시리아 아사드 정권의 대레바논 정책 연구 : 구성주의적 시작에서 본 시리아의 국가정체성을 중심으로 = (A) study on the Syria's foreign policy toward the Lebanon under the Asad's regime

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This paper is a case study analyzing Syria's foreign policy towards Lebanon through a perspective of constructivism. The range of this study is from 1976, when Syria started militarily intervening on Lebanon, to the complete withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005. The existing studies on the foreign policies of Arab countries focused on the international aspects rather than local, and most of them emphasized the conflicts between Israel and Arab. Some studies recognized the significance of cultural aspects such as particularity and historical experience of Arab culture, but there were few studies that used those aspects as a persuasive variable on theoretical level.
By approaching Syria's foreign policy towards Lebanon through a perspective of constructivism, cultural and historical aspects including national identity, which were once considered to be particular or exceptional, now are assumed as the variables of policy decision. Constructivism pays much attention to the identity of cultural aspect including actor, and the interactions between the nations. Also, it raises questions to the rational explanation that actors such as nations or policy makers have similar preferences as well as considering the identity of actors and the profits of actors to be various and changeable.
This study critically accepts such arguments of constructivism and acknowledges the effects of material variables as well as setting limitations on the applicable range of national identity variable. Therefore, the study was carried out under the assumption that the Syria's foreign policy towards Lebanon follows national identity and national interests, but the detailed proceedings of the policies are decided depending on the interactions with the surrounding.
First, Syria is where Arab Nationalism movement began and through this historical experience of escaping from the French colonialism, Syria adopted an identity of Arab Nationalism. This identity functioned as a cause for the Syrian public to unify during the time when Syria was the only nation that did not possess a uniform identity after independence and also became the ideology of dominative regulation as the Baath party centralized the power.
However, the identity of Arab Nationalism, which holds Islam as its potential central point, was not accepted by all the groups of multi-originated Syrian culture. After a minor group, Alawites, came to power, Syrianism, which emphasizes the identity of 'Syria' rather than Arab Nationalism, gathered attention as the national identity. The reasons for this were the decline of Pan-Arabism in the Arab world and the collapse of socialism caused by the economic policies of revisionism by the Asad regime.
Of course, there still were vestiges of Arab nationalism identity, but the national benefits that the foreign policies of the Asad regime sought for were safety from Israel and supremacy of Syria, both of which were sought by Syrianism. The necessary policy goal to achieve such benefits was to hold sway over Lebanon, which is not only a geographically important place for safety of Greater Syria but also a nation that was considered a brother country by the Syrian public. The environment for policy decision was proper for military intervention policies when the Asad regime first had military intervention on Lebanon to alleviate its civil war in 1976. Soviet Union supported Syria politically, economically, and militarily which allowed Syria to have an adequate military force, and to steadily improve its industrialization under revisionism. In this way, the Asad regime was able to dominate Lebanon militarily and keep safety by withdrawing Israeli troops.
However as the Cold War started to see its end, material situations of Syria began to greatly change and the policy goal was adjusted accordingly. First, as a result of the military intervention of Syria, which gave it domination over the Lebanon's military, it became meaningless to place further troops. Second, there was a possibility for Syria to be condemned by the world for having direct military intervention on Lebanon because at the time Syria was isolated from the Western cultures including the US.
Due to such limitations of material environment, the policy goal of Syria changed to 'establish political and economical Syrian Order.' In other words, it meant that Syria would seek for economic profits through active trade with Lebanon and a stable government in Lebanon favoring of Syria. As a result of this, Syria was able to gain a basis for having interventions of domestic affairs in Lebanon beginning with Ta'if Agreement in 1989. Later on, Syria firmly established Syrian Order in Lebanon through various political means during the 1990s.
The reason that the Asad regime was able to maintain the powerful dictatorship while the policies of Syria towards Lebanon was being adjusted was because it had established the unified national identity of Syria and managed to succeed in bringing the nation together by appropriately using the public's perception towards Lebanon and by handling the threats from Israel. Therefore it is safe to say that the policy goal of Syria, which was military security and economic profits, had secondary purpose to keep the Asad regime stable.
