The main purpose of this thesis is to explore Richard Rorty's neopragmatic view of language which is the source of his antifoundationalism, and show that his linguistic view cannot function successfully as a basis for fulfilling his alternative functi...
The main purpose of this thesis is to explore Richard Rorty's neopragmatic view of language which is the source of his antifoundationalism, and show that his linguistic view cannot function successfully as a basis for fulfilling his alternative function of philosophy, literary criticism. In the background of this investigation lie the heated debates about rationality between modern rationalists and deconstuctivists. I seek to reconcile these two opposing views by scrutinizing the question of whether or not Rorty's view of language can achieve the goals of literary criticism.
To do this I first investigate how Rorty arrived at his neopragmatism which rejects Cartesian epistemology as a philosophical illusion. According to Rorty, modern epistemology invented the notion of mind as the mirror of external reality. He claims to discard the very notion of "representation" which lies at the heart of epistemology, and offers antifoundationalism which denies any foundation in our knowledge. Rorty's alternative form of philosophy, neopragmatism argues that truth is a matter of practical usefulness, not of representation.
Rorty's view of language can be characterized by the following three theses: ubiquity, holism, and contingency. First, ubiquity of language means that all of our experience can be interpreted only by means of language, whence linguistic all the way. Second, linguistic holism claims that the meaning of a word can be determined only within the context in which it is used. Third, contingency of language explains that language can mean something only as a product of historical chance.
By emphasizing the hermeneutic, holistic, and contingent aspects of language Rorty goes on to emancipating us from the authoritarian forces that seek after the truth or reality. Rroty suggests that this task can be achieved by literary criticism which includes not only constructive criticism of our society, but also creative redescription of texts. He regards literary criticism as the driving force which makes possible both the individual self-creation in private sphere and the development of our society in public sphere.
Rorty's neopragmatic view of language, however, may not account for how language could be properly constrained in a practical context. This is the point where Rorty's view has been criticized for being relativistic by Hillary Putnam and Jürgen Habermas. They point out that Rorty's view offer neither any constraints on language use nor any proper means to reconciliate social conflicts. That is, Rorty's position cannot put a stop to the slide into nihilistic relativism.
Newly emerging experientialism, while incorporating recent empirical findings concerning concept and meaning, particularly form cognitive science, seems to provide another constraint on language use. Experientialism seems to offer a more adequate account of human experience, thus properly locating the constraints on our language extension. According to experientialism, all of our experience is embodied and, thus the meaning of language is grounded and, at the same time, constrained by the bodily level of experience. This way, the experientialist point of view seems to provide a clue to solve Rorty's key problem.