신제도주의 경제학과 공공정책 = New Institutional Economics and Public Policy

국문 초록 (Abstract)

사회적 딜레마 혹은 집단행동의 딜레마문제를 해결하기 위한 정부의 노력은 정책대안에 대한 분석을 통해 최적의 대안을 선택하는 것이다. 이 경우, 전통적인 정책분석은 개인에 대한 완전한 합리성(complete rationality)과 이기적 선호에 기초하여 진행되어왔다. 이는 기존 게임이론의 입장과 일맥상통한다. 이 입장에서는 정책분석을 통해 바람직한 사회적 상태를 가져올 것이라고 예측되는 정책을 도입하게 되면 개인의 행위유인이 변화하고 거기에 따라 정책이 의도하는 목적을 잘 달성할 수 있다. 반면, 타인에 대해 배려할줄 알고(other-regarding), 규범을 사용하며(norm using), 전통과 관습의 영향으로부터 자유롭지 못한 개인이라는, 보다 현실적인 인간에 대한 가정에 기초한 정책분석은 앞의 입장을 완화한 것이다. 신제도주의 경제학(institutional economics)은 행위를 설명함에 있어서 인간이 지닌 이타적 속성, 강한 상호성을 고려해야 하고 행동규준, 관습, 문화 등과 같은 제도적 제약을 고려해야 한다고 주장한다. 이러한 입장을 취할 경우 기존 게임이론에서의 사회적 균형상태인 내쉬균형(NE, Nash Equilibrium)은 더 이상 균형이 아니다. 인간을 제한된 합리성을 지닌, 규범을 사용하는 존재로 보는 이론에서는 완전한 합리성에 기초한 모든 정책은 실패할 가능성이 있는 실험이라고 본다. 이러한 문제의식을 가지고 신제도주의 경제학의 시각을 정책분석에 도입할 경우 얻을 수 있는 함의에 대해 이론적 측면에서 살펴본 후, 간단한 사례에 적용해보았다. 여기서 얻게 되는 이론적 통찰은 향후 정책사례를 분석하는데 유용하게 활용될 수 있을 것이다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

In confrontation with social dilemmas or collective action problems it is quite natural for the government to compare among various policy options and to choose the best alternative out of them. The conventional policy analysis, however, seems to be based on the premise of perfect rationality and self-centeredness of the individual actors. This is also one of the foundations on which the conventional game theory has been built. According to this view, the introduction of a new policy changes the motivations of individual actors and thus the social outcome therefrom. The individuals in the real world tend to show other-regarding preferences, follow social norms, and be bounded by customs and conventions, though. The policy analysis based on such a realistic individual is likely to lead us to more valid policy choices and implementations. The new institutional economics claims that one has to consider not only altruistic as well as reciprocal attitude of the human beings, but the institutional constraints such as the rules of action, cultural conventions and customs. If we follow this new way of thinking, the concept of Nash Equilibrium may be no longer proper in the explanation and prediction of individual behavior. According to the new thought the conventional policy analysis is misleading or even wrong for the reasons of its strong postulate of unbounded rationality and selfishness of the individuals, which probably leads to a government failure. In this paper we take the policy failure into account and theoretically investigate how to successfully make a policy formula, giving a due consideration to the institutional constraints the human beings seem to be put under. We then apply this formula to various simplistic cases to check the policy failures and successes.

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