This study aims to examine various integral forms in contemporary moral education. In particular, there are two main concepts in regard to those forms. One is justice ethics, in which Lawrence Kohlberg is one of its representatives. The other is care ...
This study aims to examine various integral forms in contemporary moral education. In particular, there are two main concepts in regard to those forms. One is justice ethics, in which Lawrence Kohlberg is one of its representatives. The other is care ethics supported by Carol Gilligan. Concerning a tension between justice and care, it has been argued that justice and care can be complemented in making ethical decisions and actions. That has been known as an integrative view of justice ethics and care ethics. According to that point, moral beings keeping their concerns for others' happiness are to make moral choices. In that course, their rational and thoughtful judgments are formed by whether actions are in accordance with certain universal moral principles such as justice. Therefore, this study focused on the integral view of justice and care will go further to consider important implications of moral education in Korea as follows:
In chapter 2, there will be the explanation and characteristic of justice ethics, the aspect of moral education in L. Kohlberg, and the criticism of justice ethics in moral education. In chapter 3, through moral education in C. Gilligan and in Nel Noddings, the aspect of care ethics will be argued. In chapter 4, I will be in favour of the necessity of the integrative view of justice ethics and care ethics, and give it a new perspective on moral education in Korea. As conclusion, in chapter 5, I will consider its possible boundaries in practice.
Firstly, in L. Kohlberg, the highest degree of morality is justice. According to him, women had preferred care and love to justice, so that they tend to have lower morality than men who had deeply regarded justice. But His argument cannot be the strongest standard of a judgment that women are inferior to men. That is, the difference between them may be made by natural ability, or social position, or education. In that fashion, moral education based on justice has inevitably produced mechanical judgments and relations in human actions. Therefore, justice is not the only source of moral principle.
Secondly, N. Noddings points out human sensibility, such as care and love, as an alternative to the application of moral principles to actions and judgments. For care in itself has the dynamical meaning of living and the practical importance of human life. In that sense, the kind of such care is able to cure the hard, mechanical, and strict aspects of moral education in support of justice ethics. However, care ethics tends to take one side in morality, that is, human affection. Therefore, it can be chiefly seated among various arguments of moral education how justice ethics and care ethics should be understood in moral education.
Thirdly, so far as an integral point of justice ethics and care ethics is concerned, it must have a good and practical example in moral education. But, in Korea, the purpose of moral education has been for justice in the context of abstract moral principles and rules. Even though morality consists of care and justice, it is not too much to say that morality of care has been eliminated in Koran moral education. That is to say, one of serious problems is that its integral direction is only on justice toward three educational processes of recognition, affection, and action. However, it does not mean that care ethics must take a higher place for moral education than justice ethics. That is because both ethics should supplement each other through their own advantages. For example, if the goal of moral education is biased to one of them, no moral agent would be perfect. Therefore, the ends, the contents, and the circumstances of moral education should be considered in both ethics.
In conclusion, it can be said that the object of an integrative moral education should at least include the element of justice as well as that of care and tolerance. Basically, the former is concerned with evils, its prevention and punishment; but the latter with forgiveness. That is, to take both elements at once is the shortest way of a just but prudent society. Therefore, an integrative model of justice ethics and care ethics in moral education should be made for the foundation of ideal moral education.