임금구조와 성과급 제도가 기업가치 요소에 미치는 영향 = The Effects of Wage Structure and Performance-based Compensation on the Components of Firm Value

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study empirically investigates the effects of incentive systems on the firm value and in particular the components of firm value. The two types of incentive systems analyzed in this study are (i) Age/Wage structure which pays compensation higher than the industry average in employees` early periods, and lower compensation in employees` later periods, and (ii) the performance-based compensation system. The analysis using 20-years` of actual employees-wage data of Korean firms shows that both the Age/Wage structure and the performance-based compensation system have positive relationships with firm value. Their effects on the various components of the firm value, however, are not uniform. While the Age/Wage structure contributes to the firm value through enhancement of ROA and cost reduction and improvement of labor-productivity, the performance- based compensation system also does through sales growth. These results imply that Korean firms use performance-based compensation mainly for the growth of the firm, not for improvement of the operational efficiency. This study differs from the previous studies at least in two ways. First, while the previous studies use macro data mainly collected from financial statements, this study uses actual employees-wage data and performance-based compensation data covering 20 plus years. Secondly, this study investigates the effects of incentive systems on the various components of the firm value where other studies focus on the firm value only. By analyzing the components of the firm value and the routes of the firm value enhancement process, this study can contribute to the microscopic design of an optimal monitoring system.

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