North Korea has undergone profound changes since economic crisis of 1990’s. For the better understanding of the past and the future of the North, the changes of economic base, social structure and political cleavages have to be analyzed comprehensiv...
North Korea has undergone profound changes since economic crisis of 1990’s. For the better understanding of the past and the future of the North, the changes of economic base, social structure and political cleavages have to be analyzed comprehensively. In this regard, this article focusing on the flow of economic surplus analyzes the changes of the sources and appropriation mechanism of economic surplus, economic actors’ adaptive activities and the social results, and cleavages and conflicts of the state class, the ruling class of the North.
In chapter 2, the dynamics of the state class rule in state socialist societies is analyzed. It includes the analysis of the specific features, surplus appropriation mechanism, and interest conflicts of the state class. Soviet-type society is considered to be the proto-type of state socialist societies because almost all state socialist societies established a precedent of Soviet experiences and if necessary, People's republic of China and the other past socialist societies are reviewed as comparable cases.
In chapter 3, the surplus appropriation mechanism based on the economic planning and the composition and the recruitment of the state class of North Korea is analyzed. It is a preliminary analysis which establishes standards referred to the changes since the economic crisis of 1990’s.
In chapter 4, the intensity and consequence of the economic crisis of 1990’s and the combination of the bureaucratic and market coordination mechanism since the economic reform policy implemented on July 1. 2002 are examined. The mechanism of formal economic management system which the state class absorbs economic surplus from private economic sector-i.e. market related economic sector-is also explored through the analysis of the financial system of government and enterprises. It explains the dependency of the state class on the market related sector.
In chapter 5, the changing social structure which is caused by economic changes, especially the coexistence of the planning and market system is analyzed. In this regard, Private economic activities of bureaucrats, workers, peasants, and intellectuals and the consequent income differentiation among them are examined. This analysis provides an insight into the social basis of the cleavages of the state class, especially the reformist counter elite.
In chapter 6, the sources of economic surplus which major factions of the state class possess are analyzed and the vertical and horizontal cleavages of the state class are explored. For this purpose the fragmented structure of North Korean economy including formal planning sector of government, market related sector of government and people, and the privileged sector of power elite is also collectively examined. Consequently a confrontation between the reformist counter elites, such as economic technocrats of government and the strategic clique, such as power elite of the party, the secret service, the machinery of law, and military becomes clear.
Based on the above analyses, this article concludes that a coalition for the economic reform making use of market economy between the middle and lower level bureaucrats and the people is forming. And being weak, the reformist counter elites in the upper level of state class also exist in the North. In this regard, the economic reform policy implemented on July 1. 2002 was a compromise between the reformist counter elites and the strategic clique who admitted the deepened economic shortage. Facing reform pressure from the economic technocrats and the people, the dominant strategic clique partially liberated market related economic activities. But they have concentrated scarce resources into their privileged sector, especially the defence industry for the maintenance of their privileges and integration.
As long as the strategic clique keep a solid integration through their privileged absorption of economic surplus, the North may muddle through without further economic reform. And if implemented, the reform may be withdrawn. The recent reinforcement of control over the market related economic activities tells this tendency. But the status of power among competing factions is variable. In addition to the possibility of continuous growth of market related economic sector, which faction controls the economic surplus and how to manage the social and political tension are the major factors which affect the change of dominant faction. Global agents also play an important role. Therefore any steps to increase the contacts with economic technocrats of the North and strengthen the global dominance over North Korean economy have to be taken more actively to enhance the power base of the reformist in the North.
Key words : State Class, Social Structure, Fragmented Economy, Cleavages, Factional Conflicts, Counter Elite, Strategic Clique