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    감사인의 감사 및 비감사 보수와 고객기업의 보수적 회계처리 수준 사이의 관계 = The Association between Abnormal Audit and Non-Audit Fees and Conservatism of Client Firms

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    https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A95938594

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    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    This study examines the association between abnormal audit and non-audit fees and the audit quality measured by the magnitude of the accounting conservatism. Abnormal audit or non-audit fees imply the level of fees in excess of the normal level of fees. If auditors receive excessive level of fees - either audit or non-audit fees, auditors may impair audit quality to maintain close relationship with clients to receive the fees continuously. Since the Enron incident and subsequent collapse of Arthur Andersen which occurred at year 2001, regulators have great concern if the excessive non-audit service impairs audit quality or financial reporting quality. Many studies also have investigated this issue either empirically or theoretically. Empirical studies use various proxy for the audit quality but the results up to now are mixed at best. However, not many studies examines the role of excessive audit fees in this context. This study extends the prior research and examines both audit and non-audit fees with respect to the magnitude of accounting conservatism of the client firms. If excessive fees impair the audit quality, auditors may allow client firms to engage in aggressive accounting practices which result in lesser magnitude of the conservatism. In this study, the conservatism implies the degree that how quickly the financial statements reflect economic losses compared with economic gains. This is the concept that first introduced by Basu(1997) and adopted by various accounting research subsequently. But surprisingly, none of the prior studies try to link the conservatism measures with respect to audit fees. Like excessive non-audit fees impair auditor independence, excessive audit fees could impair the auditor independence in the same way. This study is intended to explore this possibility. In addition, after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, the provision of non-audit service to clients by auditors are strictly prohibited or throughly monitored in the U.S. Similarly, Financial Supervisory Service of Korea (equivalent to the Securities and Exchange Commission of the U.S.) also regulate auditors` provision of the non-audit service. Thus, auditors could be very careful when they provide non-audit service to their audit clients. Media and academics also have greate concern on the effect of non-audit service. However, the concern on audit service has not been changed much. We expect that this study fills the void in this area. Moreover, because we do not know on ex ante basis if total fees or excess fees which are defined by the difference between total fees and normal level of fees are related to the auditor`s incntive which could influence the audit quality, we use both measures in our analyses. This study uses 3,483 firm-year observations collected over 2000 to 2005 period. We collect all the non-financial industry observations as long as all the necessary data are available and the firm has December fiscal year-end. In the analyses, the magnitude of the conservatism is measured by Ball and Shivakumar`s (2005, 2006) methods. The measure was developed most recently and known as the superior method to Basu`s (1997) measure of conservatism which has been used mostly frequently in prior studies. Specifically, the conservatism measure developed by Ball and Shivakumar(2005, 2006) is based on three different models: cash model, Dichev and Dechow(2002) model, and Jones(1991) model. We use all of those three models in our analyses in order to show the robustness of our empirical findings. To perform empirical analyses, we follow the following procedures. First, we measure excessive level of audit and non-audit fees by estimating normal level of fees. To do so, we regress the determinants of audit and non-audit fees to find out the coefficients on each determinants. Using the estimated models, we calculate the normal level of the fees by plugging the values of each variables into the model. The abnormal fees are measured by the difference between actual fees minus the estimated normal fees for both audit and non-audit fees, respectively. Second, we add the abnormal fees in the conservatism models to see if the level of conservatism changes depending on the level of abnormal fees. The empirical results reveal that the financial statements become less conservative as both abnormal audit or non-audit fees increase. These results are robust in various sensitivity analyses. In addition, the level of audit and non-audit fees themselves are also negatively associated with the degree of conservatism. These results imply that higher level of both audit and non-audit fees could impair audit quality or financial reporting quality. Because the findings in this study are different from those in Ruddock et al.`s (2006) study, which show that the non-audit fees are not associated with Basu`s (1997) measrue of conservatism, we try to replicate Ruddock et al.`s (2006) finding. We find that the Basu`s (1997) conservatism measure is significantly associated with neither audit nor nonaudit fees in our sample firms. These inconsistency suggests that our initial significant results are due to the use of Ball and Shivakumar`s (2005, 2006) measure of conservatism, which is known to be a better measure than Basu`s (1997) measure. These findings provide several valuable insights into the effect of audit and nonaudit fees toward regulators, practitioners, investors, as well as academics.
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    This study examines the association between abnormal audit and non-audit fees and the audit quality measured by the magnitude of the accounting conservatism. Abnormal audit or non-audit fees imply the level of fees in excess of the normal level of fee...