By approaching the foreign polices of Arab countries through a perspective of constructivism, this study found out that Syria's foreign policy towards Lebanon, contradictory on the surface, had a regular continuity and a pattern of changes.
Syria's foreign policy towards Lebanon for the future can be predicted with the result of this study. As long as there are not any radical changes on material situation, the national identity of Syria and the perception towards Lebanon will not be different. Moreover, Syria already has justified their interventions on Lebanon's domestic affairs by having international agreement with Lebanon, and security problem with Israel has not been solved yet. Therefore Syria is very unlikely to give up on the political and the economic profits in Lebanon, and intervention policy towards Lebanon will continue.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 목 차
• 제 1장 서 론
• 제 1절 문제제기와 연구목적
• 제 2절 연구범위와 연구내용
• 제 3절 기존연구 검토와 연구방법
• 제 2장 시리아의 대레바논 정책에 분석의 이론적 배경
• 제 1절 외교정책 결정요인에 관한 이론적 검토
• 1. 외교정책과 국가이익
• 2. 시리아의 외교정책 분석에 관한 기존 이론의 적실성
• 제 2절 시리아의 대레바논 정책에 대한 구성주의적 분석틀
• 1. 시리아의 외교정책에 대한 구성주의적 접근
• 2. 시리아의 대레바논 정책 분석틀
• 제 3장 시리아의 대레바논 정책 결정 환경
• 제 1절 시리아의 대레바논 정책과 국내 환경
• 1. 시리아의 문화적 환경과 국가정체성
• (1) 시리아의 역사적 경험과 아랍민족주의
• (2) 시리아의 사회구조와 시리아주의
• 2. 시리아의 정책결정구조
• (1) 정치 엘리트와 이익집단
• (2) 아사드의 리더십
• 제 2절 시리아의 대레바논 정책과 국제 환경
• 1. 시리아와 레반트 지역 정치 환경
• (1) 大시리아(Greater Syria) 개념의 함의
• (2) 시리아와 레바논의 역사적 관계
• 2. 시리아와 국제정치질서
• (1) 아랍민족주의와 중동정치질서
• (2) 국제정치환경과 시리아의 안보
• 제 4장 시리아의 국가정체성과 대레바논 정책
• 제 1절 시리아의 국가정체성 변화와 국가이익
• 1. 아랍민족주의와 시리아주의
• (1) 시리아 사회구조의 변화와 국민정체성
• (2) 국제환경의 변화와 국가정체성
• 2. 시리아 국가이익과 정책목표
• (1) 레반트 지역에서의 시리아 패권주의 정책
• (2) 시리아의 대이스라엘 안보전략
• 제 2절 아사드 정권의 대레바논 군사정책
• 1. 레바논 내전과 시리아의 군사개입
• (1) 1975년 레바논 내전과 시리아
• (2) 1982년 레바논 전쟁과 시리아
• 2. 시리아와 레바논의 이슬람 무장세력
• (1) 레바논의 이슬람 무장세력과 대이스라엘 안보
• (2) 헤즈볼라와 시리아의 관계
• 제 5장 시리아의 정책결정환경 변화와 대레바논 정책 변화
• 제 1절 정책결정환경의 변화와 정책목표
• 1. 정책결정환경의 변화와 국가이익
• (1) 정책결정의 국제 환경 변화
• (2) 정책결정의 국내 환경 변화
• 2. 시리아의 대레바논 정책목표의 전환
• (1) 레바논의 정치안정과 대이스라엘 안보
• (2) 아사드 정권의 실용주의 정책
• 제 2절 아사드 정권의 대레바논 간섭정책
• 1. 레바논 내정간섭의 합법화와 선거개입
• (1) 국제조약과 시리아의 레바논 내정간섭 합법화
• (2) 친시리아 레바논 정권 수립과 선거개입
• 2. 시리아의 사회·경제적 영향력 확대
• (1) 대중매체 장악과 레바논의 시리아화
• (2) 시리아-레바논 간의 경제적 함수관계
• 제 6장 결 론
• 참고문헌
• Abstract