실체적 속성으로서의 진리의 개념과 역할 = The Concept and Role of Truth as Inflationary Property

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

There are various views in the boundary of deflationism of truth in regarding the nature and role of truth. This paper surveys the issue on how the core thesis uniting the deflationism is characterized. First, I will examine some comments on what is the central thesis supported or rejected by the deflationists and inflationists, mainly discussing Armour-Garb and Beall`s work, and will show on which aspects they are unsatisfying. From this, I will suggest these statements: first, the central cores of deflationism are conceptual fundamentality and explanatory exhausting. Second, the particularity thesis, understood in an alternative way, cannot be a central claim of deflationism. Third, another important claim from deflationists, the expression thesis, can be derived from the two main thesis above. But it is still not clear enough what the non-expressive explanatory role of truth, which is denied by the expression thesis. So I will check some possible clarifications on it and discuss why they should be rejected. And I will introduce Dummett`s view on the role of truth condition in truth conditional explanation of meaning, and I will claim that if Dummett is right why the role must be a inflated one. Finally, I will suggest a further implication that the understanding on the both sides can be widened by connecting considerations on both views.

참고문헌 (Reference)

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