 1. 지형과 전력규모(집중도) 138
• 2. 전쟁양상과 군사기술적 변수 145
• 1) 전선돌파전 145
• 2) 해상 및 공중전 156
• 3) 특수전부대에 의한 전·후방 비정규전 163
• 4) 화생전 및 핵전 166
• 3. 국내 정치·사회의 안정성 173
• 4. 국제정치적 요소 177
• 제3절 객관적 조건-인식수준의 부조화와 ‘공격우위 신화’의 존재 180
• 제4장 ‘공격우위 신화’의 형성과 작동 187
• 제1절 현실주의적 설명 : 공세적 억지와 강제의 추구 189
• 1. 억지와 강제를 위한 합리적 선택 189
• 1) 탈냉전기 북한의 안보와 경제의 위기 190
• 2) 공세적 억지의 추구 196
• 3) 외교적 강제의 추구 199
• 2. 자기포위의 유발과 비용의 초과 203
• 1) 억지효과의 불분명성과 한·미·일의 군사적 대응 203
• 2) 국제사회의 포위망 형성 216
• 3) 미·북 관계개선 및 경제회생 노력의 좌절 220
• 제2절 인지적 설명 : 혁명 전쟁관과 형성적 경험의 영향 229
• 1. 정책결정자의 전략적 신념에 의한 선택 229
• 1) 사회주의 혁명 전쟁관 231
• 2) 형성적 경험과 공격우위의 전략적 신념 233
• 2. 혁명전쟁관의 불확정성과 형성적 경험의 정치적 조작 236
• 제3절 국내정치적 설명 : 군 중시 체제의 확립과 선군정치 247
• 1. 탈냉전 초기 내부위기와 김정일의 軍權 승계 249
• 1) 이념 및 당의 위기징후와 군의 중요성 부각 249
• 2) 김정일의 軍權 승계과정과 對軍 통제력 257
• 3) 김정일의 군 지도자상 구축과 공격성의 유지·강화 261
• 2. 김정일의 군 중시 체제 운영과 제도화 269
• 1) 최고사령관 중심의 군 중시 체제운영 269
• 2) 국방위원회 체제 확립과 공격성의 유지·강화 277
• 3. 선군정치 이념의 체계화와 ‘공격우위 신화’의 창출 290
• 1) 군 중시 체제의 이념적 정당화 290
• 2) ‘공격우위 신화’의 창출과 작동 298
• 제5장 결 론 307
• 제1절 ‘공격우위의 신화’와 선군정치 307
• 제2절 공격-방어 균형이론과 북한 사례 316
• < 참고문헌 > 322
• 국문요약 352