    This study examines the association between abnormal audit and non-audit fees and the audit quality measured by the magnitude of the accounting conservatism. Abnormal audit or non-audit fees imply the level of fees in excess of the normal level of fees. If auditors receive excessive level of fees - either audit or non-audit fees, auditors may impair audit quality to maintain close relationship with clients to receive the fees continuously. Since the Enron incident and subsequent collapse of Arthur Andersen which occurred at year 2001, regulators have great concern if the excessive non-audit service impairs audit quality or financial reporting quality. Many studies also have investigated this issue either empirically or theoretically. Empirical studies use various proxy for the audit quality but the results up to now are mixed at best. However, not many studies examines the role of excessive audit fees in this context. This study extends the prior research and examines both audit and non-audit fees with respect to the magnitude of accounting conservatism of the client firms. If excessive fees impair the audit quality, auditors may allow client firms to engage in aggressive accounting practices which result in lesser magnitude of the conservatism. In this study, the conservatism implies the degree that how quickly the financial statements reflect economic losses compared with economic gains. This is the concept that first introduced by Basu(1997) and adopted by various accounting research subsequently. But surprisingly, none of the prior studies try to link the conservatism measures with respect to audit fees. Like excessive non-audit fees impair auditor independence, excessive audit fees could impair the auditor independence in the same way. This study is intended to explore this possibility. In addition, after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, the provision of non-audit service to clients by auditors are strictly prohibited or throughly monitored in the U.S. Similarly, Financial Supervisory Service of Korea (equivalent to the Securities and Exchange Commission of the U.S.) also regulate auditors` provision of the non-audit service. Thus, auditors could be very careful when they provide non-audit service to their audit clients. Media and academics also have greate concern on the effect of non-audit service. However, the concern on audit service has not been changed much. We expect that this study fills the void in this area. Moreover, because we do not know on ex ante basis if total fees or excess fees which are defined by the difference between total fees and normal level of fees are related to the auditor`s incntive which could influence the audit quality, we use both measures in our analyses. This study uses 3,483 firm-year observations collected over 2000 to 2005 period. We collect all the non-financial industry observations as long as all the necessary data are available and the firm has December fiscal year-end. In the analyses, the magnitude of the conservatism is measured by Ball and Shivakumar`s (2005, 2006) methods. The measure was developed most recently and known as the superior method to Basu`s (1997) measure of conservatism which has been used mostly frequently in prior studies. Specifically, the conservatism measure developed by Ball and Shivakumar(2005, 2006) is based on three different models: cash model, Dichev and Dechow(2002) model, and Jones(1991) model. We use all of those three models in our analyses in order to show the robustness of our empirical findings. To perform empirical analyses, we follow the following procedures. First, we measure excessive level of audit and non-audit fees by estimating normal level of fees. To do so, we regress the determinants of audit and non-audit fees to find out the coefficients on each determinants. Using the estimated models, we calculate the normal level of the fees by plugging the values of each variables into the model. The abnormal fees are measured by the difference between actual fees minus the estimated normal fees for both audit and non-audit fees, respectively. Second, we add the abnormal fees in the conservatism models to see if the level of conservatism changes depending on the level of abnormal fees. The empirical results reveal that the financial statements become less conservative as both abnormal audit or non-audit fees increase. These results are robust in various sensitivity analyses. In addition, the level of audit and non-audit fees themselves are also negatively associated with the degree of conservatism. These results imply that higher level of both audit and non-audit fees could impair audit quality or financial reporting quality. Because the findings in this study are different from those in Ruddock et al.`s (2006) study, which show that the non-audit fees are not associated with Basu`s (1997) measrue of conservatism, we try to replicate Ruddock et al.`s (2006) finding. We find that the Basu`s (1997) conservatism measure is significantly associated with neither audit nor nonaudit fees in our sample firms. These inconsistency suggests that our initial significant results are due to the use of Ball and Shivakumar`s (2005, 2006) measure of conservatism, which is known to be a better measure than Basu`s (1997) measure. These findings provide several valuable insights into the effect of audit and nonaudit fees toward regulators, practitioners, investors, as well as academics.

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    참고문헌 (Reference)

    1 문상혁, "정보비대칭성에 따른 보수주의의 차별적 인식" 한국회계학회 31 (31): 215-242, 2006

    2 최종학, "감사인의 피감사인에 대한 경제적 의존도가 감사인의 독립성에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 30 (30): 121-154, 2005

    3 Rho, J. H., "What are Adequate Audit Fees and Audit Hours? A Survey Finding" 17 (17): 1-26, 2008

    4 Bhattacharya, U., "The World Price of Earnings Opacity" 78 (78): 641-678, 2003

    5 Kim, J. O., "The Role of Foreign Investor Firms on Financial Reporting and Audit Quality of Korean Firms" 32 (32): 55-88, 2007

    6 Ball, R., "The Role of Accruals in Asymmetrically Timely Gain and Loss Recognition" 44 (44): 207-242, 2006

    7 Ahmed A, "The Role of Accounting Conservatism in Mitigating Bondholder-Shareholder Conflicts over Dividend Policy and in Reducing Debt Costs" 77 : 867-890, 2002

