This study examines if efficient internal monitoring system increases reliance on information of voluntary disclosure. Specifically with a characteristic of the outside directors, a typical internal monitoring system introduced after the 1997 korean f...
This study examines if efficient internal monitoring system increases reliance on information of voluntary disclosure. Specifically with a characteristic of the outside directors, a typical internal monitoring system introduced after the 1997 korean financial crisis we determine if it has relevance with optimistic preliminary earnings which is announced voluntarily ahead of time by the press. As a result of the study, first, as the independency of the Board is lower, in other words, as the ratio of outside directors in the Board is lower, there is a tendency to announce the optimistic preliminary earnings. Second, as the activity of the outside directors is lower, in other words, as attendance of the outside directors is lower, there is a tendency to announce the optimistic preliminary earnings. However, We don't find relevance of the competence of the outside directors. Last, We find that the firms which are audited by a Big accounting firm which is considered to provide high quality of audit service, closing earnings is smaller than preliminary earnings. This confirms the results of the prior research that relative large responsibility of compensation for damage makes the Big accounting firm to enforce more conservative audit to reduce risk of inspection related to financial statement errors (Beaver 1993; Simunic and Stein 1987; PaekYoo 2005).In the raising interest of accounting transparencies and public announcements, the results of this study can provide beneficial information to the academic and administrative work by verifying differences in reliance of voluntary disclosure of CEO depends on constitution and management of the outside directors in the Board, in other words, the efficiency of internal monitoring system.