    8 Frankel, R, "The Relation between Auditors' Fees for Non-Audit Services and Earnings Quality" 77 : 77-105, 2002

    9 Dechow, P, "The Relation Between Earnings and Cash Flows" 25 : 131-214, 1998

    10 Dechow, P, "The Quality of Accruals and Earnings: The Role of Accrual Estimation Errors" 77 : 35-59, 2002

    1 문상혁, "정보비대칭성에 따른 보수주의의 차별적 인식" 한국회계학회 31 (31): 215-242, 2006

    2 최종학, "감사인의 피감사인에 대한 경제적 의존도가 감사인의 독립성에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 30 (30): 121-154, 2005

    3 Rho, J. H., "What are Adequate Audit Fees and Audit Hours? A Survey Finding" 17 (17): 1-26, 2008

    4 Bhattacharya, U., "The World Price of Earnings Opacity" 78 (78): 641-678, 2003

    5 Kim, J. O., "The Role of Foreign Investor Firms on Financial Reporting and Audit Quality of Korean Firms" 32 (32): 55-88, 2007

    6 Ball, R., "The Role of Accruals in Asymmetrically Timely Gain and Loss Recognition" 44 (44): 207-242, 2006

    7 Ahmed A, "The Role of Accounting Conservatism in Mitigating Bondholder-Shareholder Conflicts over Dividend Policy and in Reducing Debt Costs" 77 : 867-890, 2002

    8 Frankel, R, "The Relation between Auditors' Fees for Non-Audit Services and Earnings Quality" 77 : 77-105, 2002

    9 Dechow, P, "The Relation Between Earnings and Cash Flows" 25 : 131-214, 1998

    10 Dechow, P, "The Quality of Accruals and Earnings: The Role of Accrual Estimation Errors" 77 : 35-59, 2002

    11 Ball R, "The Effect of International Institutional Factors on Properties of Accounting Earnings" 29 : 1-51, 2000

    12 Basu S, "The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings" 24 : 3-37, 1997

    13 Givoly D, "The Changing Time-series Properties of Earnings, cash Flows and Accruals: Has Financial Accounting Become More Conservative?" 29 : 1285-1331, 2000

    14 Choi, J. -H, "The Association between Audit Quality and Abnormal Audit Fees" Seoul National University 2007

    15 Ruddock, C., "Non-Audit Services and Earnings Conservatism: Is Auditor Independence Impaired?" 23 (23): 701-746, 2006

    16 Pope, P. F, "International Differences in the Timeliness, Conservatism and Classification of Earnings" 37 : 53-87, 1999

    17 Ball, R, "Incentive versus Standards: Properties of Accounting Income in Four East Asian Countries" 36 (36): 235-270, 2003

    18 Larcker, D, "Fees Paid to Audit Firms, Accrual Choices, and Corporate Governance" 42 : 625-658, 2004

    19 Kwon, S. Y., "Effect of Non-audit Service on the Auditor’s Independence" 29 (29): 249-280, 2004

    20 Ball, R., "Earnings quality in UK private firms: comparative loss recognition timeliness" 39 (39): 83-128, 2005

    21 Jones,J.J., "Earnings Management during Import Relief Investigations" 29 : 193-228, 1991

    22 Park, J. -I, "Does Non-Audit Service Com-promise Auditor Independence?" 28 (28): 141-176, 2003

    23 DeFond, M, "Do Non-Audit Services Fees Impair Auditor Independence? Evidence from Going Concern Audit Opinions" 40 : 1247-1274, 2002

    24 Ashbaugh, H, "Do Non-Audit Services Compromise Auditor Independence? Further Evidence" 78 : 611-639, 2003

    25 Dechow, P, "Detecting Earnings Management" 70 : 193-225, 1995

    26 Gigler, F. B, "Conservatism, Optimal Disclosure Policy, and the Timeliness of Financial Reports" 76 : 471-493, 2001

    27 Watts R. L., "Conservatism in Accounting Part I: Explanations and Implications" 17 (17): 207-221, 2003

    28 Chung, H., "Clint Importance, Non-Audit Services, and Abnormal Accruals" 78 (78): 931-955, 2003

    29 Park, J., "Changes in Earnings Timeliness and Conservatism Due to the Accounting Reform After the 1997 Korean Financial Crisis" 1-26, 2005

    30 Carcello, J., "Board Characteristics and Audit Fees" 19 (19): 365-384, 2002

    31 Craswell, A, "Auditor Independence and Fee Dependence" 33 : 253-275, 2002

    32 Choi, J. - H., "Audit Pricing, Legal Liability Regimes, and Big 4 Premiums: Theory and Cross-country Evidence" 25 (25): 55-99, 2008

    33 Dietrich, R, "Asymmetric Timeliness Tests of Accounting Conservatism" 12 (12): 95-124, 2007

    34 Choi, J. - H., "A Critical Review and Suggestions on Future Studies on the Research about the Relationship between Non-Audit Service Provisions and Auditor Independence" 23 (23): 1-46, 2008

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